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Section 1. Part A.
An examination of Wittgenstein's views on religion in the
Tractatus period of his philosophy with particular attention
being given to the mystical themes and topics of that philo¬
sophy; it being argued that such themes and topics play a
central role and have an integral part in that philosophy.
Section 1. Part 6.
An examination of Wittgenstein's later theory of meaning
and conception of philosophy, culminating in a detailed exami¬
nation of Wittgenstein's Lectures on Religious Belief.
Section 2
A critical survey of the writings of certain Wittgen-
steinian philosophers of religion (D. Z. Phillips, P. Winch,
R. Holland, N. Malcolm, and R. Rhees) examining how they apply
Wittgenstein's later epistemology to religious belief and con¬
cepts - noting in particular what they have to say about the
'grammar of the reality of God'. Particular emphasis is
placed on the work of Phillips and specific attention is paid
to Phillips' use of certain 'mystical* themes and topics from
Wittgenstein's Tractatus period of philosophy to give a content
to, a characterization of what is involved in participating in
the religious life - seeing or viewing the world in a religious
manner.
Section 3
A very brief section outlining certain difficulties in
the Wittgensteinian approach to problems in the philosophy of
religion and suggesting an alternative strategy which could be
developed from the 'later' philosophy of Wittgenstein and
applied to these same problems.
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In this essay I adopt the following convention for
citations:-
Double quotation marks represent a direct verbatim
quote with reference given.
Single quotation marks are used to refer to an
already quoted passage. I also use single quota¬
tion marks for imaginary dialogue.
INTRODUCTION
I think the following points should be noted, because
they are important in accounting for the particular direction,
the particular format of my essay.
I began iby research work with a passionate interest in
the work of D. Z. Phillips (1) in the field of philosophy of
religion. To be honest,I cannot say that I had an admiring
interest,but rather his thoughts intrigued me, baffled me,
upset, if you like, rby intellectual balance. I suppose I
thought I had all the answers. I saw point in the 'falsifica¬
tion challenge' to religion, I could understand and appreciate
what philosophers were saying when they doubted whether the
concept of God was a coherent notion, and yet, if what D. Z.
Phillips was saying was at all true, none of those challenges
seemed pertinent. The meaning of religious utterances, the
intelligibility of religious concepts, the very 'truth' of
religion, all were internal to the 'religious language-game',
the 'religious form of life', all of which were part of the
'given' and thus 'unjustifiable'. It seemed as if all my
old 'battles', all my old arguments were next to useless. I
found this infuriating, frustrating and yet one had to admit,
if one wanted to retain some intellectual honesty, that
Phillips' challenge had to be faced.
And it was not only Phillips' challenge. N. Malcolm (2),
a few years earlier, had surprised the philosophical world not
only by producing a 'new version' of Anselm's 'Ontological
Argument' but further, and more importantly, by apparently
'enlisting the support' of the notions of 'language-game' and
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•form of life' to further his end, i.e. prove the existence of
God. Also P. Winch in two publications,(3) in which the
suggestions were made that criteria of intelligibility,
rationality and reality were internal to, as he called them,
'modes of social life', added fuel to the fire.
Now in attempting to 'come to grips' with these gentle¬
men, it was obvious that I would have to turn and examine the
writings of the philosopher from whom they claimed their intel¬
lectual pedigree, i.e. Wittgenstein. It was in the works of
the 'later philosophy' of Wittgenstein that notions s\>cVi as
the 'meaning of a word is its use in the language-game', 'to
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life', 'forms
of life are given , - there, basic - like our life - beyond
justification (and indeed criticism)', were conceived. (4) But
furthermore, I discovered, it was not only to the 'later philo¬
sophy' of Wittgenstein that X was referred by such a
philosopher as Phillips. He also quoted quite extensively
from the 'mystical themes or sections' of the 'early philosophy'
of Wittgenstein. (5) This seemed, on the face of it, strange,
because wasn't it the case,as Wittgenstein would have us
believe, that the 'later philosophy' was a complete rejection
of the 'early philosophy', its antithesis if you like? And
yet here was Phillips quoting extensively from both 'philo¬
sophies'. So I not only turned to examine the 'later philosophy'
but also the 'early philosophy'. And what a wealth of detail
I found in the 'two philosophies'.
In my examination of the 'early philosophy' I discovered
not only (a) the importance of the mystical theme in that
philosophy but also (b) the real nature of the 'logical' theory
of meaning Wittgenstein was presenting us with (as opposed to
what the Logical Positivist interpretation of the 'early philo¬
sophy' would have us believe). I also saw clearly why,for
Wittgenstein,religious propositions were inexpressible and
also found, especially in the later sections of the Notebooks
(6) some very interesting comments on, among others, the idea
of God, ethics, the meaning of life and immortality. So I
devote the First Section of ray essay to an examination of the
'early and late philosophies' of Wittgenstein and the views on
religion he expressed in these periods.
I mentioned that my original interest in examining the
'early philosophy' of Wittgenstein was first aroused because
of Phillips' use of some of the 'mystical themes' in that
philosophy. Indeed it seems to me that one could label
Phillips' 'religious philosophy' as a 'marriage' of the 'later
philosophy' of Wittgenstein with the 'mystical themes' of the
'early philosophy'. Let me quickly and very briefly explain
what I mean, though I shall say more in the text. It seems to
me that what Phillips obtains from the later philosophy is a
certain theoretical framework - the notions of 'language-game',
'form of life', the nature and role of philosophy-and this he
applies to religion so that, for example, we have 'religious
language-games', 'religious forms of life' etc. But the
content, the characterization he provides of what is involved
in participating in the 'religious form of life', what it means
to view the world in a religious fashion, is found, discovered
in certain of the 'mystical themes' of the 'early philosophy*.
That is, to put it rather loosely, the Tractatus 'mystic' is
aKi-n in -ma.-ny respects to Phillips' ideal or paradigm religious
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man. So in the Second Section of my essay I examine how the
notions of 'language-game', 'form of life' etc. are applied to
religious discourse, religious thought by those, I have termed,
Wittgensteinians.
But who are the Wittgensteinians? Well, I have already
mentioned Phillips, Malcolm and Winch and I would also like to
include in their number Push Rhees and R. F. Holland. But it
must be emphasised that this 'Wittgensteinian school of reli¬
gious thought' is in a very undeveloped state. Apart from
Phillips who has written extensively, Malcolm has simply
written two articles, Winch has published two works which have
small portions which bear on the topic, Holland has written
two articles which are relevant (7) and there are three chap¬
ters in Rhees' latest book which are relevant. (8) Hardly the
•meat of a systematic school' and yet,I think, there is a
certain identity of viewpoint, a certain 'family resemblance'
between them such that one can feel confident that,while they
may not all agree heartily with what the others say, they
will not disagree too much either. But it must be admitted
that,insofar as Phillips has written the most extensively on
the topics I am going to discuss,it will primarily be Phillips
I shall be interested in, and attacking.
My Second Section begins by examining Malcolm's revised
Ontological Argument article - and here I am mainly interested
in the role played by the Wittgensteinian notions of 'language-
game' and 'form of life' - and continues to critically examine
what,for me,provides the greatest fascination in relation to
the Wittgensteinians' philosophy of religion; their 'doctrine'
of God, their account 'of the grammar of the reality of God',
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of what it means to affirm God as 'real'. I conclude this
section by examining some work of Phillips on the nature of
religious belief and truth and some comments on philosophy.
In my very brief Third Section, instead of accepting the
Wittgensteinian use of Wittgenstein's notions of, for example,
•language-game', 'form of life' etc., and critically examining
their, if you like, 'doctrinal theology', as in Section 2, I
turn to^at least, present certain difficulties facing the
Wittgensteinian approach to problems in the philosophy of reli¬
gion and very briefly suggest an alternative strategy which
could be developed from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein
and applied to these particular problems.
I am aware that I may have attempted to tackle too many
themes for one essay. I admit this 'fault' from the outset.
Yet I do feel there is a certain unity in my essay. However




"My work has extended from the foundations of
logic to the nature of the world." (1)
Russell: "Wittgenstein, are you thinking
about logic or about your sins?"
Wittgenstein: "Both!" (2)
Ludwig Wittgenstein concludes the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (3) by referring very briefly and very tersely to
the notion of the mystical (das Mystische). The introduction
of the notion into the text is connected with some equally brief
comments on solipsism, ethics, God, aesthetics, the meaning or
purpose of life and eternity-all of which have this at least in
common,tWaAr they are apparently the object of the 'mystical
feeling'. But what does Wittgenstein mean by his use of the
expression, the mystical? The following four propositions con¬
tain Wittgenstein's references to the mystical in the Tractatus
and in the Notebooks. "It is not how things are in the world
that is mystical, but that it exists." (4) "To view the world
sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is
mystical." (5) "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put
into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is
mystical." (6) (This remark should also be linked with another
proposition in the Tractatus, "What can be shown, cannot be said.
(7)) And finally: "The urge tov/ards the mystical comes of the
non-satisfaction of our wishes by science." (8)
From these propositions we can understand that the
mystical is concerned not with how the world is but with that it
is. Further, to be thus concerned is to view or feel the
world 'sub specie aeterni', which is identical with viewing or
feeling it as a limited whole and this is what constitutes the
mystical. Further, that which is mystical cannot be stated
but can only be shown or made manifest. Finally, we learn that
the genesis of the mystical urge or feeling is to be found in
the inability of science to satisfy our deepest needs.
It certainly seems that for Wittgenstein the mystical is
a very important concept. And yet,in the Tractatus,we are told
that "the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all." (9)
"Even when all possible scientific questions have been answered,
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course
there are then no questions left and this itself is the answer."
(10) This is so,because "the totality of true propositions is
the whole of natural science," (11) and,further,because
"what can be said are the propositions of natural
science i.e., something that has nothing to do
with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else
wanted to say something metaphysical, to demon¬
strate to him that he had failed to give a
meaning to certain signs in his propositions." (12)
Or again,
"when the answer cannot be put into words,
neither can the question, be put into words.
The middle does not exist. If a question can
be framed at all, it is also possible to
answer it." (13)
- 2 -
"The solution of the problem of life is seen
in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this
the reason why those who have found after a
long period of doubt that the sense of life
became clear to them have then been unable to
say what constituted that sense?)" (1*0
Now the immediate problem one is faced with here is how
does one equate Wittgenstein's talk of the mystical and the
connected themes with the above comments? Certainly if one is
positivistically inclined,i.e. a logical Positivist ,there is
no essential problem. Because if, as Wittgenstein claims, the
mystical is inexpressible in principle and, further, the problem
of the meaning of life is in fact a pseudo-problem,then what
this demonstrates is that talk about the sense or purpose of
life is 'nonsense talk'. And yet can Wittgenstein really have
wanted to draw such a negative conclusion? Doesn't he maintain,
as we have seen, that 'the sense of life can become clear' even
though one may be unable to 'say what constituted that sense..'?
What it would appear Wittgenstein shares with the Positivists
is a willingness to draw a line between, on the one hand, what
we can speak about and, on the other hand, what we must be silent
about. But,as Engelmann expresses it:
"The difference is only that they (the Positi¬
vists) have nothing to be silent about,
Positivism holds - and this is its essence -
that what we can speak about is all that
matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein
passionately believes that all that really
matters in human life is precisely what, in
his view we must be silent about." (15)
Indeed in a letter to Ficker,Wittgenstein ; in further enun¬
ciation of this idea,states:
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"The book's point is an ethical one. I once
meant to include in the preface a sentence
which is not in fact there now but which I
will write out for you here because it will
perhaps be a key to the work for you. What
I want to write, then, was this: My work con¬
sists of two parts: the one presented here
plus all that I have not written. And it is
precisely this second part that is the
important one. My book draws limits to the
sphere of the ethical from the inside as it
were and I am convinced that this is the only
rigorous way of drawing these limits. In
short, I believe that where many others today
are just gassing, I have managed in my book
to put everything firmly into place by being
silent about it." (16)
Indeed further on in this same letter Wittgenstein recommends
that one should read the preface and the conclusion of the book
because they contain its most direct expression. And there the
point is forcefully made in the following terms: "The whole
sense of the book might be summed up in the following words:
what can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot
talk about we must pass over in silence." (17)
Within the text of the Tractatus itself the point which
Wittgenstein is trying to make is perhaps best expressed when
he sayd:
"The sense of the world must lie outside the
world. In the world everything is as it is,
and everything happens as it does happen: in
it no value exists - and if it did exist it
would have no value. If there is any value
that does have value, it must lie outside the
whole sphere of what happens and is the case.
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For all that happens and is the case is
accidental. What makes it non-accidental
cannot lie within the world, since if it did
it would itself be accidental. It must lie
outside the world." (18)
Or again: "How things are in the world is a matter of complete
indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself
in the world." (19) "Ethics is transcendental." (20 )
Now I mentioned above that Wittgenstein draws a line
between, on the one hand, what we can speak about and, on the
other hand, what we cannot speak about. But to draw such a line
requires that one have in mind a particular theory or account of
what it is for words to be used meaningfully, what is involved
in language having or being given successful application to the
world. And indeed the greater part of the Tractatus is concerned
with the nature of language and its relation to the world. The
central doctrine propounded on this topic is the famous 'picture
theory of meaning'. According to this theory, language consists
of propositions which picture the world. Propositions are the
perceptible expressions of thoughts, and thoughts are logical
pictures of facts. (21)
Thus,to make clear why 'ethics is transcendental' for
Wittgenstein,it will be necessary to examine further the 'picture
theory of meaning' - the theory of the significant proposition.
In doing this I also hope to refute any positivistic suggestion
that the 'picture theory of meaning* is an 'empirical theory of
meaning', either in fact or in embryo,and the concurrent claim
that the references to the mystical in the Tractatus are best
thought of as an addendum to the main text of the book - a
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regrettable addendum in that it would run counter to any truly
positivistic understanding of the world,- but an addendum never¬
theless. (22) Now it seems to me that if Wittgenstein's
Tractatus is interpreted in this fashion nothing but misunder¬
standing can result. Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning'
is not an 'empiricist theory of meaning' and Wittgenstein's
conception of the mystical is not a mere addendum to the main
text of the book, but in fact is central to a complete under¬
standing of the text. Thus,in presenting 'Wittgenstein's claims
here,I shall be concerned to argue against the Logical Positivists
on these two counts.
Further, my discussion and suggestions so far concerning
the mystical may have given the erroneous impression that
Wittgenstein only alludes to mystical themes at the end of the
book. In fact a 'vision' of the world as a limited whole, and
the say/show distinction (which has been aptly labelled as the
'semantic aspect of Wittgenstein's mysticism'), all essential
components of Wittgenstein's conception of the mystical, permeate
the whole work. Further too, it is not only Ethics 'that cannot
be put into words and which is transcendental' but also "logic
is transcendental." (23) In fact Wittgenstein's assertion that
•logic is transcendental' follows simply from his theory of
logic so that not only logic but also philosophy are inexpressible.
Indeed, given that the Tractatus is a philosophical treatise working
through the medium of logic it can at least be envisaged how
important, crucial and integral a role the concept of the
mystical plays in the work. As Wittgenstein states:
"... my main contention to which the whole
business of logical propositionSis only
corollary. The main point is the theory of
what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions
- i.e. by language (and, what comes to the
same, what can be thought) and what cannot be
expressed by propositions but only shown
(gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal
problem of philosophy ..." (2k)
Indeed Engelmann,commenting on the unity of the work, on
the interconnection between logic and ethics,says, "... on the
one hand the unutterable lies in the relations between language
and the world ('the outside world') so, on the other hand does
it lie in the relation between language and the world of
intuitive values." (25) As an actual account of the inter¬
connection between logic and ethics for Wittgenstein I believe
Engelmann's statement misses the mark,but it will suffice as a
first approximation. Rather,it seems to me,the 'Tractarian
mystic' views the world as a whole and in so doing 'sees* the
general nature of reality with logic providing the key (logic)
and,having discovered the 'general nature of reality', places
himself in agreement with it (ethical).
However,all this is just to adumbrate what will have to
be argued for. To enable me to demonstrate and more impor¬
tantly establish my point I shall examine not only the
Tractatus but also the Notebooks (26) (and especially the sections
in the Notebooks referring to God, ethics, eternity etc., themes
which although mentioned in the Tractatus are much better under¬
stood if examined within the context of the more voluminous
treatment of them given in the Notebooks) and Wittgenstein's
'Lecture on Ethics' and 'Notes on talks with Waismann'. (2?)
My main aims in this section are,firstly, to give an
- 7 -
account of 'Tractarian mysticism' illustrating its central role
and the integral part it plays in the text of the Tractatus,
.Secondly^ to refute the Logical Positivists' interpretation of
the Tractatus and, thirdly, to specifically illustrate why, for
Wittgenstein, there can be no significant ethical or religious
propositions (i.e. why ethics and religion are ineffable).
I shall begin,however, with a statement of Wittgenstein's
'picture theory of meaning'.
I think it is obvious that one central concern of
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is with the problem of sense.
As we have already seen, Wittgenstein states in the Preface to
Tractatus that the 'whole sense of the book is summed up in
the following manner: what can be said at all can be said
clearly, and what cannot be talked about must be passed over in
silence.' Prior to his stating this he also claims that "the
book deals with the problems of philosophyf problems which are
posed because "the logic of our language is misunderstood." (28)
It is because of this that it is important for Wittgenstein to
"set a limit to the expression of thoughts," (29) to state
explicitly the limits of language - what can be said with sense
and what cannot. What conditions ,then, must a proposition
satisfy to be considered meaningful?
To explicate these conditions let me first begin by
examining certain ontological claims made by Wittgenstein at
the beginning of the Tractatus. There?Wittgenstein claims,
"the world is the totality of facts, not of things." (30) And
a fact for 'Wittgenstein is "the existence of states of affairs."
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(31) Nov/ a state of affairs is constituted by objects "standing
in a determinate relation to one another." (32) What constitutes
objects standing in a determinate relation to one another is
their ability, in a state of affirs,to "fit into one another
like the links of a chain." (33) And the ability of objects to
'link together' to form states of affairs is a function of their
'form'. (3^) By the logical form of an object Wittgenstein
means the capacity of an object to combine with other objects
in states of affairs. Objects have different logical forms
when they have different possibilities of combination or
association. Further, for Wittgenstein, objects are the 'simples'
of the world and in fact "make up the substance of the world."
(35) They are, if you like, the 'stuff from which states of
affairs are constituted. Indeed to deny the existence of simple
objects would be to deny substance to the world and hence, most
importantly for Wittgenstein, the possibility of making
informative meaningful statements about the world. (36)
Now the states of affairs of which Wittgenstein is here
speaking are of an atomic or elementary form. That is, they are
the simplest kind of facts there are and they cannot be analysed
into anything more simple. (37) Now the reason behind the
Wittgensteinian claim that there are these atomic or elementary
facts or states of affairs (which consist essentially of concat¬
enations of objects) is I think quite simply elucidated. If
there were no elementary states of affairs, if all states of
affairs were reducible to simpler or more elementary states of
affairs, ad infinitum, no proposition would have determinate
sense. And "everything that can be put into words can be put
clearly." (38) If language has sense at all,that sense must be
determinate and this entails that there must be elementary pro¬
positions which are irreducible. (39)
Mow let me examine more closely the nature of these
elementary propositions - the linguistic side of the equation -
in a more detailed fashion. And here we find that language is
a mirror image of the world. Wittgenstein's elementary proposi¬
tions consist solely of names (40) which are simple,like
Wittgenstein's objects. (41) And the objects,which constitute
the atomic facts,are not only designated by names in the atomic
proposition but also the "object is its meaning." (42) Like
the states of affairs, the elementary propositions cannot be
reduced to anything simpler (43) and thus they assert the
existence of elementary states of affairs. (44) Indeed, for
Wittgenstein, the very possibility of language itself requires
the existence of (a) elementary propositions which cannot be
further analysed into yet simpler propositions and,(b) as
already stated, elementary propositions which consist entirely
of names. By using the term 'name' Wittgenstein means a term
which is unanalysable and indefinable. A name can have only
one relationship to reality: it either names something or is
not a significant symbol at all. To understand a name is to
understand its reference. And objects, the referents of names,
cannot be described or defined because,if they could,these
descriptions or definitions could be further analysable. And
if there were no simple objects we would end up,once again,in
an infinite regress situation. Therefore names are simples.
Also what has been said here, although said in connection with
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elementary propositions, applies to all propositions. This is
so because all non-elementary propositions are understood via
elementary ones,i.e. are analysable into them, are 'truth-
functions' of the elementary propositions. (^5) Therefore
elementary propositions are required which describe states of
affairs and these elementary propositions must,as we saw,
consist entirely of names which denote simple objects. (^-6)
Now so far in my exposition I have, on the language side
of the equation, talked about names and propositions. But for
Wittgenstein there is a very fundamental and technical difference
between how names and propositions signify. A name has meaning
(Bedeutung) while a proposition has sense (Sinn). And further,
it is "only in the context of a proposition that a name has
meaning." (^7) What Wittgenstein has in mind here is really
quite simple. Take the case of a proposition first of all. It
is quite obvious that there can be true or false propositions,
and one can understand a proposition which is true or false.
Indeed a necessary condition for ascribing truth or falsity -to
a proposition is that one understand what the proposition is
asserting. A name, however, for Wittgenstein, cannot have a
meaning unless there is an object corresponding to it. Not
only can a name only have meaning within "the nexus of a pro¬
position" but further the "object is its meaning." (^8)
But while this account makes it clear how names have
meaning,what does it mean to claim that a proposition has sense?
How do propositions relate to the situations or states of
affairs which they describe or represent? First of all, the
very possibility of propositions is "based on the principle
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that objects have signs as their representatives," (^9) and
Secondly , for Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is the
situation which it represents or pictures, "A proposition is a
picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know
the situation that it represents. And I understand the pro¬
position without having had its sense explained to me." (50)
But why should Wittgenstein claim that a proposition is a
picture of reality? Well,bearing in mind that the very possi¬
bility of propositions is based on the signs (names) in the
proposition acting as representatives for objects, it belongs to
the very essence of a proposition that "it should be able to
communicate a new sense to us", because a proposition must "use
old expressions to communicate a new sense." (51) We can con¬
struct new propositions by using the same words providing we
vary the way we combine the words. And in this manner "a
proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be
essentially connected with the situation. And the connexion is
precisely that it is its logical picture." (52) To understand
a new proposition is to 'read from it' the situation it describes.
Now we have reached the heart of Wittgenstein's theory of
meaning and it will be necessary,at this stage,to explicate in
more detail the nature of Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of
meaning'.
Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' has been taken
by some as an empiricist theory of meaning and knowledge.(53)
t
Professor Von Wright places Wittgenstein's concern in its
proper context. "It was the question of the nature of the
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significant proposition," and he justifies his claim here by-
quoting from Wittgenstein's Notebooks; "My whole task consists
in the explanation of the nature of the proposition." (5*0
Further,Von Wright relates a conversation in which Wittgenstein
stated how the 'picture theory of meaning* first imposed itself
on him.
"He was in a trench on the East Front, reading
a magazine in which there was a schematic
picture depicting the possible sequence of
events in an automobile accident. The picture
there served as a proposition; that is, as a
description of a possible state of affairs.
It had this function owing to a correspondence
between the parts of the picture and things
in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein
that one might reverse the analogy and say
that a proposition serves as a picture by
virtue of a similar correspondence between
its parts and the world. The way in which
the parts of the proposition are combined -
the structure of the proposition - depicts
a possible combination of elements in reality,
a possible state of affairs." (55)
Before continuing my exposition, I think,in passing,that
the following comment is justified. The ideas expressed in
this account of the 'origin* of the 'picture theory' must not
be assimilated to any 'naive realist epistemology' or any
'correspondence theory of truth' emanating from such an
epistemology. First of all,Wittgenstein is more interested in
the syntactical features of language than in any general
epistemological programme and,secondly, the 'picture theory' is
not intended to explain how we discover the truth or falsity of
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propositions. Rather its function is to explain how proposi¬
tions can have meaning. Indeed both true and false propositions
picture the same state of affairs. So far from presupposing an
empiricist epistemology, Wittgenstein is confident that he has
emancipated logic from psychology and epistemology. In fact
Wittgenstein holds that "theory of knowledge is the philosophy
of psychology" and "psychology is no more closely related to
philosophy than any other natural science." (56) Wittgenstein
is concerned solely with the sense of a proposition and he com¬
pletely divorces this concern from any examination of the ways
in which we come to know whether a proposition is true. (57)
How then, to continue, does an elementary proposition
picture reality? The pictorial aspect of an elementary proposi¬
tion is the arrangement of names: how names are arranged
(combined, related, structured) pictures how objects are
possibly arranged. (58) One has to say'possibly'here because
not every proposition pictures an actual arrangement or com¬
bination of objects,although every proposition pictures a
possible arrangement of objects. Every proposition has a sense
but not every proposition is true. Now we have seen how
Wittgenstein believed the 'picture theory' to account for our
ability to understand new propositions,but,further, Wittgenstein
also believes that,if the 'picture theory of meaning' is true,
we shall also be able to account for the problem of the false
proposition. This problem arises in the following manner. A
name, in Wittgenstein's sense of the term, is meaningless if
there is no object that it denotes. But a proposition,if it is
a false proposition,i.e. if there is no fact corresponding to
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it, is not senseless but false. (59) But how can a false pro¬
position retain its sense if, as we saw, the sense of a proposi¬
tion is 'the situation it describes'? Well the 'picture theory'
answers the problem in this fashion. It is true that what the
individual elements of an elementary proposition (the names)
signify must exist,but the actual arrangement or combination of
the names need not be exemplified in reality for the proposition
to have sense. What a false proposition signifies is simply a
non-existent combination of existent objects. And it accom¬
plishes this because,given a 'method of projection', the names
are arranged as the objects would be arranged or combined if
the' proposition were true. (60) So in one sense the combination
exists, though as a combination of names, not of what the
combination of names signifies.
Indeed,for Wittgenstein,a picture i£ a state of affairs
which represents a state of affirs. (60) It is because of this
that the picture as a whole can have sense,i.e. that it can
represent a "possible situation in logical space." (61) And it
can do this because the fact that the elements of a picture
"are related to one another in a determinate v/ay represents
that things are related to one another in the same way." For
V/ittgenstein this connexion of the elements can be called the
"structure of the picture" and the "possibility of this struc¬
ture the pictorial form of the picture." (63) The connexion
between the structure and form of a proposition and the
structure and form of what it represents is crucial, for
Wittgenstein,in representing what it means to claim that a
proposition is a picture. And,indeed,this is what one would
expect given that Wittgenstein is concerned to develop a logical
theory of meaning. Indeed propositions can picture reality
because of a logical structure and form common to both. (640
'■The structure of a picture must however be separated
from the picture itself. A picture is a structure and a pic¬
torial relationship,("the correlations of the pictures elements
with things'" (65)). And not only does a picture have a struc¬
ture but it must contain within itself the possibility of
that structure, and this Wittgenstein identifies as 'pictor¬
ial form'. (66) But as well as pictorial form,picture and
pictured must also share representational form. By represen¬
tational form Wittgenstein seems to refer to a conventional,
external (i.e. to the picture itself) stipulation or projection
linking the elements of the picture with the objects pictured.
(6?) But more fundamentally the very least which must be
common between pictured and picture, if language is to picture
reality, is logical form. "What any picture, of whatever form,
must have in common with reality, in order to be able to
depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is
logical form, i.e. the form of reality." (68) Unless the
'form of reality' is identical with the form of our pictures
of it we would be unable to construct pictures of reality.
The 'picture theory' thus involves an identity of structure
- 16 -
and a correlation of elements between the picture and the pic¬
tured. Now to speak of a correlation of elements is of course
to claim that there is a correspondence between each element of
the picture (of the propositional sign) (69) and each element
of the situation pictured. (70) But how does this apply to
'negative' facts? Is there a 'negative' element in propositions
corresponding to the 'negative' element in the facts! That is,
if one takes as an example of a proposition stating a negative
fact, 'the book is not on the desk', are we to say that the word
'not' names or stands for an object^ Now such an 'object', if
it existed, would be a representative for a logical constant -
other logical constants being 'is', 'or', 'if - then', 'some'
etc. For Wittgenstein,however,logical constants do not repre¬
sent . "My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are
not representatives; that there can be no representatives of
the logic of facts." (71) Such constants are not elements of
the picture but things we do with the picture. Thus there are
no negative facts. Now logical constants constitute the logical
form of propositions and so it follows that logical form as
such cannot be represented. "Propositions can represent the
whole of reality; but they cannot represent what they must have
in common with reality in order to be able to represent it -
logical form." (72)
Further,Wittgenstein introduces the adjective 'formal' to
refer to 'features' of logical form. And for Wittgenstein
'formal properties' and 'formal relations' are sharply distinct
from genuine properties and relations. Examples of such formal
properties and concepts are the concepts of 'complex', 'fact',
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'function', 'number'. (73) Formal concepts are contrasted with
'proper concepts' which can be "represented by means of a
function",(7*0 i.e. can be substituted for the variable x in a
propositional function. Formal concepts cannot be so substi¬
tuted and belong,rather,to the form of language. For to say of
anything that it is a function, fact, complex or name is to say
something which, if it could be true, would have no significant
denial. Such 'propositions' might then be said to be statements
about the limits of what can be said,in the sense that they
point to logical conditions of language and its application;
but because they do so point, they in another sense transgress
the limits of language for they fail the test of significant
denial. When something "falls under a formal concept as one of
its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition.
Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object. (A name
shows that it signifies an object)." (75) To ask "whether a
formal concept exists is nonsensical" for no proposition can
state what can be shown. (?6) Indeed for Wittgenstein neglect
of this distinction between "formal concepts and concepts
proper,..pervades the whole of traditional logic." (77) And it
is not only logic which is affected;indeed we are told
"most of the propositions and questions to be
found in philosophical works are not false but
nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any
answer to questions of this kind, but can only
establish that they are nonsensical. Most of
the propositions and questions of philosophers
arise from our failure to understand the logic
of our language." (78)
In so far as the statements of philosophy are attempts to
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articulate these formal, logical, features of language,without
which no proposition could be meaningfully asserted, they must
fail to make any significant statement.
"The correct method in philosophy would really
be the following: to say nothing except what
can be said, i.e. propositions of natural
science - i.e. something that has nothing to
do with philosophy - and then, whenever some¬
one else wanted to say something metaphysical,
to demonstrate to him that he had failed to
give a meaning to certain signs in his pro¬
positions." (79)
All this follows from an 'internal' examination of the
nature of a proposition as a picture,i.e. what does and does
not constitute a name in Wittgenstein's sense of the term, what
is and what is not a 'proper' concept and thus capable of
employment in propositions. But the same conclusions can be
reached if we examine more fully what is involved in proposi¬
tions picturing facts, where the sense of a proposition
consists in its truth conditions. We know what a proposition
means when we know what has to be the case if it is true. If
we know that then we simultaneously know what has to be the
case if it is false. For every true proposition there is some
determinate state of affairs that makes it true. If the truth
conditions are not satisfied the proposition is false. But
states of affairs are contingent facts. (80) Can there then be
propositions which picture necessities in the world? Wittgen¬
stein specifically rules this out (a) because "there is no a
priori order of things" and thus (b) "there are no pictures
that are true a priori." (81)
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There are however logical propositions which are true a
priori; they are tautologies and their negations are contra¬
dictions. (82) But as analytic propositions they say nothing,
they picture nothing, they are sense-less. (83) Though logical,
tautological propositions can be called 'true', strictly speaking
this is incorrect. A tautology is not a picture, not a proposi¬
tion, and cannot be called 'true' because it is 'made true'. (8*+)
What has no factual truth conditions yields no information con¬
cerning the world. Necessary 'propositions' are 'sense-less'
(sinnlos) but they are not 'nonsensical' (unsinnig). "They are
part of the symbolism, just as '0* is part of the symbolism of
arithmetic." (85) Metaphysical propositions, understood as
propositions which claim to be both necessary and factual,are
nonsensical. Necessity belongs solely to logic; statements
about what 'is the case' are non-necessary, contingent. And this
claim has important consequences for Natural Theology. As
Anscombe states:
"Here it is worth remarking that the truth of
the Tractatus theory would be death to natural
theology; not because of ... verificationism,
but simply because of the picture theory of
the 'significant proposition'. For it is
essential to this that the picturing proposi¬
tion has two poles, and in each sense it
represents what may perfectly well be true.
Which of them is true is just what happens to
be the case. But in natural theology this is
an impermissible notion; its propositions are
not supposed to be the ones that happen to be
true out of pairs of possibilities; nor are
they supposed to be logical or mathematical
propositions either." (86)
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Essentially then metaphysics is the attempt to utter the
unsayable. To say what can only be shown in language. Proposi¬
tions cannot be logical pictures of their logical form. (87)
Rather, the showing mentioned is accomplished by every proposition,
but is particularly the function of the tautologies or 'sense¬
less' propositions of logic. The tautologies show 'the logic
of the world*. To represent "logical form, we should have to
be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside
logic,that is to say outside the world." (88) And,for Wittgen¬
stein, this is impossible,because there must be a correspondence
between the logical form of language and that of reality if
language is to function as a picture of the world. Logic must
exist before there can be any experience of the world^but there
can be no experience of logic.
"The 'experience' that we need in order to
understand logic is not that something or
other is the state of things, but that some¬
thing is_i that, however, is not an experience.
Logic is prior to every experience - that
something is so. It is prior to the question
'How?1 not prior to the question 'What?*" (89)
"Logic is not a body of doctrine but a mirror
image of the world. Logic is transcendental."
(90)
Now compare this 'experience' necessary for logic with
what we saw Wittgenstein claim . concerning the mystical
«>
feeling: It is not how things are in the world that is mystical
but that it exists." (91) To understand logic we need a
certain 'experience', not of how the world is (not of how things
are in the world) but of the existence of something. Is there
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a single realm of 'experience' being referred to here? Does
logic along with ethics, aesthetics etc. share a single quasi-
experiential ground?
To examine this question let us see what is involved in
having this logical 'experience'. It cannot, of course, be
knowledge of the truth of a factual proposition, since whether
or not a factual proposition is true is a matter of how things
are in the world. It must then be;as B. F. McGuinness expresses
it:
"an experience of the existence of objects
whose existence is not a matter of experience
in the ordinary sense: it must consist, that
is, in acquaintance with simple objects and
with their possibilities of combination. Not
that the logician must be able to list the
objects which figure in the facts that he
knows and in the possibilities that he can
envisage. In order to do logic he must be
able to answer the question 'What?' but the
answer he must be able to give is not a cata¬
logue of the objects that there are ... but
simply the answer that there are objects." (92)
So logic comes after the objects but before the existent atomic
facts. What objects there are is a non-empirical, non-logical
matter. It is of course an empirical matter which combination
of objects are actual. It is a logical matter which combinations
of objects are possible. But what objects there are to be com¬
bined is neither.
What is given by experience is always facts. A grasp of
the 'substance of the worldwhich we show we have in being able
to describe the facts we experience, is not given by any
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experience. As any experience must be an experience of a
possible contingent situation,it is not possible that experience
could tell us anything about logic. Logic precedes the uttering
of propositions, precedes their possible truth or falsity. Thus,
according to Wittgenstein, this logical 'experience' is possessed
by anyone who understands propositions (93) i as something
implicit in his thought and use of language.
Allow me, now,to trace further similarities between this
logical 'experience' and the mystical feeling. First of all,
both are feelings directed towards the existence of the world.
•That something is' and 'that there is a world' both share the
same objective referent. (9*0 Both are equally disinterested
in the 'how' of the world, but share a common interest in 'that'
there is a world. Secondly, the mystical feeling is directed
towards the world conceived as a limited whole', and surely we
are presented with the world conceived as a whole - as all that
is the case and thus limited-at the very beginning of the
Tractatus? "The world is all that is the case,' 'the world is
determined by the facts,' 'the world divides into facts.' It
is surely only of the world,considered as a limited whole, that
such comments can intelligibly be made! Further,as again
McGuinness states:
"What logic studies is spoken of as if it were
the true reality: objects are what is unutter¬
able and subsistent ... Constantly he
(Wittgenstein) talks about totalities - the
totality of objects (5«5561), the totality
of existing states of affairs (2.0*0, the
totality of true propositions (*+.11) ...;
this seems to me like the 'view of the world
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as a limited whole which we are told that
the mystic has." (95)
Thirdlyf just as that which is mystical cannot be expressed but
•makes itself manifest', so too,the logician is committed to
silence. And yet the logician can present us with the form of
reality and the mystic with the 'solution to the problem of
life'. Thus it seems to me that the logical 'experience' is
very similar to the mystical feeling. And yet it may seem
there is a difference,because is not the logical 'experience'
directed towards explicating the general form of reality - the
general form of the world - while the mystical feeling is
directed towards resolving the problem of the sense or purpose
of life? This does seem like a real difference and yet the
thoughts of the logician are part of what is involved in
mysticism. To see how V/ittgenstein resolves,or rather dissolves
the difference between world and life it will now be necessary
to explore Wittgenstein's thoughts on solipsism. Thoughts
again,which cannot be stated but make themselves manifest, are
shown.
When the Tractatus informs us that 'logic is transcendental'
what is not,of course,meant is that the logical propositions
state transcendental truths. Rather,what is meant is some such
idea as expressed in this remark of Wittgenstein's:
"There seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar
depth - a universal significance. Logic lay,
it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences
- For logical investigation explores the
nature of all things ... It takes its rise
... from an urge to understand the basis, or
essence, of everything empirical." (96)
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Logical propositions show the form of reality and what they
show is something which pervades everything sayable. What
logic displays is the 'scaffolding of the world' and in saying
that logic displays this scaffolding.,Wittgenstein is reminding
us that logical propositions are concerned only with logical
form. (97) Yet logic has a connexion with the world so that,
although logical propositions are not about the objects of the
world,they still show something about the world. (98) For
Wittgenstein,
"logic pervades the world: the limits of the
world are also its limits. So we cannot say
in logic 'the world has this in it, and this,
but not that.' For that would appear to pre¬
suppose that we were excluding certain
possibilities, and this cannot be the case,
since it would require that logic should go
beyond the limits of the world; for only in
that way could it view those limits from the
other side as well. We cannot think what we
cannot think; so we cannot think what we
cannot say either." (99)
What Wittgenstein is maintaining here should, I hope by
now, be reasonably clear. But what is difficult here is,first
of all .that Wittgenstein intends the above remairfcsto be a
comment on the claim,'the limits of my language mean the limits
of my world," (100) and secondly,, his further claim,that what
is said above provides the "key to how much truth there is in
solipsism." (101) As Wittgenstein continues:
"For what the solipsist means is quite correct;
only it cannot be said, but makes itself mani¬
fest. The world is rajr world: this is manifest
in the fact that the limits of language (of
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that language which alone I understand) mean
the limits of my world. The world and life
are one. I am my world." (102)
What is; first of all.,unexpected here is the sudden intro¬
duction of the personal pronoun in expressions such as 'my
language' and world'. Up to this point Wittgenstein's con¬
cern seemed to be with 'the world' (the logical form of reality,
the essence of the world). Secondly, what does Wittgenstein
mean when he says 'the world is mjr world,' 'the world and life
are one' and 'I am my world? To understand fully what
Wittgenstein is maintaining here it will be necessary, first of
all, to examine his analysis of the 'self'.
Now Wittgenstein maintains that "there is no such thing
as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas",i.e., no such
thing as the "human soul with which psychology deals." (103)
There exists no thinking or knowing soul or self in the world.
At the same time,Wittgenstein does believe in the existence of
another self - a metaphysical or philosophical self - which is
a "limit of the world not a part of it." (10*0 The meta¬
physical subject or self cannot be identified with my body, nor
with my experience or any part of it. That which experiences
is not itself an experience, is not part of the world. The
metaphysical self must be looked for in the boundary or limit
of the world. But why is the metaphysical self not pant of the
world? To answer this Wittgenstein provides us with the analogy
of an eye and its visual field; i.e., the metaphysical subject is
related to the world as the eye is related to its visual field.
The eye of the visual field is the source of the visual field
but not a constituent of it. (105) The metaphysical self is
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that 'outside' the world on which the existence of everything
depends. As P. Hacker states: "The owner of experience in
general, the possessor of all the experience I can ever
encounter, is the metaphysical subject." (106)
Now,the notion of a metaphysical subject is introduced by
Wittgenstein as a comment on the earlier propositions which
claimed that 'the world and life are one' and 'I am my world'.
What this suggests is that the notion of a metaphysical subject
may provide the clue to understanding Wittgenstein's remarks in
general here, and on solipsism in particular.
Wittgenstein remarks that what brings the "self into
philosophy is the fact that the world is my world." (107) Now
the claim that 'the world is my world' is the solipsistic claim,
I believe, understood as an epistemological thesis; that the
self can know nothing but its own modifications or states. The
claims 'that the world and life are one' and 'I am ay world'
are the solipsistic claims understood, I believe, as a meta¬
physical thesis; that the self is the only existent thing. Now,
if we refer to the Notebooks „we find that Wittgenstein there
remarks: "There really is only one world soul, which I for pre¬
ference call m£ soul and as which alone I conceive what I call
the souls of others." (108) Or again: "only from the conscious¬
ness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion, science and
art ... And this consciousness is life itself." (109)
Thus the world is identified with life, life is identified
with consciousness and consciousness with the self of solipsism.
What the solipsist means and is correct in believing is that
the world and life are one, that 'man is the microcosm,' that
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•I am my world'. Only, although what the solipsist means is
correct,it cannot be said, it shows itself.
There is another way, in the Tractatus,we can arrive at
the same solipsistic conclusion. This way has been labelled by
P. Hacker as the 'semantic route to solipsism' (110) and takes,
as its starting point,the claim that the 'limits of my language
mean the limits of my world.' As we saw, when discussing the
topic, by representational form Wittgenstein refers to a method
of projection by which the elements of a picture are linked with
the objects pictured. And in order for the names of elementary
propositions to have meaning, I,the language user, have to think
the method of projection. Thus,without ray consciousness
playing its role, language as such would be impossible. And, as
Hacker : states:
"the self which thinks the method of projection
cannot ... be captured by the language it
creates. The metalinguistic soul (which is the
analogue of the metaphysical self or subject)
is, as it were, the blind spot upon the retinal
image to which nothing in the visual image
corresponds ... Without it the comparison of
language and reality is impossible." (111)
What the solipsist means is that the world is m^; world. This
ineffable truth shows itself in the fact that the limits of
language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the
limits of my world.
But the limits of language., and hence of my language, are
formed by that which is non-contingent. The limits of logic
are the limits of language, the limits of the world,and 'logic
is transcendental'. That the world is my world, that I am my
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world, that the world and life are one ..are all expressions of
transcendental solipsism. And all these doctrines are
inexpressible. Furthermore,, the solipsistic theories make
essential reference to a metaphysical self: A self which is a
limit of the world not a part of it, about which nothing can be
said. This metaphysical self or subject, a limit of the world,
on which the existence of everything depends, could intelligibly
be identified with God as with very self. The limit of the
world,which from one perspective can be identified as the meta¬
physical self,can, from another perspective,be called God.
In his Notebooks Wittgenstein states:
"What do I know about God and the purpose of
life? I know that this world exists. That
I am placed in it like my eye in its visual
field. That something about it is problematic,
which we call its meaning. That this meaning
does not lie in it but outside it. That life
is the world." (112)
Or again: "To believe in a God means to see that the facts of
the world are not the end of the matter" (113): this remark
being connected with the following in the Tractatus: "How
things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference
for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world."
(114) Now we have seen that the content of mysticism - that
to which the feeling is directed - is the existence of the
world, that there is a world. But what does it mean to have
this feeling? Does it manifest itself as a puzzlement con¬
cerning a possible divine cause of the world - transcendent to
it - but 'giving' the world significance or meaning? This seems
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unlikely, for as Wittgenstein slates as early as the beginning
of the book, "the world is all that is the case." (115) And,
holding strictly to this claim,any such divine cause of the
world would, per impossible, have to be 'inside* the world -
reflect a factual situation - and this would conflict directly
with the claim that 'how' things are is of no significance.
'God does not reveal himself in the world.' Further, we do have
biographical information,supplied by N. Malcolm,that Wittgen¬
stein could "not understand the conception of a Creator ... or
the notion of a being making the world." Indeed we are told,
"any cosmological conception of a Deity, derived from the notion
of cause ... would be repugnant to him. (116)
Perhaps,then,it is the case that 'God does not reveal
himself in the world' because God is identical with the world?
Is it the case that the mystical feeling - that the world
exists - is felt, precisely because God and the world are identi¬
cal? That is, the mystical feeling is present because God ojs
the world. Is it pantheism Wittgenstein is presenting us with?
Glancing at some passages in the Notebooks might give one this
idea. There, Wittgenstein states:
"The world is given me, i.e. my will enters
into the world completely from outside as into
something that is already there ... That is
why we have the feeling of being dependent on
an alien will. However this may be, at any
rate we are in a certain sense dependent, and
what we are dependent on we can call God. In
this sense God would simply be fate or, what
is the same thing: The world - which is inde¬
pendent of our will." (117)
The 'alien will' is a reference to the factual character of
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reality and so we appear to have postulated the claim that God,
fate and world (qua the totality of facts) are synonymous. And
yet,we have been told that,'believing in God means that the
facts of the world are not the end of the matter.' As the world
qua world is simply the totality of facts in the world ("the
world is the totality of facts")(118) what Wittgenstein is
stating here cannot be any simple identification of God and the
world. As we have already seen, God does not reveal himself in
the world, is not identifiable with what is contingently the
case - with any particular fact or set of facts - and as the
facts which constitute this particular world could have been
otherwise, Wittgenstein cannot intend to simply identify God
and the world. As it has been stated, "the divinity of the
whole is not inherited by component parts of that whole." (119)
Perhaps however, Wittgenstein, while not wishing to
suggest that God and the world are identical in this sense, may
have another sense in mind. Just as 'logic is transcendental'
and manifests itself as the limit of the world, the general form
or possibility of the world, so too God is transcendental mani¬
festing himself as the general form or limit of the world of
facts,constituting its possibility. God is to be found in the
necessary general features of reality, which are precisely what
is presupposed in logic. "To give the essence of a proposition
means to give the essence of all description, and thus the
essence of the world." (120) "The general form of a proposition
is: This is how things stand." (121) And we find in the
Notebooks: "How things stand is God. God is, how things stand."
(122) 'God' then, within the terms of Wittgenstein's theory,
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denotes a formal concept. The limit of the world,which from
one perspective can be named God, can,from another perspective,
be named the metaphysical subject.
Now we have seen hov; for Wittgenstein both logic and God
are transcendental,tracing the link between logic and God, world
and life, by means of Wittgenstein's theory of transcendental
solipsism. All these constitute the 'unsayables' of the world,
are the object of the mystical feeling. But Wittgenstein also
maintains that 'Ethics is transcendental' (123)* "It is
impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions
can express nothing that is higher." (124) The reason for the
inexpressibility of ethics is best expounded in the following
passage".
"The sense of the world must lie outside the
world. In the v/orld everything is as it is
ii. in it no value exists ... If there is
any value that does have value, it must lie
outside the whole sphere of what happens and
is the case. For all that happens and is the
case is accidental. What makes it non-
accidental cannot lie within the world, since
if it did it would itself be accidental. It
must lie outside the world." (125)
Now reference has been made here to both (a) the sense of
the world and (b) the value of the world. But, as we saw,
Wittgenstein has already spoken of the sense of the world in
connection with God. And indeed we are told (i) "to believe in
God means to see that life has a meaning" (126) and,furthermore,
(ii) "the meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we
can call God." (127) It is obvious that,for Wittgenstein5there
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is 110 distinction between viewing the world ethically and
viewing it religiously.
But what constitutes value? For Wittgenstein "good and
evil only enter through the subject. And the subject is not
part of the world, but a boundary of the world." Indeed as "the
subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its
existence, so good and evil are predicates of the subject, not
properties in the world." (128) "Ethics does not treat of the
world. Ethics must be a condition of the world like logic."
(129) Or, as Wittgenstein also expresses it, "if good or evil
willing affects the world it can only affect the boundaries of
the world, not the facts, what cannot be portrayed by language
but can only be shown in language." (130)
Now we have introduced the notion of 'willing' but before
examining the concept of the will^and its relation to ethics,
allow me to reiterate why ethical propositions cannot be
'portrayed in language'. All that happens, everything in the
world,is accidental. All significant propositions are contingent,
i.e.,describe states of affairs in the world. As the only
necessity is logical necessity and value must be non-accidental,
so value - if it exists at all - must be outside the world.
Given the 'picture theory of meaning' this makes 'statements'
of value inexpressible,but the conclusion only follows if we
accept the premise of the non-contingency of the ethical - a
premise which Wittgenstein in no way argues for but simply
asserts. Thus,the fact that there are no ethical propositions
only follows from, or is a consequence of, the 'picture theory';,
if we accept the prior premise or assumption of the non-
contingency of the ethical.
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However, to continue, Wittgenstein?as we saw,has now
introduced the notion of the 'will' in his analysis of good and
evil. But how does the will express itself in an ethical
manner? Well the 'will is an attitude of the subject to the
world' and,furthermore,* the subject is the willing subject',
(131) by which comment I take Wittgenstein to be claiming that
the metaphysical subject and the willing subject are one and
the same. And as further confirmation of this claim,Wittgenstein
also.states: "If the will did not exist, neither would there be
that centre of the world, which we call the I and which is the
bearer of ethics." (132)
But what does it mean for the subject,considered as
ethical will,to have an attitude to the world: Wittgenstein
expresses the point in these terms: "The world is independent
of my will." There is no logical or causal connection between
what I will and what actually occurs in the world. Therefore,
the will is not concerned with the facts of the world,precisely
because neither good nor evil willing can change or control the
facts. And the difference good or evil willing makes is that
they make the world - considered as a whole - "a wholly
different one. The world must ... to speak, wax or wane as a
whole. As if by accession or loss of meaning." (133)
The world is given and my will,understood as the seat of
ethical attributes,"enters into the world completely from
outside as into something that is already there." (13*0 But
this 'entering into' poses a problem for Wittgenstein. It does
so because it engenders the "feeling of being dependent on an
alien will," which 'alien will' we "can call God" or "fate" or,
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indeed,just simply the "world". (135) But it is of the essence
of the ethical to 'make a difference,' to transform or transcend
the world - to make it a 'wholly different world.' "I can make
myself independent of fate." (136) But surely this suggests a
complete independence of the world from my will ~ ail independence,
which Wittgenstein articulates in the claim, "there are two god¬
heads: the world and my independent I." (137)
On the one hand,we appear to have 'God', 'fate', the
'alien will'', on the other hand ,we have will,considered as the
ethical subject. On the one hand,we have a limit of the world
which,from one point of view,can be called God and,from another
point of view,the metaphysical self. On the other hand,we have
a limit of the world which,from another point of view,we can
call the willing I.
There is,however,a resolution of this 'difficulty' and it
is to be found in an analysis of the meaning of good and evil.
But if, "what is good and evil is essentially the I, not the
world",(138) what do good and evil mean here? "Simply the
happy life is good, the unhappy bad ... the happy life seems to
be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right
life." (139) And in what does the happy life consist? Well,in
order to live happily, "I must be in agreement with the world.
And that is what 'being happy' means. I am thus,so to speak,in
agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent.
That is to say: 'I am doing the will of God.'" (1*1-0) Thus we
have the resolution of the problem of the 'second Godhead', a
resolution which is achieved when the 'willing I' is reconciled
with, is united with,the worldj a reconciliation which manifests
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itself with the will being in complete agreement with the world,
the 'alien will', accepting the world and the facts as they are.
(1*+1) Further, we are told the happy life is justified of
itself. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein speaks of a kind of
reward or punishment which resides in the ethical action itself.
(1*4-2) Indeed, it is the fact that the reward or punishment is
internal which allows us to characterise the action as ethical.
The contrast is, of course, with an action where reward or
punishment follow what has been done and are external to it.
The reasoning behind this point is not too difficult to follow.
Since the good life is the happy life - and happiness consists
in being in agreement with the world as it is - the very mark
of an unethical action or evil or unhappy life is an action
where so-called moral worth resides in certain contingent con¬
sequences occurring, certain events being or not being the case.
"The happy life is more harmonious than the unhappy." (1*4-3)
Further, Wittgenstein . states, "only a man who lives not
in time but in the present is happy." (1*4*4-) But what does it
mean to live not in time,but in the present? "Whoever lives in
the present lives without fear and hope." (1*45) To live in
'time' means to have fears and hopes^to expect and hope for
consequences to occur iri the world. Thus to live in 'time'
means one is not living in agreement with the world, one is not
happy. The man who is happy, content, is the man who has no
other "purpose except to live." (1*4-6) And such a man,living in
the present,has eternal life. (1*47) Indeed such a man has no
fear, not even in the face of death, not because he can survive
death and achieve everlasting existence, but rather because the
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mark of his living in the present is his independence from the
fear and hopes of the world. Regarding eternal life, under¬
stood as a state of existence attained by surviving death,
Wittgenstein has this to say:
"Not only is there no guarantee of the
temporal immortality of the human soul, that
is to say of its eternal survival after
death; but, in any case, this assumption
completely fails to accomplish the purpose
for which it has always been intended ...
The solution of the riddle of life in space
and time lies outside space and time." (1^-8)
The good life,then,is life lived in the present, this is
what it means to have eternal life. And further, "the good
life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis ... The usual
way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the
midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside."
(1^9) And this of course is, as we have seen, the mark of the
mystical feeling. Viewing the world as a limited whole and sub
specie aeterni. Ethical experience is mystical experience.
But how can a man achieve the state of seeing things sub
specie aeterni? How can a man be nappy at all in a
Wittgensteinian sense? "Through the life of knowledge", (150)
we are told. The aim is to place oneself in agreement with
the world by knowledge of the world. Such knowledge,however,
cannot be equated with factual knowledge (knowledge in the
world) but must,of course,be equated with the 'knowledge of the
world' achieved intellectually by the man who has read and
mastered the Tractatus. In logic,a correct understanding of
the logical form of propositions, which is the form of reality,
- 37 -
leads to an acceptance of the world as it is - to the content¬
ment of the happy man. In the 'propositions' of the Tractatus
we 'see' the nature of reality and are intellectually and,
therefore,ethically content. As Wittgenstein states: "Perhaps
this book (the Tractatus) will be understood only by someone
who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in
it." (151)
I hope my synopsis of the Tractatus and of Tractarian
mysticism and the mystical themes has shown the essential unity
of the work, "the genesis of the ideas expressed being dis¬
covered in the basic mystical feeling or 'experience*. To
picture the world at all in language, to know any facts in the
world, we must,first,be shown the general form of reality, the
essence of the world (logic), and,having had the essence of the
world thus displayed,we can then place ourselves in agreement
with it, be happy because we are content, seeing things, not
from the viewpoint of particular possibilities,but from the
viewpoint of the present - the eternal (ethical). But, one
may feel compelled to ask: What justification is there for
using the term 'mystical* here? Is there a single,quasi-
experiential mystical ground for logic, God and ethics? Is
what Wittgenstein is talking about in any way related to
genuine mystical experience? Certainly, given the use of the
term 'God' in the articulation of the thesis,the 'experience'
in question could in no way be thought of as an orthodox
Christian theistic mystical experience. B. F. McGuinness has,
however, claimed that, on the basis of an examination of
- 38 -
mystical texts and commentators' remarks on the texts, there
is a common enough mystical state which agrees with the feelings
described by Wittgenstein. He relates an example of a mystical
state, recorded by W. James, which he believes will illustrate
the notion of 'cosmic consciousness' displayed by Wittgenstein.
"The prime characteristic of cosmis conscious¬
ness is a consciousness of the cosmos, that is,
of the life and order of the universe. Along
with the consciousness of the cosmos there
occurs an intellectual enlightenment which
alone would place an individual on a new
plane of existence - would make him almost a
member of a new species. To this is added a
state of moral exultation, an indescribable
feeling of elevation, elation and joyousness,
and a quickening of the moral sense which is
fully as striking and more important than is
the enhanced intellectual power. With these
come what may be called a sense of immortality,
a consciousness of eternal life, not a con¬
viction that he shall have this but the con¬
sciousness that he has it already." (152)
But is there any reason to suppose that Wittgenstein had
any experiences which could be classified as mystical,and could
be seen as the 'experiential basis'for the thoughts expressed
in the Notebooks and the Tractatus. To answer this particular
problem I wish now to examine Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics'
where Wittgenstein describes three experiences he had . which
he there describes as having 'absolute value'. I shall analyse
this 'Lecture'^ not only to spotlight the three experiences he
there mentions,but also to examine further Wittgenstein's ideas
on the inexpressibility of religion and ethics.
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At the time of the 1929 'Lecture' Wittgenstein had aban¬
doned his 'picture theory of meaning' and with it talk of ethics
as transcendental. Yet his account of the nature of ethics and
religion was retained though of course ethics is now not des¬
cribed as transcendental but as 'supernatural'. (153) Further¬
more, Wittgenstein is prepared, in the 'Lecture' to state why a
'supernatural' approach to ethics and religion is correct. He main¬
tains that it has its genesis in a need to 'go beyond' language and
the world and he sees it as a temptation to which he is sympathetic.
But before examining this point in detail, let me explore a
distinction made by Wittgenstein,early in the 'Lecture', between
relative and absolute (ethical) value.
He states:
"Supposing that I could play tennis and one
of you saw me playing and said 'Well you play
pretty badly' and suppose I answered: 'I know,
I'm playing badly but I don't want to play
any better,* all the other man could say
would be, 'Ah then that's all right.' But
suppose I had told one of you a preposterous
lie and he came up to me and said, 'You're
behaving like a beast,' and then I were to
say, 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't
want to behave any better,' could he then say,
•Ah, then that's all right?' Certainly not;
he would say, 'Well you ought to want to
behave better.' Here you have an absolute
judgement of value, whereas the first instance
was one of a relative judgement." (15*0
In the case of the example of relative value,in what
circumstances would the replies of the tennis player and the
onlooker be inappropriate! Well, if the tennis player wants to
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play well, wants to become a future tennis champion then his
reply and the response of the onlooker (providing he is aware
of his ambition) would be inappropriate. That is,his tennis
playing should be directed at improving his strokes, his timing
etc., items he must perfect if his ambition of being champion is
ever to be achieved? and this being his aim it would be
inappropriate for him to reply in the way stated and equally
for the onlooker not to say that he ought to play better. But
note it is only i_f the tennis player has an aim, an end, outside
the immediate 'tennis playing situation' that such replies as
those given could be inappropriate. But the same is not true,
Wittgenstein argues, in the situation of absolute moral value.
There the goodness of the action itself 'jis its own reward'.
It is not necessary to assume non-moral ends in view to justify
the moral use of the term 'ought'. One simply ought to want to
be a good man. Now given this characterization of the
difference between relative and absolute value what does this
tell us about the nature of relative and absolute judgements of
7
value:
Well, what constitutes a relative judgement of value for
Wittgenstein is that "it can be shown to be mere statements of
facts", i.e., what it means to be a good tennis player can be
understood as 'he serves well', 'he has a good forehand' etc.
(155) But "no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a
judgement of absolute value".(156) The facts are ethically
neutral and furthermore "words will only express facts." (157)
Facts and propositions stand on the same level and this entails
that there are "no propositions which in any absolute sense are
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sublime, important or trivial." (158) No propositions can be
used to articulate what is meant by absolute or ethical values.
But then what does it mean to use such expressions as 'absolute
value'; what are they an attempt to express? Wittgenstein
■Slates:
"My whole tendency and I believe the tendency
of all men who ever tried to write or talk
Ethics or Religion was to run against the
boundaries of language. This running against
the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely,
hopeless. Ethics, so far as it springs from
the desire to say something about the ulti¬
mate meaning of life ... can be no science
... But it is a document of a tendency in the
human mind which I personally cannot help
respecting deeply and I would not for my life
ridicule it." (159)
Or again: "We thrust against the limits of language. Kierke¬
gaard, too, recognised this thrust and even described it in
much the same way" (as a thrust against paradox). (160) For
this reason a "certain characteristic misuse of our language"
runs through all ethical and religious expressions, because
"nonsensicality was their very essence." (161) And this charac¬
teristic misuse expresses itself in the case of both ethics
and religion in that ethical and religious expressions "seem,
prima facie, to be just similes." (162) That is,e.g., the terms
right and good as used in ethics and the predicates which we
apply to God such as power and love seem to be analogous to,
have some similarity with, the use which these terms have in
non-ethical and non-religious contexts. But this is to mislead
and for the following reason.
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"A simile must be the simile for something.
And if I can describe a fact by means of a
simile I must also be able to drop the simile
and to describe the facts without it. Now
in our case as soon as we try to drop the
simile and simply to state the facts which
stand behind it, we find that there are no
such facts. And so, what at first appeared
to be a simile now seems to be mere nonsense."
(163)
But our need to communicate in this context arises,
according to Wittgenstein, from our desire to verbalise certain
experiences: experiences which Wittgenstein here claims are the
experiential basis of ethical and religious value. Wittgenstein
identifies three such experiences. The first one is "my
experience par excellence" and Wittgenstein continues, "I
believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I
have it I wonder at the existence of the world." (164) The
second experience is the "experience of feeling absolutely safe"
and the third experience is that of "feeling guilty". (165)
Wittgenstein relates these experiences specifically to reli¬
gious claims in the following way:
"The first of them is, I believe, exactly
what people were referring to when they said
that God had created the world; and the
experience of absolute safety has been des¬
cribed by saying that we feel safe in the
hands of God. A third experience of the
same kind is that of feeling guilty and
again this v/as described by the phrase that
God disapproves of our conduct." (166)
But, as might be expected, just as it is impossible in
principle to meaningfully communicate religious claims so also
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it is impossible in principle to meaningfully describe these
experiences which, Wittgenstein claims in this lecture, are the
experiential basis of the ethical and religious life. "The
verbal expression which we give to these experiences is non¬
sense." (167) Take the experience of wondering at the existence
of the world. Wittgenstein claims that it only makes sense to
wonder
"at something being the case which I could
conceive not to be the case ... To say 'I
wonder at such and such being the case' has
only sense if I can imagine it not to be the
case ... But it is nonsense to say that I
wonder at the existence of the world, because
I cannot imagine it not existing." (168)
Or again Wittgenstein states; "Think for instance about one's
astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be
expressed in the form of a question and there is no answer to
it. Anything we can say must, a priori, be only nonsense."
(169)
But how true is this? Isn't one's astonishment that
anything exists an experience and surely experiences sire facts
in some sensed As Wittgenstein himself states: "they have
taken place then and there, lasted a certain definite time sind
consequently are describable." (170) Or, as Wittgenstein
stresses the point in terms very reminiscent of Kierkegaard;
"I will make my point still more acute by saying 'It is the
paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have super¬
natural value.'" (171) Now Wittgenstein believes it is possible
that there is one way to meet this paradox. Instead of des¬
cribing the first experience mentioned as one of wondering at
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the existence of the world, he suggests it should be described
as the "experience of seeing the world as a miracle." (172)
That is, to see the world as a miracle is to see it from an
entirely different point of view than that provided by the
scientific point of view. "The truth is that the scientific
way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a
miracle." (173) Wittgenstein arrives at this conclusion because
he believes that once an event, seen as a miraule, is also
viewed as a possible candidate for future scientific explana¬
tion, then whatever was once considered miraculous about the
event disappears. It is absurd to say that "science has proved
that there are no miracles" (17*0 because to state this is to
conflate two entirely disparate ways of looking at an event.
It is to conflate regarding an event as scientifically explic¬
able (\irhether or not the specific explanation is known) and
regarding an event as a miracle — 3-n event regarded as a
miracle being scientifically inexplicable in principle.
But how exactly does this new way of describing the
experience of wonder at the existence of the world, i.e., seeing
the world as a miracle, help to solve the paradox: Wittgen¬
stein states: "Now I am tempted to say that the right
expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the
world, though it is not any proposition in language, is the
existence of language itself." (175) But how exactly does this
restatement dissolve the alleged paradox? The simple answer is
it fails to dissolve the paradox. As Wittgenstein continues:
"all I have said by shifting the expression
of the miraculous from an expression by means
of language to the expression by the existence
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of language, all I have said is again that
we cannot express what we want to express
and that all we say about the absolute
miraculous remains nonsense." (176)
Perhaps this is a premature conclusion. Would it not be better
to say;not that we attempt to express the inexpressible, i.e.,
talk nonsense, but that rather we simply have not found the
"correct logical analysis of what we mean by our ethical and
religious expressions " (177)? To this Wittgenstein retorts:
"Now when this is argued against me I at
once see clearly, as it were in a flash of
light, not only that no description that I
can think of would do to describe what I
mean by absolute value, but that I would
reject every significant description that
anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio,
on the ground of its significance. That is
to say: I see now that these nonsensical
expressions were not nonsensical because I
had not yet found the correct expressions,
but that their nonsensicality was their very
essence." (1?8)
Now apart from the clear statement which V/ittgenstein
gives here to the supernatural nature of both ethics and reli-
gion^hat is of major interest is V/ittgenstein's identification
of three experiences which he has undergone and to which he not
only accords absolute value but also claims that these
experiences represent the experiential basis of religion and
ethics for him. Thus we appear to have an affirmative answer
to the question as to whether or not 'Wittgenstein did experience
mystical sensations. The three experiences he mentions are
again (a) the experience, par excellence, of wondering at the
- 46 -
existence of the world, (b) the experience of feeling absolutely
safe and (c) the experience of feeling guilty. A further prob¬
lem arises here as to how correct it is to identify all of
these three experiences as primarily mystical experiences. It
seems to me that the first and second experiences are clearly
mystical in character but the third experience (that of feeling
guilty) is not normally, I would have thought, mystical in
character, though it is possible that it may have mystical
significance. The experience of 'wonder at the existence of
the world* surely underpins both the logic and ethics of the
Tractatus and the experience of 'feeling absolutely safe', safe
no matter what the facts are, living without hope or fear, must
surely be the experiential basis of the ethical man in the
Tractatus, the happy man.
Furthe^ Anscombe cannot surely be correct when she identi¬
fies Wittgenstein's notion of the mystical with the "entirely
ordinary feeling" often experienced at the inability of science
to provide all the answers. (179) It is in fact the experiences
of wonder and security which are the source of, the genesis of,
Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with science. It is because
Wittgenstein experienced these feelings that the answers of
science could never really satisfy him.
However the 'Lecture' and the argument of the Tractatus
still leave unanswered many puzzles. I shall only mention two
here. The first puzzle relates to the 'mystical unity' of the
Tractarian philosophy and is centred on a problem concerning
the notion of 'showing'. The second puzzle relates to
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Wittgenstein's claim that there can be no significant religious
propositions.
The first problem has been raised by E. Schaper in her
part of a symposium on Saying and Showing in Heidegger and
Wittgenstein (180) and concerns the univocality of the notion
of 'showing' that is operative in the Tractatus. That is, is
the same notion of 'showing' being used when it is maintained
that the transcendental shows itself in its logical and
'ethics-religious' instantiations? That is, what is shown is
different,but is the notion of 'showing' the same that is
operative in each case? Take the logical instantiation first.
What is shown is the logical form by which a proposition can be
a picture of a fact. What the picture, the proposition, has in
common with reality, its logical form, cannot be put into words.
And it cannot be put into words because any attempt to articu¬
late the formal, logical features of language without which no
proposition could be meaningfully asserted would have no
•significant denial'. 'Propositions can represent the whole of
reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in
common with reality in order to be able to represent it - a
logical form As Schaper says: "The reason why what we might
call formal statements, that is, statements applying formal
concepts, do not say anything is that they have no significant
denial. In that sense they prescribed limits to what can be
said or thought." (181) And speaking of the 'ethice-religious'
instantiation of the transcendental and what is shown.and how
it is shown,she states:
"Wittgenstein does not say here (the 'Lecture')
or in the Tractatus, however, that the
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experience of wondering at the existence of
the world, of seeing the world as a miracle,
is incoherent. What he does say is that our
seeking to put this experience into words
results in nonsensical expressions ... Our
attempts to express our experiences here,
then, must be quite different from our
attempts to express the logical conditions
of significant speech. For our difficulty
there was that we tried to express what had
no significant denial, whereas our difficulty
here is that we are inclined to express our
wonderment in terms of a supposition that the
world might exist contingently, but this is
not even an attempt to express a formal
truth. Not only is it something that cannot
be said, it cannot even be shown." (182)
Technically I believe Schaper is correct here. The
notion of 'showing' cannot be the same in the two cases. Yet
may I suggest a way of looking at the matter which might miti¬
gate this difficulty. The 'experience' of wonder at the
existence of the world is part of the content of the mystical
feeling, not 'how' but 'that' there is a world. And just as
the 'experience' of wonder at the existence of the world is
the quasi-experiential mystical ground for ethics so too, if my
previous account has been correct, is it for logic. Now given
this same 'experiential' basis for logic and ethics and the
conclusion that there can be no saying in logic or ethics -
what 'truths' there are 'manifesting' themselves - I think it
is at least not difficult to see why Wittgenstein should want
to talk about showing here in a univocal sense. This does
not, however, alter the fact that both instantiations of the
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'transcendental' do not in fact 'show' in the same way - the
notions of showing must be different - but it could at least
explain why Wittgenstein did not appear to notice a difficulty
or discrepancy here; why he thought, as he apparently did, that
only one notion of 'show' was at work.
Secondly?I wish now to look at Wittgenstein's account of
religious language. According to that account religious asser¬
tions and expressions?such as 'God loves all men', seem prima
facie to be just similes. W. D. Hudson speculates that such a
claim is simply mistaken. He states:
"When a Christian believer, for instance,
says that God loves us, I do not think he
means to speak of God's attitude towards us
as one of which love is an allegory; or when
he says that God is almighty, I do not think
he means that God has a characteristic of
which almightiness is a simile. I think that
in both cases he means literally what he says.
If he did not he would have no problem of
evil on his hands. It is only because
Christians believe that God loves us in a
perfectly normal sense of 'loves' and that
God is almighty in the perfectly normal sense
of being able to do whatever is logically
possible, that they have to face the question
•Why then does God allow us to suffer pain
and loss?'" (183)
Certainly what Hudson says may be true for some religious
believers. Perhaps;in particular,true for those for whom
the problem of evil does not even constitute a problem. (But
here, of course, if I can use a phrase, we are talking of
simple or naive religious belief.) Or, true for those for
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whom the problem of evil is .just seen as a problem, Tha-t is, cer¬
tainly it is true that for a religious believer to see the
problem of evil as a problem, the terms in question must be
used in something like a normal sense. However, be that as it
may, I am not aware of any theodicy or 'justification of the
ways of God to man' which at the conclusion of the argument
retains a use ,for example,of the term 'loves' is predicated of
God which is anything like 'a perfectly normal sense' of
'loves'. And this includes both those theodicies which include
and those which exclude eschatological hopes or expectations.
As D. Z. Phillips relates in attacking a particular theodicy:
"There are screams and screams, and to ask of
what use are the screams of the innocent ...
is to embark on a speculation we should not
even contemplate. We have our reasons, final
human reasons, for putting a moral full-stop
at many places. If God has other reasons,
they are his reasons, not ours, and they do
not overrule them. That is why, should he
ask us to consider them, we, along with Ivan
Karamazov, respectfully, or not so respect¬
fully, return him the ticket ... And if there
is a 'higher' form of reasoning among God and
his angels, where such matters are open for
compromise and calculation, then so much the
worse for God and his angels." (18^-)
Phillips' critique here, based as it is on moral considera¬
tions, is of course not merely a critique of a particular
theodicy, but is a critique aimed at the very possibility of
theodicy in general. Be that as it may, what Phillips does
highlight is the fact that any theodicy must differentiate
between 'God's reasons' and 'our reasons', 'God's love' and
'our love* - a contrast between the divine and human which
surely suggests that when any Christian believer says,'God
loves us*, he is by no manner of means using the term 'love* in
a 'perfectly normal sense'. Indeed isn't this one reason why
Christian theologies have found it necessary to formulate a
doctrine of analogy?
But of course one must remember that for Wittgenstein
what in 'religious language appeared to be a simile is in fact
mere nonsense.' Can one accept this claim? If the claim
being made here is that language as such is inadequate or
incoherent - not that that which it is an attempt to verbal¬
ise is incoherent - to serve as a vehicle of communication
then I am afraid one must reject the point and on logical
grounds too. When Wittgenstein claims that there is some¬
thing to be discovered, something to be communicated,i.e.,
religious and ethical value, only language cannot communicate
the discovery, language as such being inadequate here, then I
think Wittgenstein's claim is open to the following objection,
put forward by D. Z. Phillips in another context but
equally important ihd relevant here. "Our language is not a
poor alternative to other means of communication, it is what
constitutes communication ... There can be an inadequate use
of language, but it makes no sense to say that language itself
is inadequate." (185) As F. Hamsey expressed the point: "What
we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."
(186)
On this particular point we have already seen Wittgenstein
maKe reference to S. Kierkegaard. J. Walker in an article (187)
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claims that Wittgenstein probably had Chapter 3 of Kierkegaard's
Philosophical Fragments in mind. Here, Walker informs us,
Kierkegaard says things like the following. "The supreme para¬
dox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that
thought cannot think." "A limit is precisely a torment for
passion." "This unknown something with which the Reason
collides when inspired by its paradoxical passion ... Let us
call this something: God." And we know also from Malcolm that
Wittgenstein held Kierkegaard in high esteem. "He referred to
him, with something of awe in his expression,as a 'really
religious' man. He had read the Concluding Unscientific Post¬
script - but found it 'too deep' for him." (188)
For Kierkegaard "religious suffering ... is precisely the
consciousness of the contradiction, which is pathetically and
tragically incorporated in the consciousness of the religious
individual." (189) For Wittgenstein too, the tendency of the
religious man is 'to run against the boundaries of language',
a tendency, which we saw, although 'perfectly absolutely hope¬
less 'jis one which Wittgenstein 'personally cannot help
respecting deeply.'
PART B
Although it is true that Wittgenstein's later philosophy
can only really be understood when viewed against the back¬
ground of a continuous struggle with the ideas expressed in the
earlier work - the Tractatus - the essential continuity of the
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'earlier' and 'later' philosophy must not be neglected. The
'sense of a proposition', the 'structure of language', these
were the problems which puzzled Wittgenstein in his 'early
philosophy' and it is to these same problems that Wittgenstein
provides the very different answers of the Investigations (1)
period. The 'picture theory of language' is rejected because
it neglects the importance of use in language and the multi¬
farious uses that language can have. Language does not have
only one function, to picture or state facts. As P. Hacker
states:
"Although the change runs deep, it is instruc¬
tive to conceive of it as a transformation
rather than a substitution, a matter of
rotating the axis of the investigation one
hundred and eighty degrees about the fixed
point of our real need. In the Tractatus
the structure of language or thought provided
the insight into the structure of reality.
In the Investigations the structure of
language is still the subject of investiga¬
tion. Moreover it is still isomorphic with
the structure of reality, not because language
must mirror the logical form of the universe,
but because the apparent 'structure of reality'
is merely the shadow of grammar." (2)
What however does it mean to claim that for Wittgenstein,in this
period of his thought,'the apparent structure of reality is
merely the shadow of grammar: To explicate this thought is,
in an important sense, to elucidate the Wittgensteinian con¬
ception of language and its relation to reality as propounded
in the Investigations period and this I shall now proceed to do.
- _
"For a large class of cases - though not for all - in
which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the
meaning of a word is its use in the language." (3) Or again:
"Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its
employment." (4) Thus, "to understand a sentence means to
understand a language. To understand a language means to be
master of a technique." (3)
It is simply wrong to believe that language can only
portray or represent reality in one unique way, that "thought,
language (must be) the unique correlate, picture, of the world";
that "proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one
behind the other, each equivalent to each." (6) There are
countless kinds of sentences, "countless different kinds of
use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this
multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but
new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come
into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten."
(7) Again: "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a
hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue,
nails and screws. - The functions of words are as diverse as
the functions of these objects." (8) The mistake of the
Tractatus is to take as a paradigm factual or descriptive
sentences, then assessing the meaningfulness, the very
verbalisability of all other sentences in terms of this para¬
digm. Instead of trying to discover 'the general form of
propositions' rather, Wittgenstein claims, what should be >
spotlighted are the 'games' we play with language - the
'language-games' - because in so doing we are pointing to the
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different uses and variety of language.
According to Malcolm, the idea of language as playing
games with words occurred to Wittgenstein on the occasion of
seeing a football match.
"One day when Wittgenstein was passing a
field where a football game was in progress
the thought first struck him that in language
we play games with words. A central idea of
his philosophy, the notion of a 'language-
game', apparently had its genesis in this
incident." (9)
But what kind and variety of uses of language has Wittgenstein
in mind when he talks of 'language-games'? He Slates:
"Review the multiplicity of language-games
in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders and obeying them -
Describing the appearance of an object, or
giving its measurements -
Constructing an object from a description
(a drawing) -
Reporting an event -
Speculating about an event -
Forming and testing a hypothesis -
Presenting the results of an experiment in
tables and diagrams -




Making a joke; telling it -
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic -
Translating from one language into another -
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the
tool.s in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity
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of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said
about the structure of language. (Including the author of the
II
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) (10)
Given,however, that language has this multiplicity and
variety of use?what do the various 'language-games' we play
with words have in common with each other? What, in other
words, makes them into language or parts of language? In the
Brown Book Wittgenstein has this to say:
"We are not however, regarding the language-
games which we describe as incomplete parts
of a language, but as languages complete in
themselves, as complete systems of human
communication." (11)
However in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein
States:
"For someone might object against me: 'You
take the easy way out J You talk about all
sorts of language-games, but have nowhere
said what the essence of a language-game,
and hence of language, is: what is common to
all these activities, and what makes them
into language or parts of language' ... Instead
of producing something common to all that we
call language, I am saying that these pheno¬
mena have no one thing in common which makes
us use the same word for all, - but that they
are related to one another in many different
ways. And it is because of this relation¬
ship, or these relationships, that we call
them all 'language'....Consider, for example,
the proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean
board-games, card-games, ball games, Olympic
games, and so on. What is common to them all?
- Don't say: 'There must be something common,
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or they would not be called "games'" - but look
and see whether there is anything common to
all: - For if you look at them you will not
see something that is common to all, but
similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that. To repeat: don't
think, but look! ... And the result of this
examination is: we see a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and criss¬
crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail: I can think
of no better expression to characterise these
similarities than 'family resemblances'; for
the various resemblances between members of
a family: build, features, colours of eyes,
grit, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and
criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall
say: 'games form a family.'" (12)
Words have uses, language gains its intelligibility
because in using language we are 'playing games with words' -
we are displaying our 'language-games'. But further,not only
are the 'language-games' we play with words the condition of
the very intelligibility of language but also 'language-games'
must be regarded as facets of our 'natural history'.
"Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a
part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking,
playing." (13) And, just as it would not make much sense to
ask for an explanation of, a justification of walking or
drinking so the mistake of many philosophers is "to look for an
explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-
phenomenon'. That is where we ought to have said: This
language-game is played." (l^f) Or again, "it isn't a question
of explaining a language game by means of our experiences, but
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of noting a language-game." (15) "Look on the 'language-game'
as the primary thing." (16) Thus the programme of the
Investigations is to supply"remarks on the natural history of
human beings", bearing in mind "that the language game is so
to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on
grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there
- like our life." (17)
However, to mention 'natural history' is to emphasise the
following aspect of 'language-games'. "To imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life." (18) Or again: "the term
'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form
of life." (19) The expression 'form or forms of life* occurs
only five times in the Investigations, and we have already seen
two of these uses, but in explicating what Wittgenstein has in
mind here I shall add to these references (a) remarks made in
other works and (b) remarks made concerning closely related
concepts such as "common behaviour of mankind", and "natural
history".
Wittgenstein gives only one example of 'form of life' in
the Investigations. He states: "Can only those hope who can
talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language.
That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this com¬
plicated form of life." (20) "The word 'hope' refers to .a
phenomenon of human life." (21) I take it that the point
Wittgenstein is primarily making here is that although hope
can be regarded as a 'phenomenon of human life' - 'a form of
life' - still it is only insofar as one can imagine a language
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of 'hoping' that one can imagine hope as a form of life, As
we saw,'to speak a language is part of a form of life.' But
simply to say this may mislead unless we remember that 'to
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.' This is
so because, as Wittgenstein _states, "if a lion could talk, we
could not understand him." (22) And this is so because "the
common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means
of which we interpret an unknown language." (23) The inter¬
pretation and understanding of an unknown language demands a
shared 'form of life'. Thus} our inability to understand the
'speech' of a lion is a function of the fact that there is no
shared or common 'form of life' between lions and ourselves.
Words or language alone cannot enable us to understand
language.
"'Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too
honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate
pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him
to howl on particular occasions as if he
were in pain, even when he is not. But the
surroundings which are necessary for this
behaviour to be real simulation are missing." (2^0
The fourth reference in the Investigations is the
following;
"•So you are saying that human agreement
decides what is true and what is false?' -
It is what human beings say that is true and
false; and they agree in the language they
use. That is not agreement in opinions but
in form of life. If language is to be a
means of communication there must be agree¬
ment not only in definitions but also (queer
as this may sound) in judgements ... It is
- 60 -
one thing to describe methods of measurement,
and another to obtain and state results of
measurement. But what we call 'measuring'
is partly determined by a certain constancy
in results of measurement." (25)
Human convention is at work when we have a 'language-game' or
'form of life' and this convention must include agreement in
judgement as well as in definition if language is to be a
vehicle of communication. Such conventions are based on uni¬
formities of nature.
"Disputes do not break out (among mathema¬
ticians, say) over the question whether a
rule has been obeyed or not. People don't
come to blows over it, for example. That is
part of the framework on which the working
of our language is based (for example, in
giving descriptions)." (26)
Wittgenstein is not claiming here that to obey a rule i_s to
act in a manner which others agree in calling obedient. Rather
what he i£3 maintaining is that unless there is a uniform and
constant behaviour or reaction then the concept of rule, and
thus the concepts of agreement or disagreement with the rule,
could never be given application. ""If humans were not in
general agreed about the colours of things, if undetermined
cases were not exceptional, then our concept of colour could
not exist'.' No:-our concept would not exist." (27) In the
absence of certain kinds of regularity - in this case of
natural phenomena - the very possibility of applying concepts
would be made impossible. What we 'call measuring' can only
have application and significance if we are all agreed on the
results of our measuring. The very possibility of our
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predicating truth or falsity of our judgements depends on a
prior constancy and regularity in our judgements.
The fifth and final reference in the Investigations to
'form of life' comes when Wittgenstein remarks: "What has to
be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life."
(28) A passage which can be read profitably with this is the
following:
"One might say: " VI know*- expresses comfortable
certainty, not the certainty that is still
struggling." Now I would like to regard this
certainty, not as something akin to hastiness
or superficiality, but as a form of life.
(That is very badly expressed and probably
badly thought as well.) But that means I
want to conceive it as something that lies
beyond being justified or unjustified; as it
were, as something animal." (29)
The 'given', the 'forms of life' are 'beyond justification'.
Indeed what "people accept as a justification - is shown by
how they think and live." (30) Again, Wittgenstein speaking
specifically on the notion of justification states: "If I have
exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my
spade is turned. Then I sum inclined to say: 'This is simply
what I do.'" (31) Underlying human conventions are human
actions. Thus "... write with confidence 'In the beginning was
the deed.'" (32) Stating grounds, giving justifications must
come to a conclusion and the conclusion is "not an ungrounded
presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting." (33) Just
as we saw, we must claim 'this language-game is played' so
what constitutes the 'given' are the 'forms of life' - 'forms
of life' which are part of "the natural history of human beings." (3^)
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As I hope can be seen from my exposition,the concepts of
'language-game' and 'form of life' are extremely important in
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Indeed the 'language-games'
listed,such as asking, thanking, praying etc.; and such 'forms
of life' listed,as hoping and feeling certain,constitute the
'given' from which philosophy must begin.
If philosophy must begin with these 'forms of life' and
'language-games' what particular role can be alloted to philo¬
sophical investigation? The principal elements of Wittgenstein's
conception of philosophy are brought together well in the
following paragraph:
"It was true to say that our considerations
could not be scientific ones ... And we may
not advance any kind of theory. There must
not be anything hypothetical in our considera¬
tions. We must do away with all explanation,
and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is
to say its purpose, from the philosophical
problems. These are, of course, not empirical
problems; they are solved, rather, by looking
into the workings of our language, and that
in such a way as to make us recognise those
workings: in despite of an urge to misunder¬
stand them. The problems are solved, not by
giving new information, but by arranging what
we have always known. Philosophy is a battle
against the bewitchment of our intelligence
by means of language." (35)
This being the case means that, for Wittgenstein, a
philosophical investigation is therefore "a grammatical one.
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing
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misunderstandings away ... misunderstandings concerning the use
of words, caused among other things, by certain analogies
between the forms of expression in different regions of
language." (3&) Language unifies that v/hich is in fact diverse.
Indeed we are "unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all
the everyday language-games because the clothing of our
language makes everything alike." (37) Philosophy is thus 'a
battle caused by language's bewitchment of our intelligence'
and language causes this trouble because we are unable "to turn
our eyes away from a picture which holds us captive", and
indeed, thus dazzled "we fail to see the actual use of the
word(s)" we are studying. (38)
Malcolm well illustrates this novel orientation of
Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy by quoting from
a lecture of 19^6:
"What I give is the morphology of the use of
an expression. I show that it has kinds of
uses of which you had not dreamed. In philo¬
sophy one feels forced to look to a concept
in a certain way. What I do is to suggest,
or even invent, other ways of looking at it.
I suggest possibilities of which you had not
previously thought. You thought that there
was one possibility, or only two at most.
But I made you think of others. Furthermore,
I made you see that it was absurd to expect
the concept to conform to those narrow possi¬
bilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved,
and you are free to look around the field of
use of the expression and to describe the
different kinds of uses of it." (39)
If the genesis of philosophical mistakes is to be found
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in the inability of philosophers to widen their vision and to
cease focusing on one particular paradigm,then philosophers
must be made aware of other paradigms. "The work of the philo¬
sopher consists in assembling reminders for particular
purposes." (40) If "a main cause of philosophical disease is
a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one
kind of example"(41), then the philosopher must be made aware
of other word uses "so as to command a clear view of the use of
our words." (42) And if our "grammar is lacking in this sort
of perspicuity" this is so because one must "distinguish
•surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'." (43) And of course it
is 'depth grammar' that the philosopher is interested in. This
distinction between 'surface' and 'depth' grammar is important
for Wittgenstein because he sees the origin of many philoso¬
phical problems in the fact that the 'surface grammar' of the
use of a sign or signs misleads us concerning the 'depth
grammar' of the sign or signs, i.e., how the sign is in fact
used (depth grammar) as opposed to how it appears it is used
(surface grammar).
The aim then of philosophy is to fully understand how our
words are used because "a perspicuous representation is of
fundamental significance because it earmarks the form of
account we give, the way we look at things." (44) Indeed,
"philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither
explains nor deduces anything." (45) And yet,although in one
sense nothing is explained,in another sense everything is
•explained' or 'made clear' because we now understand what,
prior to being made clear,was the source of philosophical
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difficulty and confusion. 'Philosophical propositions' may be
simply undisguised grammatical truisms but they do lead to the
disappearance of philosophical problems. "Philosophy may in no
way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end
only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is." (46) Thus philosophy produces
clarification simply by description of grammar, a description
which, it has been claimed, is "not aimed at revealing the
structure of the world, but the structure of our thought, not
directed at eternal metaphysical verities, but at those facts
of the natural history of the mind which will dispel confusion."
a?)
To say this?however,is not to imply that for Wittgenstein
philosophical 'questions' and 'solutions' are only linguistic
problems and solutions. 'Wittgenstein does not want "to talk
only about words." (48) Rather, "grammar tells us what kind
of object anything is" (4-9), and indeed, "essence is expressed
by grammar." (50) In fact, according to Wittgenstein's thesis,
essence is not only expressed in grammar, but also constituted
in grammar. "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the
language." (51) Thus metaphysical sentences are disguised
arbitrary grammatical rules: "The only correlate in language to
an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only
thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a
proposition." (52) The necessary truths which the metaphysician
enquires after are 'mere' grammatical necessities. Or, as
P. Hacker expresses it: "The necessary truths which the meta¬
physician seeks in his investigations into the essence of the
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world are mere reflections of grammar." (53)
Why, however, should these grammatical rules be labelled
arbitrary? Well they are arbitrary because they are autonomous.
They are not based on any ultimate constituents of reality,
i.e. Tractarian 'objects'. "The connection between "language
and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong
to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and auto¬
nomous." (5*0 Thus grammar cannot 'conflict with' or 'contradict'
reality. "The thing that's so difficult to understand can be
expressed like this. As long as we remain in the province of
the true-false games a change in the grammar can only lead us
from one such game to another, and never from something
true to something false. On the other hand if we go outside
the province of these games, we don't any longer call it
'language' and 'grammar', and once again we don't come into
contradiction with reality." (55)
Facts in the world do not provide an 'explanation' of
the grammatical rules we do have. Rather, if we do look for
an 'explanation' of grammatical rules, we shall have to dis¬
cover it "in training". (56) Grammar is deposited in our
language and in following the grammatical rules which we do we a
are displaying our social nature. Thus what makes sense within
a given grammar is dependent upon the rules that constitute
that grammar and, in keeping with the conventionalist nature
of the thesis being expressed here, "what looks as if it had
to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our
language-game.Jr (57) 'Essences', as we saw, are 'constituted
in grammar' - not found but made - and it is in this sense
that grammar is autonomous.
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Furthermore, as we saw above, grammar is not only auto¬
nomous but there are as many different grammars as there are
language-games - 'a change in the grammar can only lead us
from one such game to another'. The grammatical rules are the
rules of particular language-games constituting not only the
possibility of sense and nonsense in the 'game' but also the
possibility of the application of the game to reality. The
move is from language to ontology, and, given that there is
such a move and given the foundational nature of the rules of
grammar, we can now see clearly why 'to imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life'. The 'language-games' and
'forms of life' which exist represent the 'given' of reality.
They are there - "like our life". (53) It is in this way that
the 'apparent 'structure of reality' is merely the shadow of
grammar'.
WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF
I concluded ray account of the 'Tractatus period' of
Wittgenstein's philosophy by critically discussing Wittgenstein's
claim that the temptation of the religious man was 'to run
against the boundaries of significant language' - a tempta¬
tion which won respect, however, from Wittgenstein. What, in
the light of the Investigations' theory of meaning and language,
can we say about such a temptation? Can we account for it?
Given the change in point of view arising from the nev;
theory of meaning it would seem that such a temptation ought
not to arise in the first place, let alone be accounted for.
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This is so because the original temptation - the desire to run
against the boundaries of language - can arise only if one is
working with a theory of meaning such as the Tractatus account
which maintains that factual, scientific discourse is the only
significant language. However, once this theory is abandoned
and factual, scientific discourse is no longer held to be a
paradigm of intelligibility, it is then possible to admit the
existence of significant religious assertions and indeed the
existence of 'religious language-games'. Indeed, and more
fundamentally, it is no longer possible to permit the descrip¬
tion of the religious attitude as one of 'running against the
boundaries of language'. This is no longer intelligible.
Rather, from the Investigations' point of view, one must
simply point to the fact of the existence of religious people -
people who, because they adopt a religious attitude to the
world, act and talk in a religious way. There simply are
'religious language-games' and 'forms of life' and the task ■ f
facing the philosopher is to articulate the grammar of the
beliefs and attitudes held.
Thus, from the new point of view, there can be and are
significant religious utterances and 'language-games' - 'language-
games' which are as verbalisable and as meaningful as any other.
Indeed the Tractatus dichotomy between the expressible (factual
discourse) and the inexpressible (transcendental) must be aban¬
doned. And, indeed, consistent with this there are no mystical
passages or themes in the later work. Kore fundamentally,
however, there are, in fact, only three significant references
to religion in these same works and these are, in themselves,
cryptic and parenthetical. The three references are: "Essence
is expressed by
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grammar ... Grammar tells what kind of object anything ife
(Theology as grammar)" (59); "How words are understood is
not told by words alone (Theology)" (60); "You can't hear
God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you are
being addressed - That is a grammatical remark." (61) I wish
now to look briefly at these three references in turn and
attempt to relate them to the theoretical framework of the
later philosophy.
(a) I take it that in referring to 'theology as grammar'
Wittgenstein is concerned to make the point that theology arti¬
culates the standards of intelligibility implicit in the
language of a religion. Furthermore, insofar as theological
propositions are concerned with the object of religious
responses ,i.e., God, grammar articulates what can and cannot be
said of the divine object. And in articulating the grammar of
a particular religion we are 'expressing essence', that which is
the fundamental ground - the 'given' - of the particular
T eLlgi-on.
(b) In discussing the meaning or use of words we saw that to
understand how a word is used we must see it in its 'natural
environment', its natural 'language-game'. And of course to
'imagine a language-game is to imagine a form of life'. "Only
in the system has the sign any life." (62) It is not sufficient
to examine word usage in a vacuum - by 'words alone' - but
rather we must relate the words to the particular 'forms of
life' of which they constitute a part. Similarly with theology,
theological terms only are meaningful because they are an
expression of? constitute a part of, a particular* 'form of
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life'. Separate theological terms from the 'system in which
they have their life' and they lose their significance, their
intelligibility.
(c) Finally, the point of Wittgenstein's remark,'"You can't
hear God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you
are being addressed" - That is a grammatical remark,' is that
the sense in which it is 'impossible' to overhear God speaking
to someone is that it would make no sense logically - speci¬
fically within the 'Christian, in particular, 'language-game -
to claim or suppose that one could. That is, if someone did
claim to 'overhear God' he would be refuted not by employing
extra sensitive listening equipment to show him he was mistaken
but rather by pointing out to him that within the language-
game it simply made no sense to so claim.
As I have said, apart from these parenthetical asides in
the major works of the later period, there are no other signi¬
ficant references in these works as to how Wittgenstein believes
his later philosophy could or would apply to religious belief.
However, we do have some pupils' extant lecture notes on the
subject of religious belief, pelivered in Cambridge in 1938 by
Wittgenstein; these 'Lectures on Religious Belief' belong to
a course of lectures on 'belief', (63) and it is to an examina¬
tion of the content of these lectures that I now wish to turn.
In these 'Lectures' Wittgenstein appears to be concerned
with the central issues of the nature, role and status of
religious belief claims and the criteria of rationality
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attendant upon such belief claims. The main aim of the
'lectures' is to attempt to display the grammar of religious
belief and to relate the expressions of belief to the human
phenomena, to the human attitudes and emotions, in which such
belief expressions are embedded.
Wittgenstein begins the 'Lectures' by taking as an
example of a religious belief, the belief in the Last Judgement.
(6*0 (This in itself may seem a strange example of a religious
belief to adopt for examination insofar as religious belief in
the Last Judgement, with its concomitant ideas of eternal
punishment, eternal bliss, heaven and hell, is a belief which
has had a fluctuating interpretation and uneasy history within,
in particular, Christian theology. Be that as it may, it is
around such a religious belief that Wittgenstein wishes to base
his discussion.)
Wittgenstein poses the following question:
"Suppose that someone believed in the Last
Judgement, and I don't, does this mean that I
believe the opposite to him, just that there
won't be such a thing? I would say; 'not at all,
or not always.' Suppose I say that the body
will rot, and another says, 'No. Particles will
rejoin in a thousand years, and there will be a
Resurrection of you.' If some said: 'Wittgen¬
stein, do you believe in this?' I'd say: 'No.'
'Do you contradict the man?' I'd say: 'No.' If
you say this, the contradiction already lies in
this. Would you say: 'I believe the opposite,'
or 'There is no reason to suppose such a thing'?
I'd say neither." (65)
Now I think some fundamental distinctions need to be drawn
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here. First of all-in the case of the belief in the 'destiny
of the body'?it surely is the case that Wittgenstein is contra¬
dicting the man who believes that there will be a resurrection
of the body. This is so because Wittgenstein does believe and
affirm that the exact opposite will occur - the body will Tot.
But this conclusion need not necessarily apply to the belief in
the Last Judgement. In this case 'Wittgenstein simply states
that he does not believe in the Last Judgement. Here the denial
of belief may simply amount to the claim [a) ^Ihst Wittgenstein
has no thoughts on the matter or ib) that Wittgenstein does not
list such a belief among the contents of his beliefs. He is
not specifically denying or contradicting the belief in the
Last Judgement. He is not specifically affirming, as in the
case of the 'destiny of the body', that he believes a state of
affairs will occur which is the exact opposite to what the man
who believes in the resurrection of the body affirms.
Despite the correctness of the points made here I doubt
whether Wittgenstein would be very impressed because,fundamen¬
tally }he is not simply interested in correct applications of the
term 'contradiction'. Rather his thesis is much more wide
ranging and is concerned not simply with affirmations or denials
of a particular religious belief but with the whole sphere of
religion and religious belief in general. The believer and
unbeliever differ not simply in what they affirm or deny -
indeed this may be essentially unimportant - but in a much more
radical way. Wittgenstein explicates the point in the following
way:
"There are, for instance, these entirely
different ways of thinking first of all - which
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needn't be expressed by one person saying one
thing, another person another thing. What we
call believing in a Judgement Day or not
believing in a Judgement Day - The expression
of belief may play an absolutely minor role ...
Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an
utterance of belief in a Last Judgement? But I
couldn't either say 'Yes' or 'No' to the state¬
ment that there will be such a thing. Nor
'perhaps' nor 'I'm not sure'. It is a statement
which may not allow of any such answer." (66)
And this is because;
"It isn't a question of my being anywhere near
him, but on an entirely different plane ... I
think differently, in a different way. I say
different things to myself. I have different
pictures." (67)
What however, first of all, does it mean to talk about
'different ways of thinking', to being on 'an entirely different
plane'. Wittgenstein gives this further example?
"Take two people, one of whom talks of his
behaviour and of what happens to him in terms
of retribution, the other one does not. These
people think entirely differently. Yet, so
far, you can't say they believe different
things. Suppose someone is ill and he says:
'This is a punishment,' and I say: 'If I'm
ill, I don't think of punishment at all.' If
you say: 'Do you believe the opposite?' - you
can call it believing the opposite, but it is
entirely different from what we would normally
call believing the opposite. ... It is this
way: if someone said: 'Wittgenstein, you don't
take illness as a punishment, so what do you
believe?' - I'd say: 'I don't have any thoughts
of punishment.*" (68)
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Within religious belief to see the events which befall
one as either a reward or punishment is,of course,to see these
events as in some important sense 'acts of God', products of
divine activity. Now of course if one is an atheist one will
not see these events as instantiations of divine reward or
punishment because the condition necessary to see the events
in this way (belief in a God and a God who acts in the world)
is not one which is shared with the religious believer. In
this sense the atheist 'doesn't have any thoughts of punishment
and may in a sense not be said to believe the opposite,to
contradict the believer. However this is so, it appears to me,
because such a religious belief, as the belief that events must
be seen as a reward or a punishment,is, if I can coin a phrase,
an internal or secondary belief of the 'religious form of life',
and is dependent for its significance, its very intelligibility
on a constitutive or fundamental belief,such as (a) the belief
that there is a God and (b) the belief that there is a God who
acts in the world. Now while it may be possibly intelligible
to claim that atheists do not believe the opposite of religious
believers' internal beliefs, can the same point apply to
constitutive or fundamental beliefs , such as the belief that
there is a God? The believer says 'there is a God', the
atheist says 'there is no God'; are they believing the opposite
contradicting one another? It seems to me obvious that they
are, indeed how else could one make sense of the atheisms
denial of God's existence if this were not the case? To negate
a sentence is not to change the meaning or significance of that
self same sentence, it is simply to deny the truth of what is
as serted.
W. D. Hudson thinks ,however, that Wittgenstein's point is
a good one here and illustrates its validity in the following
way;
"If someone says 'God is wise' we are entitled
to presume that he thinks God exists; but by
the same token, if 'God is not wise' is inten¬
ded as a contradiction, we are entitled to
assume that the speaker also takes God to
exist. The essential difference between
believers and unbelievers is not that sort of
difference. It is that the unbeliever refuses
to participate in the believer's form of life
at all." (69)
From this Hudson concludes that the unbeliever cannot contra¬
dict the believer. Now certainly it is true that, if one embarks
on a discussion of the wisdom or otherwise of God, one is
entitled to presume that One's, protagonist assumed the existence
of God and,further, that this must be the case if one is to
contradict the . other in ones conclusions. But of course; in
such a discussion of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of God, what
one is discussing is, in my terms, an internal belief, and the
fact that it is an internal belief which is being discussed is
evidenced by the fact that the kind of debate illustrated would,
in an important sense,be a theological one. That is, ignoring
for the present the problem of the status of assertions
involving divine predication, the debate would be betv/een two
committed believers. An atheist by definition, however, denies
God's existence and thus if he were to mean anything by the
claim that 'God is not wise' it certainly cannot involve the
assumption that God exists nor be thought of as any kind of
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contradiction of the believer. No atheist vaould want to claim
as a substantial article of his credo the belief that God
exists. But what about the belief that there is a God - this
constitutive or fundamental belief - and the belief that there
is no God! Are they contradictory beliefs? For Hudson,the
essential difference between the religious believer and the
atheist, as we saw, is that the 'unbeliever refuses to
participate in the believer's form of life'. But what
constitutes his refusal? Well,surely one possible reason may
be his belief that there is no God, a belief challenged and
contradicted by the believer who says there is a God. Certainly
it is true that within the believer's 'form of life' no ques¬
tion of God's existence may arise, and thus, in an important
sense,all talk takes place on the basis of this assumption of
God's existence,,But it surely is not satisfactory to present
us with the stark alternative of either participating in the
'religious form of life' or not so participating - such
participation or lack of participation being denied any
propositional content such that one could say the believer and
the atheist contradict one another when they affirm or deny
God's existence/be.,utter a constitutive or fundamental belief.
For Hudson however "an unbeliever is someone who rejects
the believer's whole form of life rather than contradicts his
beliefs." (70) To further advance his claim,Hudson asks us to
consider the criticisms propounded by ProfessorS'tbaittson in his
critique of B. Russell's Theory of Descriptions. He states:
"Strawsori's criticism, invites us to think what
we would do if someone, having said 'The king
of France is wise', asked us whether we
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considered what he had said to be true or false.
We should say that we did not consider it to
be either because, since there is no king of
France, the question whether or not he is wise
simply does not arise. Strawson argues that,
whilst anyone who said 'The king of France is
wise', would normally be taken to believe that
there is a king of France, his statement does
not logically entail that there is, as Russell
supposed, because if in reply to it we said
'But there is no king of France' we should not
consider ourselves, or be considered by others,
to have contradicted the speaker. We should
not be saying that what he had said is false.
We should be saying that the question of its
truth or falsity does not arise." (71)
These points are well made and?further, it is not difficult to
see how the issue could be moved from the 'secular' to the
'religious': i.e., for, 'the king of France is wise!, read,'God
is wise'. However, assume the original claim or statement was
not,'the king of France is wise', but the statement,'there is
a king of France', or to give this a religious reading,'there
is or exists a God! Such a statement would logically entail
that there is alternatively either a king of France or a God
such that anyone claiming the opposite, i.e., 'there is no king
of France', or,' there is no God', would be considered to have
contradicted the original claim or statement. And if we dwell
solely on the religious claim,wouldn't this be an example of
the 'unbeliever contradicting the beliefs of the believer'?
To this Hudson replies:
"we shall say that an unbeliever is someone who
rejects the whole religious 'form of life'
rather than someone who can participate in it
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to the extent of calling the believer's asser¬
tions false." (72)
In other words 'contradiction', 'truth' and 'falsity' are terms
which can have a role within the'religious form of life', they
can apply to what I have already termed internal beliefs. But
're.ject the whole religious form of life' must be a kind of
activity which cannot be given any propositional content;else
the possibility of the unbeliever contradicting the believer
would emerge as a real possibility. Certainly in 'rejecting
the whole religious form of life' there may well be involved
a plethora of emotions, attitudes, fears, hopes, desires, etc.,
but there must surely be also involved a propositional element,
for how else could such a rejection be labelled 'a rejection'?
The unbeliever must surely deny the believer's claim that
there is a God. Yet, Hudson informs us,
"to contradict another person is to utter the
negation of what he has asserted. Unbelief is
not accurately described if it is defined as
the contradiction, in this strict sense, of
belief." (73)
Certainly religious unbelief is not merely the utterance of
the negation of that which is asserted by the believer,but it
must, at the very minimum, at least involve such an utterance.
When the believer says, 'I believe in God', or,'God exists' and
the atheist says,'I do not believe in God', or,'God does not
exist', not only do they believe they are contradicting each
other in the strictest sense of the term,but they are also
correct in their beliefs.
Leaving aside the particular issue of contradiction;let
me explore more fully now Wittgenstein's references to
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'different ways of thinking', to being on 'an entirely different
plane*. More particularly then,what is involved in affirming or
assenting to a religious belief, such as the belief in the Last
Judgement? Wittgenstein states:
"Suppose somebody made this guidance for life:
believing in the Last Judgement. Whenever he
does anything, this is before his mind - he has
what you might call an unshakeable belief. It
will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to
ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by
regulating for all in his life." (7*0
Any disagreement between a religious believer and a non-believer
is not adequately described if it is expressed in terms of a
clash of contrary beliefs. In fact,to uphold a religious belief
is,for Wittgenstein, to regulate one's thought and action in a
special way - such regulation being given content in the claim
that one sees one's actions and the events that befall one in
a special way. It might involve, as already suggested, seeing
one's life and what happens to one as 'a reward or punish¬
ment'. Thus the believer who has this 'unshakeable belief' -
who experiences religious claims as absolutes - is on an
'entirely different plane' from the unbeliever. Indeed it
may not be the case that this difference is manifested in
the expression of the belief because,as we saw,within the
context of the belief 'the expression of belief may play an
absolutely minor role'. Indeed beliefs in general, and
religious belief in particular, are displayed more in what we do
than in what we say. The foundation of belief is embedded in
action not words, a point evidenced by the fact that, according
to Wittgenstein, as a criterion of the firmness of a belief we
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must look to what a 'man risks'. (75) As Wittgenstein relates
in another context when discussing where justification must stop:
"The end is not certain propositions striking
us immediately as true; i.e. it is not a kind
of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which
lies at the bottom of the language-game." (76)
Surely however, one cannot rest content with such a claim?
Actions do not take place in a vacuum. How one acts or behaves
is determined by the kind of beliefs one has about the situation
in question and such beliefs not only can be expressed, talked
about, argued about but also assessed as to their truth,to such
an extent that it is simply wrong to claim that 'the expression
of belief may play an absolutely minor role'. Actions can be
appropriate or inappropriate, correct or incorrect, and one ready
criterion,which can be deployed to determine the appropriateness,
correctness or otherwise of any particular action, may be whether
the belief expressed in the action is a true belief, is in accord
with how things are in the world. Be that as it may,Wittgen¬
stein's position here has led one critic to maintain that, for
Wittgenstein ,'commitment must logically precede rather than
follow the entertaining by a Christian of any proposition of his
faith' with the consequence that 'religious statements are linked
logically to a commitment'. (77)
Is this a correct conclusion? To answer this,let me
approach the question by asking whether,for Wittgenstein,one
should draw the conclusion that the religious believer's state¬
ments can never be understood, if they cannot be contradicted?
To this point Wittgenstein replies in a very tentative fashion.
He states:
- 81 -
"If you ask me whether or not I believe in a
Judgement Day, in the sense in which religious
people have belief in it, I wouldn't say: 'No.
I don't believe there will be such a thing.' ...
And then I give an explanation: 'I don't believe
in ...' , but then the religious person never
believes what I describe. I can't say. I can't
contradict that person. In one sense, I under¬
stand all he says - the English words 'God',
'separate', etc. I understand. I could say:
'I don't believe in this,' and this would be
true, meaning I haven't got these thoughts or
anything that hangs together with them. But not
that I could contradict the thing. You might
say: 'Well if you can't contradict him, that
means you don't understand him. If you did
understand him, then you might.' That again is
Greek to me. My normal technique of language
leaves me. I don't know whether to say they
understand one another or not." (78)
(Two interesting points arise here. First of all, I suspect
that Wittgenstein is giving expression here to his doubts as to
whether religious utterances are intelligible or meaningful in
any important sense. Secondly, the use of the word 'normal'
is strange here. Such a term surely seems particularly
inappropriate unless one is thinking of a situation where
criteria of intelligibility are straightforward - such as
provided by the Tractatus model? The use of such a term is
certainly not in keeping with the new theory of meaning.)
However,to continue, one reason Wittgenstein gives above
for the inability of the non-believer to contradict the believer
arises from the alleged inability of the believer and non-believer
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to agree on a description or account of the believer's beliefs.
Now this argument seems particularly weak. Of course there may
well be occasions when such difficulties arise; when it is
difficult (but not surely impossible ) to agree on an actual
account of what it is that the believer believes. Surely,
however, for the believer to be able to rule out certain des¬
criptions or accounts of his beliefs as erroneous,he must be
able to give a propositional content to his own beliefs, £knd
further, what would it mean to claim that a religious
believer subscribes to certain beliefs if the believer was unable
to give any verbal content to such beliefs? In fact,Wittgenstein
later admits that the believer and non-believer may well
"describe the same things", (79) but still he remains hesitant as
to whether this implies they understand one another. V/hen dis¬
cussing the term 'God' and its use in language he states the
following:
"The word is used like a word representing a
person. God sees, rewards, etc. 'Being shown
all these things, did you understand what this
word meant?* I'd say: 'Yes and no. I did learn
what it didn't mean. I made myself understand.
I would answer questions, understand questions
when they were put in different ways - and in
that sense could be said to understand.'" (80)
Thus the failure to understand - if there is such a failure
- does not arise from an inability to understand the meaning of
individual words or terms constituting religious sentences,or
indeed the presuppositions or implications of their usage. To
that extent religious statements are not 'linked logically to
a commitment'. But,for Wittgenstein,at another level^under-
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understanding may be lacking, precisely because the unbeliever
does not share the 'thoughts of the believer or anything that
hangs together with them'. Indeed religious statements do not
"just differ in respect to what they are about. Entirely
different connections would make them into religious beliefs." (81)
Such 'connections' for Wittgenstein, such 'entirely
different ways of thinking', what it means to be on 'an entirely
different plane', are best expressed,as we have seen, in the
claim that the religious believer 'uses pictures'. What,however,
does Wittgenstein mean here when he suggests that religious
believers use pictures? More particularly what does Wittgenstein
mean by the term 'picture', and what is involved in its
use? On occasions, by 'picture', Wittgenstein seems to mean
nothing more nor less than an ordinary work of art. As he
-Slates:
"Take 'God created man'. Pictures of Michelangelo
showing the creation of the world. In general,
these is nothing which explains the meanings of
words as well as a picture, and I take it that
Michelangelo was as good as anyone can be and
did his best, and here is the picture of the
Deity creating Adam." (82)
The suggestion here seems to be that what is expressed in the
proposition, 'God created man', is best elucidated and understood
if,along with the utterance of the words,we have presented a
picture of the event as well. On other occasions Wittgenstein
seems to mean something entirely different by the term 'picture'.
For example,when he claims: "'God's eye sees everything' - I
want to say of this that it uses a picture", (85) it is very
obvious that he is not thinking about or presupposing any
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ordinary work of art as constituting the picture involved.
Indeed,what possible work of art could elucidate the meaning of
such a proposition? Rather, on this occasion,Wittgenstein seems
to be referring to some kind of mental idea, image or picture and
the reason why he prefers to call this a picture is best illus¬
trated in the following quotation. One:
"could imagine that religion was taught by means
of these pictures. 'Of course, we can only
express ourselves by means of picture.' This is
rather queer ... I could show Moore the pictures
of a tropical plant. There is a technique of
comparison between picture and plant. If I
showed him the picture of Michelangelo and said:
'Of course, I can't show you the real thing,
only the picture' ... Tha absurdity is, I've
never taught him the technique of using this
picture." (8*f)
With a non-religious picture it is possible to contrast
the picture with the object, scene, event or thing pictured.
One can compare picture and pictured. This,however, is not
possible in the religious case. One just has the picture, one
cannot compare the picture with that which is pictured in
reality. In religion,however,"the whole weight may be in the
picture." (85) And, not only may the whole weight be in the
picture but further,in identifying religious belief with the use
of pictures,Wittgenstein maintains all he really wants to
achieve is to "draw attention to a particular technique of usage".
(86) Indeed in claiming that religious believers use pictures,
Wittgenstein maintainSyhe is only "making a grammatical remark:
(what I say) can only be verified by the consequences he (the
religious believer) does or does not draw." (87)
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In answer to the question of what is involved in the
use of religious pictures, according to Wittgenstein, before one
can participate in religious belief one must be trained in the
technique of using the appropriate picture or pictures. To
acquire this technique means learning what conclusions are drawn
from the picture and what are not. The conclusions drawn deter¬
mine what constitutes sense or nonsense in religion. Thus, as an
example, ta.k.e the Wittgensteinian religious picture , 'God's eye
3ees everything'. .Religious believers using this picture would
be prepared to claim that the use of such a picture entitles them
to draw the conclusion that God knows what will happen in the
future, as well as what is happening now. Such a use is_ in accord
with the technique of usage of the picture. But on the other
hand,as Wittgenstein asks: "Are eyebrows going to be talked of,
in connection with the Eye of God?" (88) Certainly not! Reli¬
gious believers would regard it as absurd to wonder whether God's
\
eyebrows are bushy or shaggy. The use of the picture, the rules
of usage, render such questions absurd.
Now two points must be emphasised here. By characterising
religious belief in terms of 'using pictures', Wittgenstein,
first of all, is not intending to denigrate religious belief or
believers: "I don't want to belittle him (the religious believer)".
(89) Secondly, as already noted, Wittgenstein claims to be
merely 'drawing attention to a particular technique of usage ...
associating a particular use with a picture'. Now in suggesting,
as I have done, that by a picture Wittgenstein primarily seems
to have in mind some kind of mental picture or image,I was
attempting to make sense of statements like the following.*
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"The word 'God' is amongst the earliest learnt -
pictures and catechisms, etc. But not the same
consequences as with pictures of aunts. I
wasn't Shown (that which the picture pictured).
The word is used like a word representing a
person. God sees, rewards, etc." (90)
What is distinctive about such a picture is that it, unlike an
ordinary picture, cannot be contrasted or compared with that
which is pictured. One cannot compare God with the picture of
God, as one can compare one's aunt with her picture. All one ,
has in the religious case i_s the picture, the mental picture or
image. But further, and more importantly, does one even have that?
If by talk of pictures we are, as Wittgenstein claims, merely
'drawing attention to a particular technique of usage', high¬
lighting what 'conclusions can or cannot be drawn from the
pictures', then,surely, these pictures must be identical with or
reducible into propositions. That is, all one is doing, i"B
claiming that religious believers use pictures,is to spotlight a
particular and unique use of language - a use or technique which
can be taught and learnt. Indeed if we are to talk of 'conclusions
or consequences drawn', all of which is learnt by being taught a
particular technique of use,is it not the case that for picture
it would be more appropriate to read proposition? (91)
Now if this is what is involved in using religious pictures,
surely - to return to the issue or problem of understanding - the
unbeliever or atheist can understand the believer! If the
unbeliever is informed,e.g.,that certain conclusions are drawn
from the use of a picture 7 given our understanding of picture ,
he can understand this.. So how can it be intelligible to claim
that.in some sense,the unbeliever may not understand the believer?
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I think Wittgenstein believes there still is a sense in which it
may be claimed that the unbeliever does not fully understand the
believer's belief - what it 'means to the believer' to use reli¬
gious pictures.
For the religious believer to use the religious pictures is,
as we saw for Wittgenstein, to have 'an unshakeable belief. A
belief which will regulate for all in a believer's life.' How,
not only,in religious belief,do the beliefs assented to regulate
- not only are we presented with an explanatory framework, pro¬
vided with a criterion of action - but also
"a number of ways of thinking and acting
crystallise and come together. A man would
fight for his life not to be dragged into the
fire. No induction, terror. That is, as it
were, part of the substance of the belief." (92)
Or again:
"What is the criterion for meaning something
different? Not only what he takes as evidence
for it, but also how he reacts, that he is in
terror etc..." (93)
I think Wittgenstein is trying to say that unless one experiences
the believer's terror, unless one has a similar affective
response, unless one has an "extremely passionate belief" (9*0
in the,e.g.5 'Last Judgement', one will,in an important or deep
sense,not really understand what the religious believer believes.
Wittgenstein seems to be saying here that the unbeliever, who
construes religious belief theoretically, does not
fully understand the use of the religious picture or pictures .
Ultimately,the meaning of religious statements is to be found in
one's commitment. Religion can only be understood with passion.
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Understanding religion or religious belief is incompatible with
scepticism. To say this; however, is simply to claim that, if the
atheist does not Bhare the beliefs of the believer, the beliefs
of the believer do not have the same significance - a psycho¬
logical matter - for the atheist as they have for the believer.
The beliefs, in this sense.,may not mean the same to both men.
Such a claim,however, does not entitle us to draw the conclusion
that the atheist cannot understand the nature and content of the
believer's beliefs.
In discussing the criterion,which Wittgenstein postulates,
for 'meaning something differentwe saw Wittgenstein remark
that it 'may not only be how someone reacts, that he is in terror,
but also what he takes as 'evidence' for it. Now what does
Wittgenstein have to say concerning the criteria of rationality
for religious belief claims? Normally we consider a belief
rational if it is an evidential belief - a belief for which there
is good or adequate evidence. Wittgenstein discusses the ques¬
tion with particular attention to the different kinds of reasons
which may be given for religious beliefs,as opposed to factual,
scientific beliefs.
Is it the case that the religious believer believes and
uses the religious picture , e.g., of the Last Judgement', because
he thinks the evidence for such a happening as a Last Judgement
well established, while the unbeliever does not? Wittgenstein
relates the following.
"These controversies look quite different from
any normal controversies. Reasons look entirely
different from normal reasons. They are, in a
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way, quite inconclusive. The point is that if
there were evidence, this would,in fact,destroy
the whole business. Anything that I normally
call evidence wouldn't in the slightest influence
me. Suppose, for instance, we know people who
foresaw the future; make forecasts for years and
years ahead; and they described some sort of
Judgement Day. Queerly enough, even if there
were such a thing, and even if it were more con¬
vincing than I have described, belief in this
happening wouldn't be at all a religious belief.
Suppose that I would have to forego all pleasures
because of such a forecast. If I do so and so,
someone will put me in fires in a thousand years,
etc. I wouldn't budge. The best scientific
evidence is just nothing. A religious belief
might in fact fly in the face of such a fore¬
cast, and say 'No. There it will break down.'" (95)
Furthermore,this religious belief in the 'Last Judgement's
"must be called the firmest of all beliefs,
because the man risks things on account of it
which he would not do on things which are by
far better established for hira." (96)
Not only is this belief, in the 'Last Judgement', the firmest
of all beliefs but,further,
"one talks of believing and at the same time one
doesn't use 'believe' as one does ordinarily.
You might say (in the normal use): 'You only
believe - oh well -' here it is used entirely
differently; on the other hand it is not used as
we generally use the word 'know'." (97)
"It is for this reason that different words are
used: 'dogma', 'faith'. We don't talk about
hypothesis or about high probability." (98)
The emphasis on commitment^ and the denial that religious
belief is any kind of evidential belief - the evidences produced
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guaranteeing the rationality of the belief - is meant to spot¬
light the contrast between religious belief and scientific
belief, religious belief, it is claimed, being radically
different from the entertaining of a scientific belief or hypo¬
thesis. Could,however,religious people or believers accept this
account, given by Wittgenstein, of the non-evidential basis of
their faith? Don't they talk of believing because of the
evidence of,say, a religious experience,or because of the truth
of certain historical facts? To this Wittgenstein retorts:
"We do talk of evidence, and do talk of evidence
by experience. We could even talk of historic
events. It has been said that Christianity
rests on a historic basis. It has been said
a thousand times by intelligent people that
indubitability is not enough in this case ...
Because the indubitability wouldn't be enough
to make me change my whole life. It doesn't
rest on an historic basis in the sense that the
ordinary belief in historic facts could serve
as a foundation - there we have a belief in
historic facts different from a belief in
ordinary historic facts. Even they are not
treated as historical, empirical propositions.
Those people who had faith didn't apply the
doubt which would ordinarily apply to any
historical proposition." (99)
For Wittgenstein,then,historical facts or events cannot
serve as any kind of basis, or provide any kind of foundation
for religious belief -and this would still be the case even if
the events in question were indubitable. No fact or event, no
matter how well evidenced or significant,could serve as a founda¬
tion of a religious belief,because, even if the events were
indubitable,they could not change my whole life as religious
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belief does. One immediate retort to this point is that this is
simply not true. Events, even a single event, have been knov/n
to change completely an individual's fundamental beliefs, atti¬
tudes, indeed even his complete life. Perhaps individuals acted
wrongly in allowing the course of their lives to be so changed
by the passage of events,but,as a mere matter of fact} it is clear
that events can and have changed lives. Further, even accepting
the Wittgensteinian point here, what do,in particular, Christians
mean then when they claim their religion rests on 'an historic
basis'? It is of course obvious that they will 'have a belief
in historic facts different from a belief in ordinary historic
facts', but what is the nature of the belief involved here?
This surely requires some specification.
What then are we to say of the rationality of such beliefs,
the reasonability of such individuals! To this Wittgenstein
replies:
"Here we have people who treat this evidence in
a different way. They base things on evidence
(100) which taken in one way would seem exceed¬
ingly flimsy. They base enormous things on this
evidence. Am I to say they are unreasonable?
I wouldn't call them unreasonable. I would say
they are certainly not reasonable, that's
obvious. 'Unreasonable' implies, with everyone,
rebuke. I want to say: they don't treat this as
a matter of reasonability. Anyone who reads the
Epistles will find it said: not only that it is
not reasonable, but that it is folly. Not only
is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to
be." (101)
(I am no New Testament scholar,but,if my memory serves me right,
the Apostle, when he characterised the belief in the Resurrection
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as a folly,was simply stating how such a belief appeared to the
Greeks in particular, and not suggesting that the belief as such
was a folly, or unreasonable.)
Those whom Wittgenstein does consider unreasonable, in a
sense implying rebuke, are apologists for, or against,religion
who make the 'ludicrous'; assumption that religious beliefs can
be verified or falsified,by treating them as though they were
scientific hypotheses. Referring to an attempt by one, Father
O'Hara^ClOS) to show that religious beliefs can be scientifically
proved, he says:
"I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable.
I would say if this is religious belief, then
it's all superstition. But I would ridicule it,
not by saying it is based on insufficient evi¬
dence. I would say: here is a man who is
cheating himself. You can say: This man is
ridiculous because he believes, and bases it on
weak reasons." (103)
Before making a few critical comments on Wittgenstein's
claims, I think it is important to note a certain continuity in
Wittgenstein's position here with the account of religious belief
given in the Tractatus period. Although the philosophical
framework is very different^ i.e., his later theory of meaning
apparently permits religious propositions intelligibility,
significance) the element of continuity arises from his resis¬
tance to the claims of science. This resistance to the
perspective of religious claims understood as factual claims,
factual hypotheses, was a predominant aspect of the Tractarian
philosophy and, as noted, it continues in the Investigations
period. Religion or religious belief is not embryonic or
confused science or scientific belief. Indeed religion and
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science are simply different modes of thought. Having thus
rejected the claims of science, Wittgenstein is then committed
to give an account of religious belief in non-scientistic terms,
which he does in both periods of his philosophy. The particular
articulation of his thoughts here,which finds expression in the
I f '
Investigations period,is to,quite simply, point us to the
•religious language game1, to the grammar of religious belief as
expressed there. The'ee, according to Wittgenstein, displaying
the grammar of religious belief involves illustrating that
religious beliefs are not factual beliefs nor hypotheses,but
regulative pictures v/hich control our thinking, guide our conduct
in very different ways -the meaning or significance of a reli¬
gious proposition not being a function of factual truth
conditions, but rather a function of the regulative and affec¬
tive difference it makes to the lives of those who live by it.
Religious beliefs, unlike scientific beliefs, are not hypotheses,
are not based on evidence,but find their meaning or significance
Iti the role they play in the believer's life.
What jjS the difference,then,between the man who believes
in the 'Last Judgement' and the man who does not? It is
obviously not, as we have seen, a matter of empirical evidence,
because even if there were evidence predicting the actual
occurrence of a 'Judgement Day', a belief in such a happening
wouldn't be a religious belief. Indeed the religious believer
may well be aware that evidence is lacking and not,by itself,
regard this as a great problem, because the very presence of
evidence 'may destroy the whole business'. Thus relipqous
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belief is not mere empirical belief, i.e., a belief in the
occurrence of particular events. Nov/ while this last point may
well be accepted, must one proceed to claim, as Wittgenstein
apparently does, that,not only is religious belief not mere
empirical belief, but also no reference to factual beliefs
is implied, no factual beliefs entailed, in the statement of a
religious belief! Now in discussing Wittgenstein's references
to religious belief as using a picture, we saw that,for
Wittgenstein, j the 'whole weight may be in the picture', and
this is so,because it is impossible to take a position
outside the picture and compare the picture with that pictured -
the impossibility here being logical, i.e.,it would make no
sense to talk or think of doing so. Can one rest content with
such an account! Surely if the picture of the Last Judgement
is to regulate, have commissive and affective force in a
believer's life,this can only happen if,in some sense for the
believer, some empirical content is given to the claim that there
will be a Last Judgement. The belief in the Last Judgement
cannot be simply encapsulated or constituted by the picture .
It is of course true that one cannot compare one's picture
of God with God, one's picture of a Last Judgment with the
Last Judgment. However, this does not entail that the truth
or otherwise of the belief that there is a God or the belief
that there will be a Last Judgment is irrelevant to the
adequacy or significance of the religious pictures . Cer¬
tainly it is true that what one can and cannot affirm about
God or the Last Judgment is constituted by the rules of usage
which determine the use of the pictures in the religious life;
- 95 -
but surely the pictures must be believed to have some
extra-mental reality - to have factual implications - for
them to play the role they do play in the religious
life? As Professor N. Smart slates, when discussing the belief
in hell^, and the affective responses attendant upon such a
belief.'
"A sulphurous picture is presented, and connected
with specified sorts of sin. A man's belief in
this picture is seen in the terror with which he
lives, induced in part by his load of guilt. It
surely makes a difference if he recognises that
from an empirical point of view there is no
ground for belief in survival, and that his
sufferings will cease with his death. For
however much we may want to say that belief in
hell is a matter of keeping before one a certain
picture, this cannot exclude us from considering
questions of survival at the empirical level.
The difference that the recognition of his
literal non-survival would make is this: that
his terror is no longer like that which a person
might have if he were told that on a certain
date the police would begin to torture him. The
latter case of terror is normal, and in a
straight forward way rational. But terror at a
non-literal hell is transformed into something
different: it is a vivid realization, sub specie
aeternitatis, of one's guilt, and of one's sense
of alienation from God. If a man in these
circumstances nevertheless sometimes began to
fear hell the way he would fear torture, ought
he not to be reassured?" (104)
Similarly, with the notion of a 'Last Judgement'? would we not
say that someone,who experienced terror at the thought of a
non-literal 'Last Judgement', was in a very important sense
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deluded?
Further, is it correct to dismiss questions of evidence
when the beliefs in question are religious beliefs? Surely
the availability or otherwise of evidence for any particular
religious belief _is of crucial importance in determining the
validity of that belief? Indeed, this is a point which many
religious believers would themselves accept. Certainly a
belief based on evidence, for example a belief in the existence
of God, may be inaccurately described as a religious belief.
Indeed whether or not one wants to characterise such a belief
as a religious belief will depend very much on the kind of
features being present which Wittgenstein himself points to:
that is, the regulative and affective nature of the belief.
But surely any religious belief in the existence of God must
presuppose an evidential factual belief if it is to cease
being thought of as a mere regulative belief with no empirical
or factual consequences. Or again, suppose that by believing
religiously in a Last Judgement we are simply to mean that this
particular religious belief regulates and controls a person's
life in an affective manner. On such a view any particular
factual belief in any coming event is religiously irrelevant.
The problem then is to see how the religious belief can be
anything more than a mere regulative belief involving only the
upholding of certain attitudes.
In criticising O'Hara Wittgenstein makes the point that
any putative 'defence' of religious claims presented in scien-
tistic terms would be in essence superstition. Now I
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suspect that Wittgenstein's characterization of O'Hara's apolo¬
getics here as superstition is directed at two points,
that O'Hara defends religion in scientistic terras that such
a defence would admit the religious importance of evidential
factual beliefs or hypotheses as components of religious belief
itself. To admit the religious significance of such beliefs
would, I suspect for Wittgenstein, be the quintessence of super¬
stitious belief. Why however should a religious belief in a
'Last Judgement', if it also involves or presupposes an empirical
belief that there will be such an event as a Last Judgement, be
labelled a superstitious belief? What criteria or criterion
could be invoked here to justify such a claim? Surely the life,
death and 'resurrection' of Jesus, within traditional Christian
theology, are regarded as historical events, as historical facts,
as historical empirical propositions - the historical basis on
which Christianity rests7. The mere fact or facts, as Wittgen¬
stein points out, that religious people may not 'apply the doubt
which would ordinarily apply to any historical propositionJ (or,
in contradistinction,assuming these historic events were well
established, 'the indubitability wouldn't be enough to make me
change my life') surely is not sufficient to dismiss the question
of the empirical truth or falsity of these empirical facts,
thought of as providing the historic basis of Christian belief,
as superstition?
The weaknesses displayed here show, I think, first of all,
just how much emphasis Wittgenstein does place on the regulative
and commissive aspect of religious beliefs or pictures and,
what is also displayed is the fundamental inadequacy of such an
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accountfunderstood as providing the grammar of religious belief.
It is surely only by linking the regulative and commissive force,
of such a religious belief■as the belief in the Last Judgement,
with belief in the occurrence of such an event and,more funda¬
mental^ belief in an independently existing God, that such a
belief or picture becomes more than a mere picture or
regulative device? Indeed, surely the regulative force of such
a 'picture' is,to a large extent,determined by its factual force
or character. Biographical considerations cannot provide a
proper foundation for,in particular, Christian religious belief.
Finally, what can be said of Wittgenstein's claims con¬
cerning the non-reasonability of religious belief claims? I
have already commented on Wittgenstein's claim that his descrip¬
tion of religious belief as folly has some biblical justification.
Furthermore,to characterise religious belief as folly is,in an
important sense,to claim that religious belief is unreasonable,
and not 'non-rationalas Wittgenstein seems to want to suggest.
Let me explore further what Wittgenstein has to say concerning
the non-rational nature of religious belief. He states:
"Whether a thing is a blunder or not - it is a
blunder in a particular system. Just as some¬
thing is a blunder in a particular game and not
in another. You could also say that where we
are reasonable, they (religious believers) are
not reasonable - meaning they don't use reason «
here. If they do something very like one of
our blunders, I would say, I don't know. It
depends on further surroundings of it." (105)
And as an example of a 'blunder' which it would be inappropriate
to classify as a blunder, Wittgenstein giates:
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"If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the
blackboard, and then said: "Now, I'm going to
add," and then said: "2 and 21 is 13>" etc. I'd
say: "This is no blunder."" (106)
In such a case, Wittgenstein argues, the mistake would be too
gross to be thought of as simply a mistake - one would have to
look for some other kind of explanation. And,applying this to
that,
the religious case, Wittgenstein appears to be saying/if reli¬
gious belief is understood as any kind of scientific belief,
it can be classified as a blunder. But whether or not reli¬
gious belief is any kind of blunder, in this sense,depends on how
it is viewed - the surroundings which constitute the framework
of the belief. For Wittgenstein, the surroundings sire such, in
the religious case,as to make him wary of classifying religious
belief as any kind of evidential, ' scientific belief'. And one
reason for being wary is constituted by, as Wittgenstein sees
it, the strange use - or perhaps,one should say,lack of use -
of the term 'reason*. Normally one's reason for accepting a
particular belief claim is constituted by whatever evidence
there is for that particular claim,but in the religious case,the
evidence for any particular belief claim is either so totally
unconvincing or lacking —or indeed thought to be irrelevant -
that to talk of believing,on the basis of rational considera¬
tions, or of having a rational belief,is viewed as inappropriate
talk. Thus,one claims one's religious belief is non-rational,
and,for Wittgenstein,in this sense,religious belief 'is no
blunder'.
Can one,however,sustain the argument that the religious
use of the term 'belief' is entirely different from the use of
- 100 -
the term in non-religious contexts? Apart from the considera¬
tions presented above, Wittgenstein has already sketched, as we
have seen, certain differences between the religious use of the
terra 'believe' and its use in non-religious contexts.But are
his conclusions to be accepted here? Certainly, one can distin¬
guish a religious belief from a non-religious belief,but does
this imply that there is a difference in kind between,on the
one hand,religious beliefs and,on the other hand,non-religious
beliefs? Indeed, doesn't the very possibility of making such a
distinction or contrast illustrate that we cannot claim that
the uses of the term in a religious and non-religious context
are entirely different? Further, despite what Wittgenstein
claims, the nature and content of religious beliefs can be
changed by developments or progressions in non-religious beliefs.
Indeed,one might suspect that the analysis of the nature and
content of certain religious beliefs,as presented by Wittgen¬
stein, has been very heavily influenced by certain secular or
non-religious beliefs,i.e., in particular, philosophical beliefs
as to what is philosophically tenable or acceptable.
Furthermore,and finally, despite Wittgenstein's claim that
he is plotting the grammar of religious belief,, I suspect that
the most fundamental criticism that any Christian religious
believer would make is that Wittgenstein has singularly failed
to plot what is religiously distinctive about such belief.
That is, his analysis fails to recognise what Smart has labelled
as the 'bipolar' nature of religious belief. (107) That is^ not
only is religion linked to moral behaviour, practice and atti¬
tudes, as pinpointed by Wittgenstein, but it is also linked to
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the "pole of the transcendent". (108) Indeed its linkage to
the transcendent, to the belief that there is or exists a God,
whom religious pictures are pictures of; is in a sense
paramount,because it is such a belief which gives sense and
intelligibility to the moral and other practices. Indeed,if
one analyses religious belief primarily in terms of its regula¬
tive and affective force on one's life,it is difficult to see
how the account one is giving of the transcendent language of
religion can be anything other than a reductionist account of
religious belief and language. Religious belief may involve
having certain attitudes to the world and life,and these need
not necessarily all be moral attitudes,but it is also much more
than simply that - in particular, it involves a belief in an
independently existing God.
These points can be made in conclusion. There is nothing
particularly novel or unusual in the claims, expressed by
Wittgenstein,regarding his analysis of the nature of religious
belief. The claim that religious belief ought not to be
assimilated to factual belief, that it obtains its unique
meaning by the role it plays in a believer's life,is,for the
most part, certainly not original. Further, as in the ''fractatus
I
period, the influence of Kierkegaard looms large. Compare what
we have seen Wittgenstein say, with these sample quotations from
Kierkegaard.
"While objective knowledge rambles comfortably
on by the long road of approximation without
being impelled by the urge of passion, subjective
knowledge counts every delay a deadly peril, and
the decision so infinitely important and so
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instantly pressing that it is as if the oppor¬
tunity had already passed." (109)
"Only in subjectivity is there decisiveness, to
seek objectivity is to be in error. It is the
passion of the infinite that is the decisive
factor, and not its content, for its content is
precisely itself." (110)
"Now when the problem is to reckon upon which
side there is most truth, whether on the side
of one who seeks the true God objectively, and
pursues the approximate truth of the God-idea;
or on the side of one who, driven by the
infinite passion of his need for God, feels an
infinite concern for his own relationship to
God in truth ... the answer cannot be in doubt
for anyone who has not been demoralised with the
aid of science." (111)
We have seen that Wittgenstein regarded Kierkegaard
highly, held him to be a 'really religious' man.though far 'too
deep for him'.. and further felt himself incapable of receiving
from Kierkegaard "the good effects which he would (produce) in
«
deeper souls". (112) He said to Dr hrury that Kierkegaard v/as
"by far the greatest philosopher of the nineteenth century."
(113) Perhaps, however, if Wittgenstein had held Kierkegaard
in less esteem and reflected more on the teachings of his own
later philosophy that words may have a 'family of meanings',
(11*0 we would have been presented with a more balanced and
less individualistic account or analysis of the nature of
religious belief - an account which would not have concen¬
trated or been centred on one particular, and at that highly
disputable, analysis of the nature of religious belief and an
account which is thus so individualistic because it does
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not reflect and detail the claim that there is not one set of
rules of usage of,e.g.,the terms 'reason', 'evidence', 'fact',
but instead res^xyes the rules of use for these terms to the
'scientific language game'. (The question of whether there is
or is not,a 'family of meanings', more than one set of rules
of use of the terms mentioned, I do not at this moment wish to
comment on.) I think, however, that reflection along these
lines would have been more in keeping with the general tenor
and import of his later philosophy and,in particular, the theory
of meaning displayed thereTalthough,perhaps,what his later
philosophy may or may not dictate,as to what he should say about
the nature and analysis of religious belief,is overruled by his
own moral or religious ideas as to the nature and content of
religious belief.
However, Wittgenstein's analysis of religious belief is at
best rather cryptic, inhibited - if not at times contradictory -
all of which, I think, reflects the fact that Wittgenstein
displayed throughout his philosophical speculations an intense
unease and uncertainty when dealing with religious phenomena in
general, and religious belief and discourse in particular.
\ 1
However what is distinctive about this Investigations phase of
Wittgenstein's philosophy is the apparent implication, or hint,
that religion is 'a form of life' (115), constitutes a 'system'
(116) within which 'religious language-games' become,in their
own way,as verbalisable and as meaningful and even as true or
false as any others. (That is, criteria of meaning and truth
are internal to the'language-game'.) HoyjeveV, as already
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suggested, it is not altogether clear that Wittgenstein fully
accepts this characterization. (117) Religion as the
inexpressible, the ineffable>as on the Tractatus model,may
still have an appeal. Meanwhile,certain philosphers of reli¬
gion are more than ready to use Wittgenstein's Investigations'
theoretical framework to counter the very possibility of philo¬
sophical scepticism with regard to the meaningfulness of
religious assertions and/or the possibility of religious know¬
ledge and truth claims. It is to a critical examination of





The first important and significant work in recent philo¬
sophy of religion to incorporate and utilise the'Wittgensteinian
notions'of 'language-game' and 'form of life' was Professor
Norman Malcolm's famous article which represented an attempt to
revive a 'version' of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument(s). (1)
In response to this article there was an impressive body of
criticism which concurred in the conclusion that the argument,
considered as a proof or demonstration of God's (necessary)
existence,fails. interest in re-examining Malcolm's argument
will not be so much to say anything new, either in agreement
with or in opposition to this conclusion, but rather (a) to
trace what specific role the'Wittgensteinian notions' play in
Malcolm's reformulation of Anselra's argument and (b) to assess
the significance of their use.
Professor A. Flew commenting in his recent book God and
Philosophy on the use,in Malcolm's argument,of the'wittgen¬
steinian notions'of 'language-game' and 'form of life' says:
"If it really were, as Malcolm apparently thinks,
a corollary of the later philosophy of Wittgen¬
stein that the existence of God could be deduced
from some alleged facts of verbal usage, this
would surely constitute a reduction to absurdity
of that philosophy: a conclusion very far indeed
from the intention of so devoted a disciple." (2)
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Or again,R. E. Allen, commenting critically on the 'Wittgen-
steinian moves' in Malcolm's reformulated Ontological Argument,
claims the following. There is
"a theme which runs like a thread through the
texture of Malcolm's disquisition, the theme
that religious language is a type of protected
discourse. Malcolm seems to imply that the
existence of God cannot be significantly denied,
since that denial would constitute a confusion
of types of language. It would involve the use
of concepts of limited application (specifically,
the ordinary concept of existence) in an alien
context, it would involve application without
meaning. One may choose to play the religious
language game or choose not to ... But one
cannot meaningfully deny the premise on which
that game depends: 'This language game is
played."* (3)
Obviously both these philosophers are highly critical and
suspicious of the introduction and use of the 'Wittgensteinian
concepts' in Malcolm's reformulated Ontological Argument. The
heart of the criticism seems to reside in the claim that
Malcolm,by so introducing and using the notions of 'language-
game' and 'form of life',is enabled to prove thereby the
existence of God. Now I hope to show,by first of all closely
examining Malcolm's reformulated Ontological Argument and
secondly,plotting the role and use of the'Wittgensteinian
notions', that such a criticism is at first sight
unjustifiable, but th2ct a deeper level of argument -
when one plots closely the 'significance' of their use - such
criticisms (as displayed above)do make a valid point. Hovrever
to actually establish my case let me turn first,from these
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general comments,to a specific examination of Malcolm's
reformulation of Anselm's Ontological Argument as given in
Section II of Malcolm's article.
Prior to the presentation of his reformulated version of
the Ontological Argument Malcolm,in section I of the article,
rejects the 'traditionally recognised' form of the Ontological
Argument where it is claimed that,if God is that 'than which
nothing greater can be conceived', he must be thought to exist
because if he did not exist he would be something less than
that 'than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Such an
argument,of course, depends for its validity on the contention
that existence or to exist is a perfection and thus that
'existence is a real predicate'. Malcolm rejects the claim
that 'exists' is a 'real predicate', although admitting that he
cannot provide any rigorous refutation of the doctrine, but he
is quite content to accept the following Kantian refutation'.
"By whatever and by however many predicates we
may think a thing - even if we completely deter¬
mine it - we do not make the least addition to
the thing when we further declare that this
thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly
the same thing that exists, but something more
than we had thought in the concept; and we could
not, therefore, say that the exact object of my
concept exists." (4)
Now,according to Malcolm,not only is Anselm responsible
for this invalid form of the Ontological Argument but also for
a different and valid form or version of the Ontological Argu¬
ment, both of which are found in Anselm's Proslogian. (5) The
claim that 'existence is a perfection' has been rejected,but
Malcolm claims to find in this second and valid version of the
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Ontological Argument a very different claim - viz 'the logical
impossibility of nonexistence is a perfection'. He expresses
the point in the following way*.
"His first ontological proof uses the principle
that a thing is greater if it exists than if it
does not exist. His second proof employs the
different principle that a thing is greater if
it necessarily exists than if it does not
necessarily exist." (6)
Further, if we accept the claim involved in the second 'proof -
that 'necessary existence' can be predicated of God-we do have
a further reason for rejecting the claim that 'existence is a
perfection' because such existence would be contingent existence
and
"the notion of contingent existence or of con¬
tingent nonexistence cannot have any application
to God. His existence must either be logically
necessary or logically impossible." (7)
What is also clear is that by necessary existence Malcolm means
logically necessary and,while Kant was correct in arguing that
contingent existence is not a perfection or a predicate,this is
not the case,as Malcolm argues, for necessary existence ^which is
a predicate, a property and a perfection.
In essence Malcolm believes that what Anselm was trying
to accomplish is the following. The proof is an attempt to
deduce God's necessary existence from our conception of Him as
a 'being than which none greater can be conceived'-* the 'most
adequate object of worship'— by showing that HUs existence
must be either logically necessary or logically impossible.
Malcolm's summary of what he considers Anselm's modfel argument
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to be, as stated in Proslogian 3, is as follows:
"(1) If God, a being a greater than which cannot
be conceived, does not exist then he cannot come
into existence. For if he did, he would either
have been caused to come into existence or have
happened to come into existence, and in either
case he would be a limited being, which by our
conception of him he is not. Since he cannot
come into existence, if he does not exist, his
existence is impossible.
(2) If he does exist, he cannot have come into
existence (for the reason given), nor can he
cease to exist, for nothing could cause him to
cease to exist nor could it just happen that he
ceased to exist. So if God exists, his existence
is necessary.
(3) Thus God's existence is either impossible or
necessary.
(4) It can be the former (i.e. God's existence
can be impossible) only if the concept of such a
being is self contradictory or in some way
logically absurd.
(5) Assuming that this is not so (i.e. assuming
that our notion of God is logically coherent),
(6) it follows that God necessarily exists." (8)
Necessary existence must then be predicated of God,not
existence (contingent existence). Further, this assertion must
not be interpreted in such a way that someone, while agreeing
that perhaps nothing could prevent God's existence, still might
claim that it might just happen that God does not exist. As
Malcolm expresses the point in his article:
"from the supposition that it would happen that
God did not exist it would follow that, if he
existed, he would have mere duration and not
eternity. It would make sense to ask "How long
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has he existed?", "Will he still exist next
week?", "He was in existence yesterday but how
about to-day?", and so on. It seems absurd to
make God the subject of such questions. Accor¬
ding to our ordinary conception of him, he is an
eternal being. And eternity does not mean
endless duration, as Spinoza noted. To ascribe
eternity to something is to exclude as sense¬
less all sentences that imply that it has
duration." (9)
Necessary existence, he says later,
"is a property of God in the same sense that
necessary omnipotence and necessary omniscience
are his properties ... The a priori proposition
•God necessarily exists' entails the proposition
'God exists', if and only if the latter also is
understood as an a priori proposition; in which
case the two propositions are equivalent. In
this sense Anselm's proof is a proof of God's
existence." (10)
This is Malcolm's reformulation of what he considers to
be the valid version or form of Anselm's Ontological Argument
and it is to the above reasoning^ as particularly instanced in
Malcolm's summary of the proof, that criticisms of the proof
have been directed. (11) But note, there has been no mention
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of or no use of the Wittgensteinian notions of * language-game'
or 'form of life'. This does not give any support to Flew's
claim that it is a 'corollary of the later philosophy of 'Witt¬
genstein that the existence of God is deduced merely from some
alleged facts of verbal usage'. Where then do the'Wittgen¬
steinian notions' enter? To see the role which the
'v/ittgensteinian notions' do play we must, first of all, look
back at Malcolm's summary of the proof.
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There we saw (premises three and four) that God's
existence is either necessary or impossible,and it is the
latter only if 'the concept of such a being is self-contra¬
dictory or in some way logically absurd'. However, assuming
(premise five) that otre concept of God is logically coherent,
it follows that 'God necessarily exists' (conclusion). Thus
Malcolm's reformulation of Anselm's Ontological Argument is of
the following form. Assuming that the concept of God is
logically coherent, it follows that God necessarily exists. As
Malcolm states:
"the only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's
claim that God's existence is necessary is to
maintain that the concept of God, as a being a.
greater than which cannot be conceived, is
self-contradictory or nonsensical. Supposing
that this is false, Anselra is right to deduce
God's necessary existence from his characteriza¬
tion of him as a being a greater than which
cannot be conceived." (12)
Now it is precisely this step that certain philosophers
have taken in trying to refute the Ontological Argument. They
have tried to show that the concept of such a being, as pre¬
supposed in the argument, is logically incoherent; that the
concept of God, a being a 'greater than which cannot be con¬
ceived' , understood, in particular, as the concept of a
'logically necessary being', is self-contradictory. This is
claimed to be the case because it is believed only propositions
can be necessary and if,to accommodate this point for 'logically
necessary beingone writes 'God exists' is a logically
it
necessary proposition;this still will not suffice because it is
claimed no existential proposition can be logically necessary.
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All existential propositions are contingent and logical
necessity merely reflects particular linguistic conventions.
Thus a 'logically necessary being' is a contradiction in terms.
Professor J. N. Findlay is one philosopher who, at one time,
believed this point to be true and indeed in his article 'Can
God's existence be Disproved' (13) claims, although in initial
agreement with Malcolm as to what would or should constitute
the idea of a being 'a greater than which cannot be conceived' -
the idea of an adequate object of worship - to provide an
Ontological Disproof of God's existence for the reasons given
above. Briefly, Findlay's argument goes something like this:
(1) If 'God is to be the adequate object of our religious
attitudes'1, if 'God is to satisfy religious claims and
needs, he must be a being in every way inescapable, One
whose existence we cannot possibly conceive away * because
he possesses his qualities in 'some necessary manner.'
'Necessary existence must be part of God's nature.'
(2) On 'a modern view of the matter, necessity in propositions
merely reflects our use of words, the arbitrary conventions
of our language.' There are no 'necessary facts of
existence.'
(3) This being so, this 'modern' view of necessity makes it
'self-evidently absurd to speak of such a Being and attri¬
bute existence to him.' It 'entails its necessary non¬
existence or non-significance.• (14)
Malcolm believes this conclusion does not follow and I
shall summarise his argument in the following way:
(1) God's existence is not impossible or self-contradictory.
'But I do not know how to demonstrate that the concept of
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God is not self-contradictory. That is I do not understand
what it would mean to demonstrate in general, and not in
respect to any particular reasoning, that the concept is not
self-contradictory.' However, 'I should think there is no
more of a presumption that it is self-contradictory than is
the concept of seeing a material thing. Both concepts have
a place in the thinking and the lives of human beings.' (15)
(2) Thus,while I accept Findlay's premise (1) and indeed his
premise (2), ('I am inclined to hold the 'modern* view that
logically necessary truth 'merely reflects our use of words'')
I am 'unable to see how that view is supposed to lead to
the conclusion that 'the Divine existence is either sense¬
less or impossible'.' (16)
(3) Because given that the concept of God, the concept of a
Necessary Being, does play a role, have a place in the
thinking and the lives of human beings, we should 'look at
the use of words and not manufacture a priori theses about
it,' 'the view that logical necessity merely reflects the
use of words cannot possibly have the implication that every
existential proposition must be contingent.' (17)
(k) And indeed when we look at the religious literature, in
particular the 'Ninetieth Psalm we find it saids "Before
the mountains were brought forth, or even Thou haast formed
the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting,
Thou art God." Here is expressed the idea of the necessary
existence and eternity of God, an idea that is essential to
the Jewish and Christian religions. In these complex systems
of thought, these "language-games", God has the status of a
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necessary being. Who can doubt that? Here we must say
with Wittgenstein, "This language-game is played!"' (18)
Thus Fihdlay's claim is rebutted, argues Malcolm, because
"we may rightly take the existence of these
religious systems of thought in which God
figures as a necessary being to be a disproof
of the dogma, affirmed by Hume and others, that
no existential proposition can be necessary." (19)
This is where Malcolm's 'Wittgensteinian move' is
introduced. It does not appear in the formulation of his
version of Anselm's Ontological Argument, nor does it func¬
tion as any kind of 'proof of God's existence'. Father, its
function is to combat the claim that the very concept of a
logically necessary being is a contradiction in terms, it being
argued that the coherence of a concept is assufed by its use
in a well-founded language-game. (20) The conclusion of
Malcolm's version of Anselm's Ontological Argument was: Provided
>
that the concept of God is coherent, assuming that this is so,
it follows that God necessarily exists. In claiming that the
logical coherence or soundness of the concept of God is assured
by its having a role, a use, in a well-founded 'language-game',
Malcolm is not thereby proving the existence of God. That he
thinks has already been accomplished by his reformulation of
Anselm's argument.
Before proceeding to assess the full implications of the
•Wittgensteinian move' on Malcolm's part, I want to pause to
consider these two issues. First of all,has Malcolm accurately
and adequately characterised the 'religious language-game' in
his above remarks? Has he, in fact, correctly characterised
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the idea of God as the idea of a logically necessary Being - an
idea 'essential to the Jewish and Christian religion'? Secondly,
assuming that he has, may we not then be faced once again, in a
different v/ay, with doubts as to the logical coherence of the
concept so characterised. I want to assess the nature of these
doubts or difficulties and in so doing we will,once again, be led
back to discussing the Wittgensteinian move' in Malcolm's argu¬
ment and I intend, at this stage, to study the full implications
of its use and its general relationship to the reformulated
Ontological Argument as such.
First of all then, has Malcolm accurately and adequately
characterised the 'religious language-game'? In citing the
Ninetieth Psalm as evidence Malcolm was hoping to provide some
biblical justification for his claim that God is thought of as
existing in a logically necessary manner. Let us look again at
the passage cited. 'Before the mountains were brought forth,
or even Thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from
everlasting to everlasting, Thou art God.* All that is said
here is that God is everlasting.not that he is a logically
necessary being and surely to say of a being that he is ever¬
lasting is simply to say that he has endless existence or
duration? However, if we reflect back on Malcolm's comments,
which I quoted at the conclusion of the summary of his revised
Anselmian argument,we shall remember that, for Malcolm, there
is a crucial distinction to be made between what is involved in
merely enduring - having 'mere duration' - a.vid.
existing eternally. Indeed we were there referred to Spinoza
who,we were told,noted that 'eternity does not mean endless
duration'. Thus it is by understanding what it is for God to
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exist in an everlasting manner as essentially involving the
claim that God is eternal - to ascribe eternity to God 'jls to
exclude as senseless all sentences that imply that he has dura¬
tion* - that Malcolm believes the reference in the Bible to God's
everlasting existence should be understood. And of course, for
Malcolm, to describe God as a necessary being, as a necessary
existent, ijs to claim that God is eternal. Thus, in
summary, Malcolm takes the Biblical passage as supporting
his claim that God must be thought of as a logically
necessary Being by making two suppositions. Firstly,
God's everlasting existence is understood as His eter-
nality; secondly, God's eternality is understood as His
necessary existence.
Surely, however, when one looks at the context of the
Biblical passage in which the phrase 'from everlasting to ever¬
lasting' occurs and especially when one notices references^in
particular.to the 'formation of the earth' - the creation of
the world - it does seem rather quixotic to maintain that God's
existence is understood there as durationless, timeless
especially when God is said to have existed 'before' the
creation of the world. There does seem to be absolutely no
warrant for claiming that the psalmist meant eternity (in the
sense ascribed to it by Malcolm) as opposed to endless duration
by the phrase 'from everlasting to everlasting*. As N. Pike
claims with reference to Malcolm's biblical example here:
"I think it is instructive to note that this is
the biblical passage singled out by Malcolm when
attempting to support the idea that God is time¬
less. One must suspect that scriptural passages
conveying this idea are not easy to find." (21)
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Thus, I would claim, because it says in the Psalm 'even from
everlasting to everlasting Thou art God', Malcolm can in no way
justify his claim that this means that 'God exists' is a
necessarily true proposition - that God is thought of as a
logically necessary Being.
However, let us assume that Malcolm has correctly charac¬
terised an idea here 'essential to the Jewish and Christian
religions', ca.ll the resultant concept be employed in anything
like the normal ways or manner in which the concept is deployed
within traditional Christian belief? That is, can the concept
of an eternal (i.e. timeless), omnipotent, omniscient, creator
, God function in the way and manner it is supposed to within
traditional Christian belief? Could it indeed have any appli¬
cation at all? Let us look specifically at the problem of what
it could mean to say that a God who is timeless creates the
world. I concentrate on the notion of creation in particular
because the idea of God as creator is referred to in the passage
quoted from the Ninetieth Psalm. Would the concept of a God who
is eternal (i.e. timeless) and yet creator of all there is be an
intelligible conception?
Now obviously if there is no world but only God, and God
is essentially timeless, the concept of time would have no
application. What it is to exist in time - to have duration -
could only apply to the world itself or events and things in the
world. But given this characterization what could it mean to
say that God created the world? The immediate image one has
here is of a certain situation pertaining before the creation
of the world - or to be more accurate of nothing existing but
God - and of a very different situation obtaining after the act
- 118 -
of creation; the world existing as well as God and being caused
to exist by God's creative power. But if God is thought of as
essentially timeless can we apply such temporal predicates as
'before' and 'after' to his act of creation? Indeed, more
fundamentally, what could it mean to say that a timeless God
creates? God cannot be said to exist before the creation of the
world because that would suggest that God is in a temporal
position relative to the world, i.e. he antedates it. Equally,
the world cannot be said to exist after God's act of creation
because that too would temporally place the world in relation
to God. Surely too, if one is going to talk of creation or an
act of creation one is essentially talking of a causal rela¬
tionship, a relationship in which the cause precedes the effect
in time. Since,however, God is understood as essentially time¬
less, no temporal relationship between God and the world can be
given any content, can even be described. Thus it would seem
no sense can be given to the claim that an eternal God^under-
stood as timeless, created or creates the world. The concept of
God,understood as the concept of an eternal (timeless) creator.,
is an incoherent concept. (22)
Faced with such a claim,what would Malcolm's likely reply
be? Perhaps^if I expand a little more fully a quotation I have
already given from Malcolm's article;we may see just what he is
likely to say in reply. Malcolm states:
"I do not know how to demonstrate that the
concept of God ... is not self contradictory.
But I do not think that it is legitimate to
demand such a demonstration. I also do not
know how to demonstrate that either the concept
of a material thing or the concept of seeing a
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material thing is not self contradictory, and
philosophers have argued that both of them are.
With respect to any particular reasoning that is
offered for holding that the concept of seeing
a material thing, for example, is self contra¬
dictory, one may try to show the invalidity of
the reasoning and thus free the concept from
the charge of being self contradictory on that
ground. But I do not understand what it would
mean to demonstrate in general, and not in
respect to any particular reasoning, that the
concept is not self contradictory. So it is
with the concept of God. I should think there
is no more of a presumption that it is self-
contradictory than is the concept of seeing a
material thing. Both concepts have a place in
the thinking and the lives of human beingl." (23)
Now given our knowledge of how Malcolm dismissed the claim
that the concept of a logically necessary Being is a contra¬
diction in terms - by pointing to its alleged use in a language
(religious language)~I think it is not difficult to see how
Malcolm would deal with the present alleged incoherence in the
concept of God. (Though I think it should be noted when
Malcolm claims, in the above quotation, that he would not 'know
what it would mean to demonstrate in general' as opposed to
providing particular refutations of particular arguments or
reasonings concerning the alleged incoherency of the concept of
God, that such a claim is rather misleading. What particular
considerations did Malcolm present to illustrate that the
concept of a logically necessary Being is not an incoherent
concept? Rather7the procedure is a general one.) One simply
points to the use of the concept in a language-game, a language
game which constitutes its 'home base', and it is from such use
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that we can be assured that the concept is coherent. Thus such
religious sentences;as 'God created heaven and earth and all
that in them is,' 'In the beginning God created heaven and
earth' by their very use in 'religious language-games' will show
that the concept of an eternal (timeless) creator is not an
incoherent notion.
Further confirmation, if further confirmation he needed,
that this is the kind of move Malcolm would make, can be found
in Malcolm's critical review of A. White's study of G. E. Moore.
(2*f) However., as we shall see, what we are provided with is not
merely further confirmation of the kind of move Malcolm would
deploy but also a further extension of his argument. In the
review in question he is discussing the kind of reply which
could or should be made if it is claimed that the concept of
seeing a material thing is self-contradictory. ('We have just
seen, in the long passage quoted from Malcolm, that Malcolm
treats both this claim and the claim concerning the incoherence
of the concept of God together,and one would suspect that the
form of the arguments deployed to illustrate the coherence of
the concept of seeing a material thing would equally well apply
to the 'God' case.) To the claim ,thenjthat the concept of
seeing a material thing is self-contradictory,Malcolm replies
in the following way:
"... to understand that this claim is mistaken
it is sufficient to realise that these sentences
(examples of the kind of sentences Malcolm has
in mind are: 'I know that that thing sticking up
in the garden is a shovel', 'I see your glasses
under the bed*) do have a correct use in
ordinary discourse, which they could not have
if they were self-contradictory."
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And, he continues, such sentences "can be correctly used to make
a true statement." (25)
Just as the correct use of the. e.g., sentence ( ' I see your
glasses under the bed'; can be taken as a refutation of the claim
that the concept of seeing a material thing is self-contradictory
so, by parity of reasoning, correct use of the sentence,'In the
beginning God created heaven and earth', can also be taken as a
refutation of the claim that the concept of an eternal (timeless)
creator is incoherent. Both sentences have uses in 'established
language-games'. All this we have already seen Malcolm claim,
but he is wanting, I have suggested, to extend the argument here.
Not only do such sentences 'have a correct use', but further
such sentences 'can be correctly used to make a true statement'.
Indeed,I think,he wishes to claim that the possibility of such
sentences making a true statement is a criterion of their
correct use. Their possibility of making a true statement con¬
stitutes their correct use. Thus to apply this development of
his argument against the claim that the concept of,e.g., an
eternal (timeless) creator is incoherent would be to claim
something like the following. Not only is it the case that
certain sentences which employ the word 'creator', or more
generally the word 'God', have a use in established religious
language-games but?further,what is meant by saying such sentences
have a use is that such sentences, when correctly deployed, used,
can make true statements.
Now this is obviously a much stronger claim than anything
Malcolm has hitherto presented us with. One may be reasonably
unsympathetic to the claim that established use in a 'language-
game' guarantees the coherence of any concept in that
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•language-game' (and particularly so in the case of religious
concepts)a."0<ione may feel that Malcolm should, rather than
generally present mere use in the 'language-game' as a guarantee
of coherence, be prepared to argue the case with 'respect to the
particular reasoning' presented arguing for the incoherence of
the concept involved. At the very least,however, one may feel
that Malcolm has made a point that established use of a concept
in a 'language-game' should make us especially careful and
particular in our argumentation before dismissing such a concept
as incoherent. But when Malcolm proceeds to claim that by
correct use he means 'can be used to make true statements' then,
I think,one naturally feels that Malcolm is claiming much too
much, at any rate especially in the case of religious concepts
and beliefs. Because it is just in this area where questions
of truth and falsity are so difficult, where questions of the
coherency of the concepts involved do most often arise. Perhaps,
however,Malcolm is arguing we are misled into thinking things
are difficult here,but I do think we would need much more
argumentation,than Malcolm has presented us with ,to dissolve
our worries here - to assure us that there are no more problems
with the concept of God than with the concept of seeing a
material thing. What one may accept as a salutary warning
against too quick dismissal of a concept as incoherent - its use
in an 'established language-game' - becomes(however, entirely
unacceptable if the warning is transformed into the claim that
by its use in a 'language-game' one means its function of
possibly being used to make true statements.
However,leaving aside the question of the adequacy or
otherwise of Malcolm's claims concerning what assures the
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coherency of a concept, Malcolm is surely going to be placed in
an untenable position with regard to his revised Anselmian
Ontological Argument if he takes seriously his own argumentation
here? As we saw,the Ontological Argument,as stated by Malcolm,
was of the form: Provided that, assuming that,the concept of
God is coherent, God necessarily exists. However, if to illus¬
trate the coherence of the concept of God all one has to show
is not only that a sentence, which employs the word 'God1, has a
correct use in the language but also can be 'correctly used to
make a true statementthen it would seem,one is not merely
illustrating the coherence of the concept but claiming that the
concept is instantiated in reality. To claim that such sentences,
which have 'God' as their subject matter,can be used to make
true statements is, it would appear, to claim that God exists.
Surely if in demonstrating the coherency of the concept of God
one's argument ,to this end,involves the assumption of God's
existence,this will negate the importance of, make redundant,
the original Ontological Argument? To see that the concept is
coherent _is to see that God exists. That is, once again, given
that Malcolm's revised Anselmian argument is of the form —
provided the concept of God is coherent, God necessarily exists -
it would appear that,if the demonstration of the coherence of
the concept of God necessarily involves an affirmation of God's
existence,this fact would render Malcolm's revised Anselmian
argument redundant or superfluous. Both 'arguments',i.e.,
(a) Malcolm's revised Ontological Argument and (b) the
'argument' involved in the 'this language-game is played' move,
it would appear, have the same conclusion - that God exists.
Argument (b), however, must be considered primary because argument
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(a) is not&complete argument &v»d is only acceptable on the basis
of a valid argument (b). The validity of argument (b) has,
however, the important consequence that it too involves the same
conclusion as argument (a) - that God exists, And it is for this
reason that I want to claim Malcolm's revised Anselmian Onto-
logical Argument is rendered redundant or superfluous.
Then,just as Malcolm claims to have discovered 'two
distinct arguments' in Anselm's writings so it would also appear
there are 'two distinct arguments' in Malcolm's article as well.
One argument, of a traditional form, spotlights the distinctive
features or characteristics peculiar to the concept of God and
argues that such features necessitate the instantiation of the
concept in reality. The other argument does not claim that there
are any such distinctive features or characteristics peculiar to
the concept of God, but rather plots the role and function of
the concept within 'religious language-games' and 'forms
of life' and draws its conclusion from this examination. The
validity of the 'first argument' Is dependent on whether or
not the distinctive features or characteristics peculiar to the
concept of God have been (a) plotted correctly and (b),if so,
the implications which it is claimed do follow, do actually
follow. The validity of the 'second argument' IS dependent
on our interpretation of and our acceptance or otherwise of
certain Wittgensteinian 'insights' - the primacy in both an
ontological and epistemological sense of 'language-games' and
'forms of life'. Finally, accepting that I have plotted
correctly the significance of the 'this language-game is played'
move by Malcolm,perhaps we can now sympathise with Professor
Flew's reaction to the alleged'wittgensteinian moves' in
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Malcolm's article (showed in common with H. C. Allen)-although
we may disagree with the particular expression of his reaction
that Malcolm is claiming that 'the existence of God can be
deduced merely from some alleged facts of verbal usage'.
Certainly it is at least true "tha^now that we have plotted the
role of the'Wittgensteinian moves' in Malcolm's arguments, before
we could hope to adequately assess the validity of such' moves
we would require more than the mere hint or suggestion of argu¬
ment that Malcolm has presented us with.
What is, however, involved ,for the religious believer,in
participating in 'religious language-games' and 'forms of life'
uttering religious assertions about God, assertions which can
be used to make true statements? Malcolm at the conclusion of
his article feels constrained to give some account of the
'human phenomena' which 'compel' individuals to participate in
the'religious forms of life', play the 'religious language-
games'. That is, he wishes to examine what is involved in under¬
standing religious concepts, finding them meaningful, parti¬
cipating in the 'religious language-games' and affirming
religious beliefs or claims as true. Such an analysis requires
an examination of the 'human phenomena', the 'forms of life' in
which 'religious language-games' have their life and sustenance.
For Malcolm this problem crystallises itself into an
attempt to give an account of how and why the concept of God -
the concept of a 'being a greater than which cannot be conceived'
- has "meaning for anyone. Why is it that human beings have
even formed the concept of an infinite being, a being a greater
than which cannot be conceived?" (26) That is, in the absence
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of any direct or indirect reference to the world - which is ruled
out in the 'ontological approach* - why have human beings formed
the concept of God? What is the genesis of the concept of God?
For Malcolm there can be no "deep understanding of that concept
(God) without an understanding of the phenomena of human life
that gives rise to it." (27) Malcolm feels unable to give a
complete account of the human phenomena but he is willing to
hazard a suggestion. This suggestion is:
"There is the phenomenon of fueling guilty for
something that one has done or thought or felt
or for a disposition that one has. One wants
to be free of this guilt. But sometimes the
guilt is felt to be so great that one is sure
that nothing one could do oneself, nor any
forgiveness by another human being, would remove
it. One feels a guilt that is beyond all
measure, a guilt 'a greater than which cannot be
conceived'. Paradoxically, it would seem, one
nevertheless has an intense desire to have this
incomparable guilt removed. One requires a for¬
giveness that is beyond all measure, a forgive¬
ness 'a greater than which cannot be conceived'.
Out of such a storm in the soul, I am suggesting,
there arises the conception of a forgiving mercy
that is limitless, beyond all measure. This is
one important feature of the Jewish and Christian
conception of God ... There is that human pheno¬
menon of an unbearably heavy conscience and ...
it is importantly connected with the genesis of
the concept of God, that is, with the formation
of the 'grammar' of the word 'God'." (28)
Two points require to be made here. First of all, Malcolm
informs us that with the help of his example he is trying to
plot the 'formation of the 'grammar' of the word 'God'' -
- 127 -
display how the word 'God' can have any meaning for anyone.
Indeed he later proceeds to inform us that it is only by plot¬
ting the human phenomena which underpin the concept of God that
one can "grasp the sense of the concept." (29) Now Malcolm
could be claiming one of two things here. Either.(a) he is
claiming that the information which he is imparting is informa¬
tion concerning the genesis of the meaning of the word 'God',
a.TnJ.
what it is for the word 'God' to have meaning, /the fact that
he tells us that he is discussing 'the formation of the 'grammar*
of the word 'God'' would tend to support the view that this is
what he believes himself to be doing. Or,(b) he is claiming
that the example used, and the human phenomena referred to, help
to illustrate why the concept has ever been meaningful to anyone
- why it has been thought significant or to have a point. The
distinction made here is an important one, i.e. what is the
meaning of the word 'God' as opposed to what is involved in the
word 'God' having significance or a point - being meaningful in
this sense to a believer. It is the difference between asking
what the meaning ofUaeparticular English word 'God' is,as
opposed to posing questions concerning the significance, point
or purpose of its use to religious believers. I think that if
the distinction made here is kept in mind it can be
usefully employed to help explicate certain crucial points or
claims which Malcolm will later make.
Secondly, it seems to me that just as Malcolm's elucidation of
the Ninetieth Psalm does not justify him in concluding that the Bible
contains the idea of God as a logically necessary Being, so, here
too, I doubt whether the fact that a person experiences infinite
guilt offers any ground for belief that it can be alleviated by
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an infinite forgiving mercy - *a greater than which cannot be
conceived'. First of all^the initial experience, the guilt, is
if anything a moral experience with no necessary connections to
religious ideas or concepts. Secondly, as C. Lyas has pointed
out, Malcolm has not established - even if we allow him the
connection between the experience of guilt and the genesis of
the concept of the greatest possible being - that such a being
should be thought of as a necessary being. "Such a being might
be required to annihilate himself in order to relieve this
guilt." (30)
However this last point need not worry Malcolm too much
for5as he states:
"I am sure that this concept is related to human
experience in other ways. If one had the acute-
ness and depth to perceive these connections,
one could grasp the sense of the concept." (31)
Nor is this all Malcolm wishes to say because he wants to relate
these thoughts to a remark made by Kierkegaard, Not only is the
sense of the concept discovered in its relation to human
experience, to its grounding in the 'form of life' where the
concept was formed, where it has its genesis, but also, Malcolm
claims, quoting approvingly from Kierkegaard:
"There is only one proof of the truth of
Christianity and that, quite rightly, is from
the emotions, when the dread of sin and a heavy
conscience torture a man into crossing the
narrow line between despair bordering upon
madness - and Christendom." (32)
0ry as he might equally well have said,,again with reference to
Kierkegaard:
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"It is subjectivity that Christianity is con¬
cerned with, and it is only in subjectivity that
its truth exists, if it exists at all." (33)
What are we to make of this argumentation? Clearly
Malcolm's purpose is to relate the concept of God to 'the
religious language-games', the 'religious forms of life', the
'human phenomena* that give rise to it, to its genesis in the
emotions and needs of man. The suggestion seems to be that
unless one understands these human experiences and phenomena
that give rise to the idea of God, see how these phenomena are
related to the genesis of the concept of God, one will, in an
important way, be ignorant of the sense of the concept.
Furthermore,not only is the sense of the concept discovered in
these experiences but also religious truth is a function of
these emotions or experiences.
Now there is a fallacy,recognised in philosophy, called the
Genetic Fallacy and one is guilty of committing the Genetic
Fallacy if one confuses or confounds psychological questions
about the origin and genesis of beliefs with logical questions
about their truth and grounds. The warning provided by the
Genetic Fallacy is that we must distinguish questions about the
evidences for particular beliefs, or about their truth or
falsity, from questions about their psychological origins or
causes. Now one common complaint often laid at the door of many
critics of religion is that they commit the Genetic Fallacy by
assessing the truth or falsity of particular religious beliefs
in terras of their alleged psychological origins. That is, they
consider an account of the particular origins of a belief as
providing answers to the logical questions of the truth or
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falsity of such beliefs. Note, however., what Malcolm's position
is here. In the case of religious beliefs - although he only
mentions Christianity he does say his point has a wider applica¬
tion - no such distinction as maintained in the statement of the
Genetic Fallacy can be justified. That is, one cannot, with
reference to religious beliefs, distinguish between questions
of the psychological origin(s) of the belief and logical ques¬
tions of the truth or falsity of the belief. That is, the
mistake of those critics of religion,who in the past have been
accused of committing the Genetic Fallacy, is not to be found in
their method of procedure but rather in the fact that they found
religious beliefs to be in some sense false or spurious. In the
religious situation, for Malcolm, it is only with reference to
the phenomena of the emotions - the human psychological pheno¬
mena that generate the concept of God, that form the concept -
that one can apply the predicate true. The truth of a religious
belief is of and 'from the emotions'. Biographical considera¬
tions then do not only guarantee the sense of the concept of God
but also constitute what it means to affirm religious beliefs as
true. 'The proof of the truth ... is from the emotions.' Given
this account, it may not be so much the case that, as Professor
Flew argues, 'the existence of God is deduced from some alleged
facts of linguistic usage' but rather the 'proof of the truth
of Christianity' has its foundation in emotional needs and
desires.
Presented,then,with this analysis of the 'religious form
of life', the 'religious language-games' and experiences in
which the concept of God has its genesis -biographical con¬
siderations providing a sufficient ground for adhering to
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religious beliefs as true -what possible relationship could the
Anselmian Ontological Argument,as first explicated by Malcolm,
have to such religious belief? How could such an argument be
connected with and to religious belief? Malcolm writes:
"At a deeper level, I suspect that the argument
can be thoroughly understood only by one who has
a view of that human 'form of life' that gives
rise to the idea of an infinitely great being,
who views it from the inside, not just from the
outside, and who has, therefore, at least some
inclination to partake in that religious 'form
of life'. This inclination in Kierkegaard's
words is 'from the emotions'. This inclination
can hardly be an effect of Anselm's argument,
but is rather presupposed in the fullest under¬
standing of it." (3^)
To the extent of course that one is a participant in the reli¬
gious 'form of life', viewing 'things' from the inside, the
impetus being provided by the emotions, it is hardly likely that
a "piece of logic" which can be "followed deductively" would be
of any religious or other significance. (35) To such a person
the Anselmian Ontological Argument would be superfluous or
redundant.
However,Malcolm asks us to consider another case. He
States:
"I can imagine an atheist going through the
argument, becoming convinced of its validity,
acutely defending it against objections, yet
remaining an atheist. The only effect it could
have on the fool of the Psalm would be that he
stopped saying in his heart 'There is no God',
because he would now realise that this is some¬
thing he cannot meaningfully say or think. It
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is hardly to be expected that a demonstrative
argument should, in addition, produce in him
a living faith." (36)
Malcolm's atheist would I suppose 'believe that' there is a God,
but, in Malcolm's terminology, remain an 'atheist' in as much as
his affirmation of God's existence does not encourage him or,
if you like, convert him, into participating in the religious
'form of life'. He would not be a committed believer, his
belief would have no emotional backing - he would not 'believe
in' God if this is understood to mean participating in the reli¬
gious 'form of life'.
Now apart from noting the Pickwickian sense of the terra
'atheist' employed here, I think the following point should be
stressed. Earlier I distinguished between (a) what it is for
a word to have a meaning and (b) what is involved in its use
being significant, meaningful, having a purpose or point for
anyone. Now obviously, given the account Malcolm presents us
with above, when Malcolm talks about the 'sense' ot 'meaning'
of the concept. 'the grammar of the word 'God' \ being dis¬
covered in the human phenomena, the emotional experiences under¬
pinning the use of the word,he must be talking about what
constitutes the significance or point of using the word - what
constitutes the word being found meaningful by a believer. If
you want to find the significance of its use you must relate it
to the human phenomena and experiences where it has its genesis.
For Malcolm's 'atheist' such phenomena have, by definition, no
significance. The sense or meaning which such phenomena provide
for the concept are closed to him. However he can and may still
affirm God's existence, the words have a meaning for him. He
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may not find them significant, see the point or purpose of
affirming the existence of God - he does not participate in the
'religious form of life'-but he can still intelligibly affirm
"fhere is a God'. The words have a meaning for him, he can be
said to 'believe that' there is a God.
Interestingly Malcolm, in a later article (37)» rejects
the analysis of the situation presented here, rejects his
account of what is involved in plotting the grammar of the word
'God' by reference to the human phenomena underpinning it, and
maintains that it is not psychologically but logically impossible
to believe that God exists and have no - what he now calls -
'affective attitude' towards Him. He states:
"I must confess that the supposed belief that
God exists strikes me as a problematic concept,
whereas belief in God is not problematic ...
the inclination we are discussing is to hold
that you could believe that God exists without
believing in God. As I understand it, we are
supposed to think that one could believe that
God exists but at the same time have no affective
attitude towards God. The belief that he exists
would come first and the affective attitude
might or might not come later. The belief that
he exists would not logically imply any affective
attitude towards him, but an affective attitude
towards him would logically imply the belief
that he exists. If we are assuming a Jewish or
Christian conception of God I do not see how one
can make the above separation. If one conceived
of God as the almighty creator of the world and
judge of mankind how could one believe that he
exists, but not be touched at all by awe or
dismay or fear? I am discussing logic, not
psychology. Would a belief that he exists, if
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it were completely non-affective really be a
belief that he exists? ... Would it be anything
at all? What is the 'form of life' into which
it would enter?" (38)
Now,not only here do we have stated the rejection of the very
intelligibility of a 'belief that' God exists but we also have
a positive assertion concerning the intelligibility of 'belief
in' God as the only possible expression or affirmation of belief
in the 'Jewish and Christian religion'. 'Belief in' God, for
Malcolm, "encompasses not only trust but also awe, dread, dismay
etc. ... it involves some affective state or attitudes." (39)
Thus Malcolm's 'atheist', the man who cannot say 'in his
heart' 'There is no God', but who has no 'living faith', is ruled
out of court. Affirmations of God's existence are only intelli¬
gible when expressed from within a 'form of life'. It does not
make sense to speak of a 'belief that God exists' - 'belief
that', where the object of belief is God, makes no sense. Now
reflect back,once again,to the distinction I made between
the two senses of meaning, Tn the case of the points made in the
context of the Ontological Argument article it seemed obvious
that what Malcolm meant by plotting the 'sense of the concept of
God', the grammar of the word 'God' -by reference to its genesis
in the 'human phenomena' and experiences -was plotting the
significance, the point, the meaningfulness in this sense, of
the concept to the believer. Confirmation of this interpreta¬
tion was of course provided by what Malcolm claimed concerning
his 'atheist'. The 'atheist' believed that there was a God, the
words expressing the belief had a meaning, but the significance,
the meaningfulness. of the belief,in the other sense, was closed
to him. Now however, we find that the position of such a
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Malcolmian 'atheist' is an untenable one. A completely non-
affective belief that God exists is,in effect, not a belief that
God exists for it makes no sense to say that one believes that
God exists but not be touched by awe, fear, dismay, etc. Such
a belief is unintelligible because it has misplotted the grammar
of the word 'God*. The 'sense of the concept', the grammar of
the meaning of the term 'God', can only be discovered by plotting
its use in the human phenomena, the human experiences where the
concept has its genesis. This is not a point about what is
involved in finding religious beliefs and concepts meaningful
or significant but rather a point about what is involved in
understanding the meaning of the word 'God*; a shift, a change
in the argument has occurred. A term, a concept cannot be a
shared term or concept unless there is agreement about its
criteria of application. Insofar as a committed believer and
a notional believer (someone who merely believes that God exists
with no affective response present) treat their beliefs in
different ways they cannot be said to share the same concepts.
In an important sense,if the sense of the concept, the grammar
of the word 'God' is only given within the context of the human
phenomena and experiences which constitute the 'religious form
of life' then only religious believers can significantly employ
God-talk - talk to or of God. To maintain, as Malcolm's atheist
of the earlier article would, 'I believe that God exists' would
be to express a meaningless utterance. Thus, Malcolm's argu¬
ment here is better understood if we realise that it is by
reference to the circumstances and phenomena . understood as
necessary for the word 'God' to have a meaning that he is enabled
to rule out a 'belief that' God exists as unintelligible. A
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point divorced from and separate from the question of what is
involved in finding belief in God significant or meaningful.
Two points require to be made here. First of all,Malcolm's
tlaj-vn,- in his later article,'Is it a Religious Belief that God
exists?, that 'belief that God exists' is a problematic concept
has puzzled many writers. Now it seems to me that if what
Malcolm says in this article is read along with his account,in
the Ontological Argument article,of the human phenomena and
experiences which constitute the 'religious form of life' —
phenomena and experiences which are connected with the formation
of the sense of the concept of God, with the 'grammar' of the
word 'God'—one can at least see certain of the considerations
which undoubtedly enticed Malcolm to maintain4 what he did main¬
tain, in the later article. That is,the genesis of the account
he gives in the later article of the problematic, i.e.,
unintelligible, nature of the 'belief that God exists' can be
discovered if one pays close attention to the account he gives,
among other things, of the circumstances surrounding the forma¬
tion of the 'grammar' of the word 'God' in the earlier article.
Secondly, as Malcolm expresses the point in the later
article, the claim that a 'belief in' God logically involves
some affective state or attitude, e.g., awe or trust, is quite
distinct from the claim made in the earlier article that the
genesis of the concept of God is to be found in certain human
phenomena and experiences. There is no incompatability between
the two accounts or claims,however. Indeed it is not difficult
to see that religious belief born, as it were, out of 'a storm
in the soul' will be entertained affectively. For Malcolm ,then .
what apparently makes a belief a religious belief is its
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inclusion in a distinct 'form of life', its genesis in the
emotions and its affective nature. What is, important to note
is that for Malcolm there can be no theoretical, no non-
affective ,affirmation of God's existence, no 'form of life'
independent, affirmation of God's existence.
Having traced the genesis of Malcolm's conclusions and
arguments found in the later article back to his earlier
'Ontological Argument' article, I would like now,in conclusion,
to make some critical comments with inference to the validity
of the argument and conclusions stated by Malcolm in the later
article.
Interestingly enough, considering my earlier remarks on
the Genetic Fallacy, what Malcolm has to Bay,in this later
article,about the distinction between 'believing that' and
'believing in' God is originally stimulated by his desire to
deny the claim that,with regard to religious belief in parti¬
cular, "a natural causal explanation of religious belief would
or could undermine its truth or respectability." (kO) The truth
of the belief is not here claimed to be a function of its
psychological or causal origin;rather a weaker point is claimed,
viz. that no valid causal explanation, or genetical account of
religious belief could in any way count against the truth of
such a belief. To back up his claim Malcolm gives us the
following example:
"If such a causal explanation were true, then
that is the way (or one way) God does it.
Suppose we learned that the dividing of the Red
Sea, which permitted the Israelites to escape
from the Egyptians, was probably caused by a
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strong wind. Would there be anything inappro¬
priate in the thought that this is how God
accomplished his purpose? I cannot see that
there would." (41)
'Well it depends what meaning you give to the claim that this is
'how God accomplished his purpose'. Two possibilities suggest
themselves here. First of all,God acted in some supernatural
way to specially cause the strong wind which divided the Red Sea.
Secondly, God did not act in any special way, apart from his
general act of sustaining the universe, and the event of the
strong wind dividing the Red Sea was,therefore, as natural an
event as any other event in the universe. Now if we accept the
first possibility it seems inappropriate to refer to this event
as having a natural causal explanation. The occurrence of the
strong wind dividing the Red Sea is caused by direct divine
activity of God. Alternatively, if we accept the second possi¬
bility, what meaning can we give to the claim that this is an
instance of how God 'accomplished his purpose*? In an important
sense God did not act,apart from his general activity involved
in sustaining the universe. But if that activity of sustaining
is to be considered an action,then God is responsible,in the
same way, for every individual event that occurs. Either alter¬
native is unacceptable. The first alternative, if true, would
prevent one from claiming that one had presented a natural
causal explanation the second alternative, if true, would
prohibit one from validly claiming that one had presented a
natural explanation of an event that was performed or accom¬
plished by God, i.e., a natural explanation of a religious event.
However,despite these particular difficulties, Malcolm
believes that what prevents many philosophers from accepting
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the claim that natural causal explanations of religious belief
would not undermine its truth is the supposition or assumption,
often made, that
"there is a particular belief, namely, the
belief that God exists, and with this belief
as with any other we must make a distinction
between causes of the belief and grounds or
evidence for its truth."
It is this 'belief that God exists' which strikes Malcolm as a
problematic concept as opposed to 'belief in God' which is not
a problematic concept. Now, as we have already seen, in the
case of a 'belief that God exists', what Malcolm wants to deny
is not simply that no distinction can be drawn between the
causes of the belief and grounds or evidence for its truth but,
more fundamentally, the very intelligibility of the belief
itself. 'Belief in' God is the only possible expression or
affirmation of a belief which has "God as its object." (A-3)
Now it is important to stress that for Malcolm 'belief in
God' not only "involves some affective state or attitude" but
also has "God as its object," (kk) because Malcolm's arguments,
concerning the unintelligibility of a 'belief that God exists',
have led certain philosophers, notably Professor Flew, to deny
that Malcolm's analysis of the content of a 'belief in* allows
Malcolm to claim that there is any 'object' presupposed by the
'belief in'. As Flew states:
"... supposing that belief in God does
necessarily require some appropriate response,
it may still, indeed it must, also presuppose
something for that response to be a response to.
To what, to focus on the worshipping centre of
Christian theism, does Malcolm think the true
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believer believes he is addressing his prayers?"
(45)
Malcolm could very well reply;'God is the object of the response',
but what he would deny is that one could express such a reply
I
in some such terms as(a 'belief in' necessarily presupposes a
'belief that'. Rather, God, as the object of the religious
response is part of the content of the 'belief in'. A 'belief
in' God involves some affective state or attitude, with God as
its object. To claim that such a 'belief in' presupposes a
'belief that God exists' would be to give expression to as
utterance that is unintelligible.
If we refer back,however, to Malcolm's argument we shall
see that not only is Malcolm wishing to deny that, in the case
of a belief in God a distinction can be drawn between the
'causes of the belief' and 'grounds or evidence for its truth',
but further, the claim made by philosophers, , whether or
not a belief in God based on grounds or evidences is justifiable
is the "first and great question" to be decided - there being
"time enough later to determine how one should regard him." (46)
That is,Malcolm wants to rule out of court the question,'Is it
the case that 'God really exists'?' if that is understood as a
question asked in a non-affective way and demanding a non-
affective response. Does however Malcom's argument provide him
with good reasons for rejectin ; that question, or, if the
question is answered in the affirmative, for rejecting the
'belief that' God exists?
Two considerations incline me to reject his arguments here.
First of all,surely it is the case that the non-affective
'belief that' God exists has, despite what Malcolm claims,
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entered into a 'form of life' and a'religious form of life' at
that: I am referring,of course,to the 'form of life* of reli¬
gious apologetics where it has been claimed that one can not
only promulgate but further advocate the 'belief that' there is
a God, and this on the basis of the grounds and evidence which
can be obtained for the belief. Thus,within this 'religious
form of life' an affirmative answer or response is given to the
question of whether or not God exists and the answer is thought
to be justifiable on the basis of the evidence and grounds there
presented. There, an evidential 'belief that' there is a God is
expressed and not only expressed but advocated as a belief that
deserves or ought to be accepted by all religious and non-
religious individuals alike. Surely, further, such a 'belief
that' can only play such a role if the expression of the 'belief
that' God exists is intelligible, if it is generally understood,
by both believer and non-believer, what is involved in 'believing
that' God exists^ The 'grammar' of the word 'God', the sense of
the concept cannot be peculiar to, the sole property of, those
individuals who 'partake' in the 'religious form of life'.
Secondly., even if what is distinctive of a religious belief
in God's existence is best expressed in terms of a 'belief in'
God,as illustrated by Malcolm - a belief involving some affec¬
tive state or attitude - does this fact enable us to ignore or
neglect questions as to whether the object, God, of the reli¬
gious belief or response actually exists? Surely not, because
as well as questioning the appropriateness of the particular
attitude involved i* such attitudes "varying from reverential
love to rebellious rejection" (*t7)-one could also ask the more
fundamental question as to whether the object of the attitudes
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actually exists? To believe in God may well necessarily
involve the holding of certain affective states or attitudes
towards the object of the belief,but that is not all that is
involved. As W. I). Hudson correctly states:
"... if he (Malcolm) thinks that he has
answered or eliminated that question (the
question of God's existence), he is confusing
a necessary condition of religious belief with
a sufficient condition of it. He is supposing
that belief-in is enough to constitute religious
belief given the explicit exclusion of belief-
that. This is plainly mistaken. It is true
that religious belief is not simply the belief
that God exists but it is equally true that it
is not thus exclusively belief in God." Cf8)
Now the argument mounted by Malcolm ,to justify his claim
that 'belief that God exists is a problematic concept', was only
presented because, as we saw, Malcolm believed that the basis of
our willingness to admit that, in the case of a belief in God's
existence we must make a distinction between causes of the
belief and grounds or evidence for its truth^was to be found in
our finding intelligible the claim that there was this parti¬
cular belief - the 'belief that God exists'. Malcolm also,
however,attacks another assumption he finds made here - the
assumption that we would know what would constitute good
grounds, reasons or evidence for such a belief. He cl^ivaS:
"... even if the belief that God exists is a
non-problematic concept, we seem to have no clear
conception of what would be reasons, grounds or
evidence for this belief." (^9)
Now it is not merely that we have no clear conception of what
will constitute good or bad evidence here which troubles Malcolm,
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it is rather the stronger point that the very idea of having
or presenting evidence, grounds or reasons for one's religious
beliefs seems entirely inappropriate. He states:
"Nothing is put forward in the Old or New Testa¬
ment as evidence for the existence of God.
Someone whose religious concepts were formed
exclusively from the Bible, might regard this
question of evidence as an alien intrusion. ...
It is my impression that this question of evi¬
dence plays no part in workaday religious
instruction and practice, but puts in an
appearance only when the language is idling." (50)
It may indeed be the case that nothing is advanced in the
Old and New Testament as evidence for God's existence - though
I think this claim is in fact false - but even if what Malcolm
claims is true,this does not justify his further claim that the
question of evidence is an 'alien intrusion'. What certainly
does seem to be true is that God's existence may be assumed or
presupposed in 'workaday religious practice', but questions of
evidence are indeed relevant to the assertion of God's existence.
But not in workaday religious instruction and practice', Malcolm
» 1
might argue, and if, he might continue, 'you are thinking of
religious apologetics,as earlier described,as an example of a
'religious form of life' - in reference to my claim made
previously - then you are mistaken because there, if questions
of evidence arise, language is idling.' But all this demonstrates
is that what Malcolm means by 'workaday religious instruction
and practice' is such that questions of evidence cannot arise;
he most certainly has not demonstrated that in principle
'workaday religious instruction and practice' would necessarily
rule out references to evidence. In fact it is difficult to see
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how he could proceed to do this given the role., for example, reli¬
gious apologetics does play in the religious life - a role,
incidentally, which does not occur 'when the language is idling'.
The belief in God's existence can be questioned by religious
people, further it can be questioned with reference to the
evidence available or not available to justify the belief. Such
questions can arise within religious belief and are not
'alien phenomena' totally divorced from religious life and
practice.
Surely however, with reference to the question of evidence,
unless religious belief involves empirical consequences, conse¬
quences which can provide evidence for or against the belief
"then it does not 'get a grip' on the world; it does not really
deserve the name of 'belief'." (51) Professor Hick expresses
the point in the following ways
"... there can only be any point, and in that
sense only any meaning, in the statement that
x exists or is real - whether x be an electron,
a huKvan being, a quasor, God or anything else -
if it makes an appropriate experienceable
difference whether x exists. If x is so defined
that it makes no difference within human
experience, past, present or future, whether it
be there or not, then the apparent assertion by
one human being to smother that it exists does
not really assert anything." (52)
For Malcolm,this problem crystallizes itself into the question
of whether or not the concept of God has any content and further,
whether or not such content implies certain expectations as to
how things sire or will be in the world. - As Malcolm .states
- 1A5 -
"if my concept of God has any content then I
$ust have some beliefs, and some of these
beliefs might be called 'expectations'." (53)
What,however,is meant by 'expectations' here? Malcolm presents
us with two examples and I shall relate and comment on each
separately. For the first example Malcolm refers to the Bible
(Mark 11 J 23-2*0. He states:
"As part of my concept of God I might have the
belief that faith in God will cause this moun¬
tain to be cast into the sea. But if the
mountain does not move shall I conclude that
the belief is false; or that God does not exist?
It need not be so. I might conclude instead
that my faith was not strong enough. If I drew
this latter conclusion, would that be evidence
that I did not really believe that faith will
move mountains? Quite the contrary. The belief
might be held by me in such a way that no fact
of experience could falsify it." (5*0
Now.as K. Nielsen has pointed out,what is crucial here is the
status Malcolm accords to the word 'could' in the last sentence
quoted. (55) If the 'could' here is not a logical 'could' then
it is,at least,logically possible that some fact of experience
could serve to verify or falsify the belief. But this does not
seem to fit what Malcolm has in mind. However,if the 'could' is
understood logically., such that what is being maintained is that
it is inconceivable that any fact of experience could verify or
falsify the belief, and this does seem to be the sense of
'could' which Malcolm has in mind, then the belief does seem to
be devoid of 'expectations', at least in any normal sense of
the term.
At this stage,however, Malcolm warns us that:
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"there are beliefs and beliefs. Some of them
do not issue in expectations in such a way that
their fulfilment or non-fulfilment would be a
verification or falsification of the beliefs."
(56)
As an instance of such a belief Malcolm provides us with this
second example:
"Another item of content in my concept of God
might be the belief that if I am truly repentant
my sins will be forgiven. Does this belief have
to be held in such a way, or is it generally
held in such a way, that it is verifiable or
falsifiable in experience? Certainly not ... a
belief can get a grip on the world in another
way. The man who believes that his sins will be
forgiven if he is truly repentant, might thereby
be saved from despair. What he believes has,
for him, no verification or falsification; yet
the belief makes a great difference to his action
and feeling." (57)
This last sentence is odd. Surely what the believer believes
does have a verification or falsification; his belief,that if
he is truly repentant his sins will be forgiven ,is confirmed by
his repenting and being saved from despair. However,I suspect
that Malcolm wants to retain a usage for verification and falsi¬
fication such that what can only intelligibly be said to be
verified or falsified are beliefs about events in the world and,
of course, it is other events in the world which serve to
verify or falsify them. In the case of such a belief,as Malcolm
provides in his example, we are rather to think of tbls belief
as getting a 'grip on the world* by viewing the difference such
a belief makes to a 'man's actions and feelings'. Note now,
however .that in trying to illustrate the nature of a religious
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belief with a 'grip on the world'? a concept of God with a con¬
tent, what we are referred to is not any conceivable or actual
empirical event or events but rather statements of human
psychology, to what occurs in the personality of the religious
believer. Flew, if perhaps he had this latter claim in mind,
would appear to be quite justified then,when he expressed his
doubts as to whether Malcolm's analysis of the content of a
'belief in' God presupposed the existence of some object for
the 'belief in' to be a religious response to. To have a reli¬
gious belief ,it seems then;is to have a belief which will deter¬
mine^ direct and control one's attitudes and feelings,but it is
not a kind of belief which finds expression in claims concerning
the nature of the world. It gets 'its grip on the world in
another way'.
Certain points,developed here,require greater elucidation
and I intend to do this at a later stage in the development of
the essay. However, I want to pause here because Malcolm's claim,
among others, that intelligible assertions of God's existence
can only be formed from within the religious 'form of life' has
been forcefully argued for,in much greater detail,by D. Z.
Phillips. I wish now to consider his arguments and the argu¬
ments of those other philosophers who have either been influenced





For D. Z. Phillips "contemporary philosophy of religion
has benefitted little from Wittgenstein's later epistemology."
(1) This is so because philosophers have failed to realise that
"religious concepts have their meaning within a certain form of
life," (2) and "the intelligibility of the family of language-
games covered by the term 'religion' is not assessed by wider
criteria of meaningfulness." (3) For Phillips then,the role of
philosophy is to understand religious beliefs, give a conceptual
account of them, and this entails that it can be no part of the
job of philosophy to either critically assess or sympathetically
advocate religious beliefs. "Philosophy," says Phillips, with
the thought of Wittgenstein very much in mind,
"is neither for nor against religion: 'it leaves
everything as it is'. This fact distinguishes
philosophy from apologetics. It is not the task
of the philosopher to decide whether there is a
God or not but to ask what it means to affirm
or deny the existence of God." (A-)
Philosophy must explore the 'depth grammar' of religious belief,
not the 'surface grammar', (5) and the account it gives can only
be judged adequate according to whether or not it coheres with
the "complex behaviour of religious believers". (6)
Thus,if the "philosopher wants to give an account of reli¬
gion, he must pay attention to what religious believers do and
say" (7) but such an account can only represent a conceptual
understanding of religious belief and language; it can in no way
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be thought of as providing a justification or otherwise of such
religious belief and language. Indeed the "whole conception ...
of religion standing in need of justification is confused." (8)
It is not
"the task of philosophy to settle the question of
whether a man is talking to God or not, but to
ask what it means to affirm or deny that a man
is talking to God." (9)
This means that philosophers (and here Phillips seems to have
Professors Flew and Hepburn in mind) who believe that religious
belief and language stand in need of justification, of explana¬
tion, and who see their philosophical task or role as
"pointing out, and, if possible, correcting ...
linguistic mistakes ... religious believers
make"
are not only misled as to the nature and role of philosophy but
further are illicitly claiming "to detect a norm of meaningful-
ness which cantest the validity of religious statements " - the
norm "being ordinary language". (10) Such philosophers have
paid
"too much attention to the surface grammar of
religious statements. They have assumed too
readily that words such as 'existence', 'love',
'will*, are used in the same way of God as they
are used of human beings, animate and inanimate
objects. Depth grammar is made explicit by
asking what can and what cannot be said of the
concept in question. To understand the limits
of what can be said about a concept, one must
take account of the context in which the concept
is used." (11)
This does not mean,however, that it makes no difference
whether in religion one thing is said rather than another,
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even though the distinction between what is sayable and unsay-
able does not amount to the same in every context; there "must
be a distinction between what is rational and what is irrational,"
(12) though such a distinction can only be applied within reli¬
gion. Only, "this is not to say that there is a paradigm of
rationality to which all modes of discourse conform." (13) What
the terms 'reality', 'rationality' and 'exist' mean differs from
discourse to discourse. Thus:
"a necessary prolegomenon to the philosophy of
religion ... is to show the diversity of
criteria of rationality; to show that the dis¬
tinction between the real and the unreal does
not come to the same in every context." (14)
It is to the writings of Professor P. Winch that Phillips
specifically refers when wishing to point out the diversity of
these criteria (15) and Winch claims to be fairly reflecting
what is explicitly or implicitly implied in the writings of the
later philosophy of Wittgenstein. Thus,I wish now to turn to
critically examine Winch's claims and arguments.
Winch's views receive their most detailed expression in,
to a lesser extent,his book The Idea of a Social Science.(16)
and in an essay entitled 'Understanding a Primitive Society'.
(17) Winch's main concern is with the general question of what
is involved in understanding human social life but,in his essay,
he is primarily interested in issues connected with social
anthropology.although he does indicate how his arguments and
claims could be applied to religion and religious belief. Winch
in his essay initially critically considers the work of the
anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard as found in his book
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Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic amonre the Azan.de. According to
Evans-Pritchard the African Azande believe that certain of their
members are witches who are able to exercise a malignant occult
influence over other members of the tribe such that it is
necessary to engage in elaborate rites, consult oracles and use
magic medicines to protect themselves from their harmful
influences. Now., given that the Azande believe this to be the
case, believe that there are witches with such powers as des¬
cribed, then, according to Evans-Pritchard, their subsequent
behaviour is quite logical. The only trouble or difficulty is
that although the behaviour of the Azande is quite logical in
the sense defined according to Evans-Pritchard, it is
unscientific. And it is unscientific because it is not in accord
with objective reality, with objective facts. As a matter of
objective fact there are no witches. Evans-Pritchard sums up
his distinction between the 'logical' and the 'scientific' in
the following way:
"Scientific notions are those which accord with
objective reality both with regard to the
validity of their premises and to the inferences
drawn from their propositions ... Logical notions
are those in which according to the rules of
thought inferences would be true were the pre¬
mises true, the truth of the premises being
irrelevant ... A pot has broken during firing.
This is probably due to grit. Let us examine
the pot and see if this is the case. That is
logical and scientific thought. Sickness is due
to witchcraft. A man is sick. Let us consult
the oracles to discover who is the witch respon¬
sible. That is logical and unscientific thought."
(19)
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Now Winch objects to Evans-Pritchard's arguments and con¬
clusions here on two main grounds. First of all he objects to
the implicit claim., assumed by Evans-Pritchard, that the Azande's
belief in witches must be some kind of scientific belief and,
secondly, he fundamentally disagrees with Evans-Pritchard's
attempt to "characterize the scientific in terms of that which
is 'in accord with objective reality'." (20) What is fundamen¬
tally wrong with this last claim is that it presupposes "that
"the conception of 'reality* must be regarded as
intelligible and applicable outside the context
of scientific reasoning itself, since it is that
to which scientific notions do, and unscientific
notions do not, have a relation. Evans-
Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member
of a scientific culture has a different concep¬
tion of reality from that of a Zande believer in
magic, wants to go beyond merely registering
this fact and making the differences explicit,
and to say, finally, that the scientific concep¬
tion agrees with what reality actually is like,
whereas the magical conception does not." (21)
There are beliefs and beliefs and not all of these are
scientific beliefs and there are ideas of 'reality' and what it
is to be in 'accord with reality' which do not involve reference
to empirical testing and observation by experiment, i.e.
scientific reasoning. Certainly it is true,Winch claims, that
men's ideas and beliefs must be checkable by reference to some
reality. But this does not mean that it is legitimate to pass
judgement on the Azande way of life by invoking concepts of
reality and accordance with reality which have an application
within our culture, our "Twentieth century European culture".
(22) We cannot legitimately claim that the Azande's belief in
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witches is a false belief on the basis that the scientific
criteria operative in our society shows it to be so. The check
of the independently real is not peculiar to science,and it is
just here, in elucidation of what he means, that we can begin to
see the connectionwith and importance of what Winch has to say to
religious belief. He states:
"The trouble is that the fascination science has
for us makes it easy for us to adopt its scienti¬
fic form as a paradigm against which to measure
the intellectual respectability of other modes
of discourse. Consider what God says to Job out
of the whirlwind: 'Who is this that darkeneth
counsel by words without knowledge? ... Where
wast thou when I laid the foundations of the
earth? declare, if thou hast understanding ...
Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty
instruct him? he that reproveth God, Let hira
answer it.' Job is taken to task for having
gone astray by having lost sight of the reality
of God; this does not, of course, mean that Job
has made any sort of theoretical mistake, which
could be put right, perhaps, by means of an
experiment. God's reality is certainly indepen¬
dent of what any man may care to think, but what
that reality amounts to can only be seen from
the religious tradition in which the concept of
God is used, and this use is very unlike the use
of scientific concepts, say of theoretical
entities. The point is that it is within the
religious use of language that the conception of
God's reality has its place, though, I repeat,
this does not mean that it is at the mercy of
what anyone cares to say; if this were so, God
would have no reality." (23)
Now for Winch it is not only the case that it is 'within
the religious use of language that the conception of God's
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reality has its place' but further
"reality is not what gives language sense. What
is real and what is unreal shows itself in the
sense that language has. Further, both the dis¬
tinction between the real and the unreal and the
concept of agreement with reality themselves
belong to our language ... we could not in fact
distinguish the real from the unreal without
understanding the way this distinction operates
in the language. If then we wish to understand
the significance of these concepts, we must
examine the use they actually do have - in the
language." (2k)
There is no language-independent or context-independent idea of
reality which can be used to assess conceptions of reality found
in any particular language or use of language. The notions of
'reality' and of 'accordance with reality* only have meaning,
are intelligible, within particular uses of language. One can
only intelligibly ask,'What is real?' or "What is in accordance
with reality?' within the context or use of a particular
language.
Not only do such claims refer to concepts of reality but
further,for Winch,"standards of rationality in different
societies do not always coincide ... there are differences in
criteria of rationality." (25) Although Winch does initially
admit here that the possibilities of there being different
criteria are "limited by certain formal requirements centering
round the demand for consistency^' He then proceeds to nullify
his qualification by claiming that "these formal requirements
tell us nothing about what in particular is to count as consis¬
tency." (26) However without a concept of reality, without a
concept of rationality, we would not have a language. A3 Winch
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relates with reference to the concept of rationality: "It is a
concept necessary to the existence of any language: to say of a
society that it has a language is also to say that it has a
concept of rationality." (2?)
In the Idea of a Social Science Winch summarises his own
claims very succinctly. There we are told, with reference to
the problem of what is involved in understanding something,
grasping its sense, that
"if we look at the contexts in which the notions
of understanding, of making something intelli¬
gible, are used we find that these differ widely
amongst themselves. Moreover, if those contexts
are examined and compared, it soon becomes
apparent that the notion of intelligibility is
systematically ambiguous ... in its use in those
contexts: that is, its sense varies systemati¬
cally according to the particular context in
which it is being used." (20)
However as Winch himself maintains,the main argument of his book,
the central thesis which he is trying to give expression to in
both his book and his article, revolves round the following claim*
"Criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God,
but arise out of, and are only intelligible in
the context of, ways of living or modes of
social life. It follows that one cannot apply
criteria of logic to modes of social life as
such. For instance, science is one such mode
and religion is another; and each has criteria
of intelligibility peculiar to itself. So
within science or religion actions can be
logical or illogical: in science, for example,
it would be illogical to refuse to be bound by
the results of a properly carried out experiment;
in religion it would be illogical to suppose
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that one could pit one's strength against God's;
and bo on. But we cannot sensibly say that
either the practice of science itself or that of
religion is either illogical or logical; both
sire non-logical." (29)
There is much here that demands close scrutiny. First of
all let us look at the broad sweep of the argument. Winch
begins by asking what is involved in understanding another
culture - in particular the Azande culture. That is, he is
concerned with issues connected with social anthropology. He
critically examines Evams-Pritchard's account of Azande life,
his approach to the problem of understanding involved. He
applauds Svans-Pritchard's attempts to present the sense of the
Azande's beliefs and institutions, to show the 'logical' nature
of the Azande's subsequent behaviour and action given their
initial beliefs and attitudes. However he parts company with
Evans-Pritchard, he believes Evans-Pritchard to be crucially
wrong when he claims that, although the Azande's thoughts and
actions are logical, they aire, however, not in accord with objective
reality, because the concepts and beliefs of the Azande aire not
scientific notions or beliefs and it is only scientific notions
'which accord with objective reality'. Now while Winch sympa¬
thises with Evans-Pritchard's difficulties - difficulties which
arise for any anthropologist studying em alien culture and
wishing to 'make its beliefs amd practices intelligible', diffi¬
culties which can lead an anthropologist to give an account of
the alien culture 'that will somehow satisfy the criteria of
rationality demanded by the culture to which he and his readers
belong' such a culture being one 'whose conception of rationality
is deeply affected by the achievements and methods of the
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sciences' (30) - he,however,believes Evans-Pritchard makes two
crucial errors here. First of all,he objects to Evans-Pritchard's
assumption that the Azande's belief in witches must be a
scientific belief and,secondly, his attempt to characterize the
scientific in terms of what is really in 'accord with objective
reality', an attempt which presupposes that the notion of being
'in accord with objective reality is intelligible outside the
area of scientific discourse such that one can stand outside
scientific reasoning and concepts and assess scientific concepts
and beliefs as being those which do in fact accord with objective
reality.
Now to give content to his argument here Winch refers us
to particular religious beliefs found and developed in our own
culture - '20th century European culture'. He refers,in parti¬
cular, to the beliefs and difficulties of Job as set out in the
Christian Bible. By reference to the story of Job Winch hopes
to show,or illustrate,that (a) here we have a set of beliefs
which are not scientific beliefs - beliefs,moreover, which in
their point and practice may be similar to Azande beliefs in
that they both "may express an attitude to contingencies" (31)
and beliefs which furthermore both derive their point or
importance from their aim to provide "a sense of the signifi¬
cance of human life" (32)-and (b) what constitutes God's reality
can only be seen from within the religious tradition in which
the concept of God is used, reality not giving language sense
but rather 'what is real and unreal showing itself in the sense
that language has'. What applies here to the religious case
applies equally,for Winch,to the Azande magical culture.
Note here however, first of all, the move which is made.
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Winch's original problem was to try and plot what is involved in
an anthropologist understanding,or claiming to understand,an
alien culture. That is,an anthropologist - a 'member of 20th
century European culture', a 'culture deeply affected by the
achievements and methods of the sciences'-tries to understand,
in the example given, the social structure and beliefs of the
African Azande. A member of one culture tries to understand an
alien culture, a culture of which he is not a member. Suddenly,
however,one finds that Winch,in trying to explicate and expound
what is involved here, or more precisely what is not involved,
refers us to 'modes of social life', religion and science each
constituting one, activities which singularly or together are
practised within a culture and which go to make up or constitute
a culture. That is, the initial contrast is between two
cultures: . the Azande culture with its 'magical beliefs and
practices constituting a principal foundation of its social
life' (33) and '20th century European culture', a scientific
culture. But,as the argument proceeds,we are then presented with
a contrast between modes of social life -modes of social life
which, in the case of the examples used, go to make up or con¬
stitute '20th century European culture'. And it is argued that
just the same relationships exist between these 'modes of social
life' within a culture as exist between cultures. Criteria of
reality, rationality, logic, etc. are not only systematically
ambiguous between cultures but also between modes of social life
within a culture. Now surely this claim is unacceptable? Even
if one may accept what Winch has to say concerning the contrast
between cultures,this does not entail that one may or ought to
accept what he has to say about relationships between modes of
- 159 -
social life,or at least not without some argument being given
to justify his claim. Now Winch himself might appear to accept
this point because he does state, when discussing the distinc¬
tion drawn between modes of social life, the following:
"This is, of course, an over-simplification, in
that it does not allow for the overlapping
character of different modes of social life.
Somebody might, for instance, have religious
reasons for devoting his life to science. But
I do not think that this affects the substance
of what I want to say, though it would make its
precise expression in detail more complicated."
w
Perhaps the counter example presented may not affect the
substance of what he has to say but one would have thought that
his admission of the possibility of overlap would do so, and
not simply,or merely,have made the precise expression of his
argument more complicated. Thus ,1 would conclude, , simply
from examining Winch's arguments we are in no way provided with
any justification for concluding that points made, claims made,
concerning what is involved in understanding an alien culture
or society justify us in applying such points or conclusions to
'modes of social life' to be found within a culture or society -
in the case in question within our present culture or society.
A person then may be a member of only one culture at any
given time but he may participate in many different 'modes of
social life' within a culture. One may indeed even wonder why -
given the putative truth of this account of the existence of
different modes of social life within,in particular,20th century
European society or culture and all that entails for Winchthe
original problem,as described by Winch, of understanding an
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alien or primitive society should ever have arisen. Such a
(zu
problem, as Winch characterises it, only arises/because in
trying to understand an alien society we not only . apply
scientific criteria of reality, rationality but also (b) because
such criteria are accepted in the society as the criteria, as a
'demand of the culture'. Now if what Winch maintains is correct
concerning the possibility of our participation in different
modes of social life in our culture or society, science being
merely one such mode, why has such a problem ever arisen? Why
are scientific criteria accepted as dominant? Surely if Winch's
claims are correct it should be impossible to explain such a
dominance? May it not rather be the case that our treating
scientific criteria as the criteria to be applied is not, as
Winch would perhaps have us believe, an expression of a prejudice
but rather an explicit expression of a belief or assumption that
such criteria are the proper criteria to be applied,on the
grounds that they are the criteria which are in accord with
objective reality? Success achieved in applying scientific
criteria may be no accident. Such facts may at least militate
against accepting the Winchian analysis of the situation.
Further,is it the case that criteria of rationality,
criteria of logic are culture-or mode of social life-dependent
as Winch would have us believe? (As to what constitutes
criteria of rationality or criteria of logic we are left in the
dark,even though we may find it difficult here to present an
understanding of either rationality or logic such that we could
differentiate the two.) Now, as we saw, Winch at one stage of
his argument did admit that the possibilities of there being
different criteria are 'limited by certain formal requirements
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centering round the demand for consistency', although we are
warned that these formal requirements provide no information as
to what 'in particular is to count as consistency'. "Logical
relations between propositions themselves depend on social rela¬
tions between men." (35) Now this is surely unacceptable
because as S. Lukes st-ates:
"Does this imply that the concept of negation
and the laws of identity and non-contradiction
need not operate in ... language? If so, then
it must be mistaken, for if the members of a
society do not possess even these, how could
we ever understand their thought, their
inferences and arguments? Gould they even be
credited with the possibility of inferring,
arguing or even thinking? If, for example, they
were unable to see that the truth of p excludes
the truth of its denial, how could they ever
communicate truths to one another and reason
from them to other truths." (36)
With this account I concur but I disagree with the conclusion
which Lukes wishes to draw from his argument here. He wishes to
argue that such criteria of rationality are universal but it
seems to me that M. Hollis is correct when he argues that such
rational criteria "are not so much universal as necessary." (37)
The criteria of rationality operative in '20th century European
culture' do not represent just one kind of "rational thought nor
rational thought just one species of thought." (38)
Further,consider again the example given by Winch to
illustrate what is meant by different criteria of logic.
'Criteria of logic,' we are told, 'arise out of and are only
intelligible in the context of ... modes of social life,'
5cience representing one such mode and religion another.
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'Within science or religion actions can be logical or illogicali
in science, for example, it would be illogical to refuse to
be bound by the results of a properly carried out experiment;
in religion it would be illogical to suppose that one could pit
one's strength against God's.' Criteria of logic are context
dependent, they only have application within a mode of social
life, that is where they only can be applied intelligibly.
'Criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God', by which
remark,I think,Winch means that there are no universal, no con¬
text-independent criteria of logic which can have a universal
application either within modes of social life or be applied _to
modes of social life. Look however at the examples given to
illustrate the context dependency of criteria of logic. In
science it would be illogical not to accept the results of a
properly conducted experiment. Certainly, given that one wishes
to practise science, being bound by the results of such experi¬
ments is one of the elements which wouldiconstitute what is
involved in being a scientist. The action is logical given
one's aim, the wish to be a scientist, and the intention to
indulge in scientific practise and procedure. Equally in the
religious example, given that one is a religious believer, with
a proper understanding of the nature of God and a desire to
v/orship him,it would be illogical to believe that one's strength
could matfih God's. (Although I do think there is this difference.
Not to be bound by the results of a properly conducted experiment
is to cease to be a scientist but to believe that one can pit
one's strength against God may not mean that one ceases to be a
believer. One's action may indicate that one is in a state of
rebellion against God and rebellion here may be a religious
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phenomenon and not a non-religious phenomenon.) Do however
the examples given illustrate that different criteria of logic
are involved? I would have thought that both actions are
logical or illogical in exactly the same sense. Given the
beliefs and principles which constitute each mode of social life,
the participant in each mode of social life is, in the examples
quoted, acting either logically or illogically in exactly the
same sense in behaving in either of the two possible ways open
to him. Certainly the contexts in which the 'criteria of logic'
are applied differ but this does not mean, nor do Winch's
examples justify his assertion, that 'criteria of logic' are
context- dependent.
However,despite the rather negative appraisal presented
here of 'Winch's arguments and ideas, I believe that at least some
elucidation has been given of the Winchian conception of the
diversity of criteria of reality, rationality and logic and I
wish now to turn to consider,in more depth,how Phillips and
others, who accept this Winchian analysis, apply in detail these
findings to religious belief.
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'GRAMMAR OF THE REALITY OF GOD'
For D. Z. Phillips, Malcolm's reformulation of Anselm's
Ontological Argument is of the greatest significance for reli¬
gious belief. This is so, because, claims Phillips,
"despite many opinions to the contrary, it
cannot be said that Malcolm argues from the
logical possibility of concepts to the real
possibility of things. What he is concerned to
show, and what he believes Anselm is concerned
to show, is that real possibilities are not
exhausted by the real possibility of things.
God is not a thing; he is not an existent among
existents." (39)
This is debatable. Certainly Malcolm believed that he had
demonstrated that God is not a contingent being or existent
but a necessary Being, not a thing in this sense, but surely
at the time of writing the Ontological Argument article he did
believe that it was justifiable to deduce God's necessary
existence from his characterization of him as a being a greater
than which cannot be conceived,- to move from the 'logical
possibility of a concept to the real possibility of a thing' in
this other and important sense of the term. For Phillips
however,
"it is clear that Malcolm sees one of the main
contributions of the ontological argument to be
a clarification of the grammar of the reality
of God in Hebrew and Christian traditions." (kO)
And the contribution of this clarification shows itself for
Phillips in that
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"The ontological argument rightly locates the
difficulty where religious belief is concerned
in the understanding; the difficulty of compre¬
hending the idea of an eternal God. To have the
idea of God is to know God." (41)
But surely such clarification of the 'grammar of the reality of
God' is simply the Ontological Argument move from 'the logical
possibility of a concept to the real possibility of a thing'
writ large? 'To have the idea of God is to know God' is as
good an expression of the import and significance of the tradi¬
tional Ontological Argument as one could hope to find.
Phillips will have none of this. He states:
"What the ontological argument and Malcolm's
discussion of it achieve is to show us the kinds
of questions one can and cannot ask about belief
in God. No doubt many philosophers regard
Malcolm's article as 'a victory for religion',
but that is a mistaken view of it. What Malcolm
does is to stop us in our tracks when we want to
ask certain questions about God. ... One of the
most important conclusions of the enquiry is to
show that philosophical assent to the kind of
being God can be said to possess, does not
entail belief in God. ... This, I believe, is
Malcolm's point when he says of the ontological
argument, 'I can imagine an atheist going through
the argument, becoming convinced of its validity,
actually defending it against objections, yet
remaining an atheist.'" (^2)
We must,however, remember that such an 'atheist' for Malcolm
could still affirm 'There is a God' even though he couldn't
participate in the 'religious form of life', - he did not have
a 'living faith', did not 'believe in' God in this sense.
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Phillips rejects even this conclusion of Malcolm's argument.
Malcolm is being overscrupulous "about surface grammar" when
he claims this we are told. (^3)
If the main contribution of the Ontological Argument is,
then,not to provide a proof that God exists but rather to
'locate the difficulty where religious belief is concerned in
the understanding*, what precise articulation is given to this
contribution by Phillips? Well, for Phillips,what is terribly
important for philosophers discussing the existence of God is
to determine
"the conceptual category to which the reality of
God belongs ... this is the primary question to
be answered: what kind of philosophical account
does the concept of divine reality call for?" (Mf)
Or again:
"What we want to know is what is meant by an
existential proposition which has God as its
subject." (A-5)
To answer this last question Phillips asks us to consider
the following analogy.
"Many philosophical discussions of the question,
'What kind of reality is divine reality?* have
assumed that it is logically akin to the ques¬
tion 'Is this physical object real or not?' I
suggest that it is closer to the question, 'What
kind of reality is the reality of physical
objects?' The latter question does not concern
the results of any possible empirical investiga¬
tion. It is not a question which can be
answered experimentally, since the kind of
reality it wishes to investigate is presupposed
by any experimentation. It is a question
regarding the possibility of the distinction
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between truth and falsity in the empirical
world; a question logically prior to that of
deciding the truth or falsity of the alleged
existence of a physical object ... similarly,
the question of the reality of God which is of
interest to the philosopher is a question about
a kind of reality; a question about the possi¬
bility of giving an account of the distinction
between truth and falsity, sense and nonsense
in religion. This is not a question of experi¬
mentation any more than the question of the
reality of the physical world, but a question of
conceptual elucidation." (46)
Now of course it is true that a mistake is being made if
someone equates what it means to talk of God's existence with
talk about the existence of physical objects. The mistake,too,
would be a conceptual one,- it would reveal a lack of under¬
standing of the concept of divine reality. However,in philo¬
sophical discussions of the question of God's existence have
philosophers 'assumed that' the divine reality can be compared
to the reality of a physical object'.'' Surely Phillips' point
here should be,not that philosophers have 'assumed that', but
rather have spoken 'as if' God's reality was akin to that of
the reality of a physical object'? But even if one agrees that
it is a mistake to think of that which constitutes divine
reality as in any way akin to the reality of a physical object,
surely it does not follow that,with regard to the question of
divine reality,'experimentation' is ruled out and all that is
required is conceptual elucidation? Cannot one talk and don't
religious people talk of 'discovering God', of 'finding out'
that there is a God? Phillips rejects this,however,because
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"that is not something that anyone could find out." (^7)
How in discovering why this is so,for Phillips,I think we
can advance further Phillips' argument as to why conceptual
elucidation is necessary in elucidating the reality of God. If
one believed that one could 'find out' whether there is or is
not a God,the mistake, as Phillips sees it, would reside in the
implicit assumption that any "dispute between a believer and
an unbeliever is over a matter of fact." (*f8) As Phillips
States:
"It makes as little sense to say 'God's existence
is not a fact' as it does to say, 'God's exis¬
tence is a fact *. In saying that something
either is or is not a fact, I am not describing
the 'something' in question. To say that x is
a fact is to say something about the grammar of
x; it is to indicate what it would and would not
be sensible to say or do in connection with it.
To say that the concept of divine reality does
not share this grammar is to reject the possi¬
bility of talking about God in the way in which
one talks about matters of fact." (^9)
What is there,however, about the grammar of facts which rules
out equating God's existence with a fact? First of all,
"a fact might not have been ... On the other
hand, the religious believer is not prepared to
say that God might not exist." (50)
Secondly,
"coming to see that there is a God is not like
coming to see that an additional being exists.
If it were there would be an extension of one's
knowledge of facts, but no extension of one's
understanding." (51)
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Well,the first of these last two points obviously owes a
debt to Malcolm's elucidation of the grammar of God's reality.
God necessarily exists; it is simply inconceivable that God
might either cease to exist or be caused to cease to exist, in
short,might not exist. The proposition ,'God exists', is a
logically necessary truth. With reference to the second point
however,why should 'coming to see that there is a God' not be
like 'coming to see that an additional being exists' - a
logically necessary being. It seems that Phillips can only
make this claim by maintaining that existence can only mean
contingent existence.and that he does so is evidenceiby the
fact that he maintains there would be 'an extension of one's
knowledge of facts', facts earlier having been described as
referring only to contingent states of affairs - states of
affairs which 'might not have been1'. 2L surprising claim when
one remembers Malcolm's Wittgensteinian moves to illustrate
that existential propositions can be necessary. However,if
coming to see that there is a God is not like coming to see that
an extra being exists,but rather involves an extension of one's
understanding,what then jLs this extension of one's understanding?
Phillips s-tates:
"Discovering that belief in God is meaningful is
not like establishing that something is the case
within a universe of discourse with which we are
already familiar. On the contrary it is to dis¬
cover that there is a universe of discourse we
had been unaware of." (52)
And,"to know how to use this language is to know God." (53) Or,
as Rush Rhees states: "there could not be religion without the
language of religion." (5*0 It is only if one imposes "the
- 170 -
grammar of another mode of discourse on religion - namely, our
talk about physical objects" that it will appear that 'the
word 'God' is the name of a thing.' (55) God's reality is not
like the reality of physical objects or indeed of human beings.
What it means to affirm God as real can only be discovered
within the 'language-games' of religion. Just as "it does not
make sense to suppose that physical objects in general do not
exist," so,similarly, "the possibility of the unreality of God
does not occur within any religion;" (56) or,"it makes no sense
to say that God might not exist." (57)
Before making some critical comments here,allow me to
explore further one of the above remarks. 'The possibility of
the unreality of God does not occur within any religion', but it
also
does arise, we are/told, "in disputes between religions'.' (58)
First of all,this would surely suggest that the original analogy,
drawn between the empirical world and religion.should be modi¬
fied to an analogy between the empirical world and religions.
However,if this were done,the significance or the import of the
original analogy may well go. This is so because the question
of the reality of God would then be 'a question of the possi¬
bility of sense and nonsense, truth and falsity, in a religion'.
There would then be as many different divine realities as there
are religions,and it may then be possible to enquire as to
which God is the true God, empirical investigation being rele¬
vant; while such a question would be impossible with reference
to the reality of the physical world, there only being one
reality here. Secondly, while the reality of God may be tied
to a religion, for Phillips however, the'unreality of God does
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not occur within any religion', indeed within a religion it
'makes no sense to say that God might not exist'. The question
of God's existence is unaskable because to enquire here, to
investigate, is to display a misunderstanding of the very con¬
cept of God. Can anything then be said about atheism or
agnosticism? Are these simply ruled out as tenable philo¬
sophical positions? Phillips does not think this follows. As
he states:
"If, when the agnostic says, 'I don't know
whether there is a God or not,' what he means
is 'I do not know whether it means anything,'
there is no philosophical objection to his
position." (59)
A similar treatment is accorded to the atheist.
"The most genuine indication of what atheism is
... is the recognition that religion means
nothing to one; one is at a loss to know what
to make of prayer, worship, creeds and so on.
It is the form of atheism summed up in the
phrases, 'I shouldn't call myself religious,'
'Religion has no meaning for me.' To this
latter expression of unbelief there is no philo¬
sophical objection." (60)
The positions of the atheist and the agnostic are only philo¬
sophically respectable so long as they are understood to be
claiming that, in an important sense, religion has no meaning
for them. For religion - a religion,to be strictly accurate -
to be found meaningful is for the participant to affirm the
reality of God. One cannot claim to find a religion meaningful
and at the same time deny the reality of the God found or
discovered in that religion. 'To have an idea of God is to
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know God' and 'to know how to use this language, know how to
use religious concepts is to know God'. The Malcolmian Onto-
logical Argument influence appears to come over strongly in
these last remarks but yet,Phillips has warned us,we make a
mistake if we think that the contribution of Malcolm's Onto-
logical Argument is to provide some kind of 'victory for
religion'. Rather, for Phillips, a major contribution of
Malcolm's argument is to display to us 'the kind of questions
one can and cannot ask about belief in God', - display the kind
of reality God is said to possess, elucidate the statas of
assertions of God's existence. God's existence is not the
subject of empirical investigation but rather 'conceptual
elucidation'. But what,however,does this mean if 'conceptual
elucidation' does not involve, mean or entail anything like the
traditional moves made in the traditional Ontological Argument,
i.e. a move from a concept to existence. To expound his claims
here Phillips has referred us to his parallel or analogy
between questions about the reality of God to questions about
the reality of the physical world. So let us now turn to
explore further this analogy as Phillips presents it.
In opposition to Phillips' claims,concerning the exis¬
tence of a parallel or analogy between questions about God's
reality and the reality of the physical world,Professor Hick
claims the following:
"The argument here seems to be: the user of
physical object language cannot meaningfully ask
whether the physical world exists, though he can
seek as a philosopher to elucidate the kind of
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reality it has. Similarly the user of theistic
language cannot meaningfully ask whether God
exists; though he can as a philosopher seek to
elucidate the kind of reality God has. But this
is a question-begging parallel. Whereas every¬
one is a user of physical object language, so
that there is no one in a position to ask
seriously whether the physical world exists, by
no means everyone is a user of theistic language
/and one might add, as I have already claimed,
and Phillips acknowledges, not all those who do
use theistic language are all users of the same
theistic language - deploy the same concept of
God/ and there are many who ask seriously whether
God exists. In the context of universal agree¬
ment that there is a material world, the question
about its existence or reality is (as Phillips
rightly says) a conceptual question asking for
an elucidation of the concept of a material
object. But in the quite different context of
dispute as to whether God exists the question
about the reality of God is not only a conceptual
question but also a question of fact and
existence." (61)
Now Phillips responds to this objection by pouncing, quite
correctly, on Professor Hick's use of the word 'agreement' in
this context. He states!
"He (Hick) says that whereas we are all agreed
about the reality of the physical world, we are
not all agreed about the reality of God. But
when did we agree about the reality of physical
objects? What would it be like to disagree?" (62)
If nothing can constitute our disagreeing.and the notion of
'disagreement' has no sense in this connection, then,equally,
nothing can constitute our agreeing and thus the notion of
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'agreement' has no sense here either. For surely the sense of
'agreement' here is dependent upon the sense of 'disagreement';
they are in fact correlatives. However, while the point of
logic is correct,this particular attack does not,in any manner
or means,help Phillips' case. While one may disagree with the
way in which Professor Hick expresses his point,the substance
of his argument remains and,in fact,Phillips, in raising this
objection to the argument,simply reinforces the critical point
Professor Hick is making. It is quite true, what would it be
like to disagree about the reality of physical objects? But
the same does not hold of God's reality. There disagreement
does occur, people do deny the reality of God both as between
different religions and within the one religion. Atheism and
agnosticism are not unintelligible positions. Perhaps,however,
Phillips may respond by claiming that he has not denied the
philosophical intelligibility of both atheism and agnosticism -
they are both reflections of the claim that religion is found
to be meaningless - not denials of the divine reality encapsu¬
lated within any particular religion. However,this will not
do. What is not in question is the particular philosophical
analysis one gives of these phenomena.- what it means to be an
atheist or an agnostic - but rather the very existence of the
phenomena themselves. There is no parallel here with physical
object reality - there are no agnostics etc. with reference to
physical object reality. Not only can one not be agnostic with
regard to the existence of physical objects but,further, as P.
Sherry points out,
"in the case of belief in the reality of the
external world there is nothing corresponding
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to conversion and loss of faith." (63)
However even allowing that, for the sake of argument,
Phillips' parallel does hold here,is there not a danger in the
kind of argument he presents, a danger first pinpointed by K.
Nielsen? Let me explore this point by examining further what
Phillips states in his reply to Hick. He continues:
"We are familiar with situations where we say,
•This is a tree' ... and so on. Our confidence
in saying so is not based on evidence. No; such
situations are examples of the kind of thing we
mean by talking about physical objects. ...
There is no question of justifying the criteria
for our use of 'physical object': that is how we
do use the concept. The comparison with the
reality of God was meant to be at this gramma¬
tical level. In each case there would be no
question of a general justification of the
criteria for distinguishing between the real and
the unreal." (6*0
Our confidence in our judgements with reference to physical
objects is 'not based on evidence', there can be no question
of justifying the criteria for our use of 'physical object',
indeed no 'general justification of the criteria for distin¬
guishing between the real and the unreal.' Now while one may
want to agree with these pointsswhen the reference is to
physical object reality, great caution and doubt will surely
be expressed when the reference is to divine reality. Can
there be no general justification of the criteria for distin¬
guishing between the real and the unreal? If God's reality is
the presupposition of 'religious language-games' and 'forms of
life', must for example the reality of witches and fairies be
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the presupposition of their particular 'language-games' and
'forms of life'? Against this Nielsen claims that,although it
was once true,that
"magic, witchcraft and belief in fairies were
'ongoing practices in our stream of life', they
have been rejected as incoherent by people
working from the inside."
This is so because,although
"there was an ongoing form of life in which f
fairies and witches were taken to be real
entities ... gradually, as we reflected on the
criteria we actually use for determining whether
various entities, including persons, are or are
not part of the spatio-temporal world of
experience, we came to give up believing in
fairies and witches. That a language-game was
played, that a form of life existed, did not
preclude our asking ... about the reality of
what they conceptualised." (65)
Interestingly enough, although it has not been noticed,
Phillips has something to say with reference to this problem
concerning the reality of fairies. In the course of objecting
to a demand for empirical verification with reference to the
reality of God,he states;
"Space does not permit, but it would be
interesting to ask whether the reality of ghosts
and fairies is a matter for empirical verification,
or whether it too is being treated irresponsibly
by an objection which asks us to distinguish
between talk about the supernatural and its
reality." (66)
Well, there is the supernatural and the supernatural,and I
suppose if Phillips wants to regard talk of fairies and ghosts a
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as on a par with talk of God.on the basis that they are all part
of the content of the supernatural,that is his business. One
may perhaps feel tempted to advise, what he himself so often
advises, that he look again and see the role the respective
concepts play in their 'forms of life' and then enquire whether
he still wants to say the same. However, a serious objection
which Phillips may feel is relevant against Nielsen is that
Nielsen seems to suggest that empirical criteria could be
deployed to argue for or against the existence of supernatural
entities. The validity of the reality referred to in super¬
natural talk, whether of God or of fairies, cannot be assessed
by means of empirical verification, with reference to empirical
criteria.for Phillips though. If Phillips,however,were to
argue thus,the argument could not be sustained because, as we
saw, it is not only supernatural reality which cannot be based
on empirical evidence, the same applies to the reality of
physical objects, the physical world. Now I think,first of all,
in conclusion here,that Phillips' reference to the 'fairy
example' at least shows that he considers it a relevant case, a
relevant example - he does not dismiss it as an absurd
example, as an example which would have no bearing or relevance
to the conceptual point he is trying to make. Secondly, when
one reflects that (a) we have ceased to believe in the existence
of fairies and witches and (b) there do exist people, atheists
and agnostics, who refuse to play the 'religious language-game'
- a phenomenon not present, for example, in our talk of physical
objects - we may well agree with Nielsen that the fact that a
'language-game' is played 'does not preclude our asking about
the reality conceptualised in that game'.
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Finally,I think there is an even deeper worry or concern
with Phillips' analogy or parallel. To ask a question about
the reality of the physical world, the reality of physical
objects, is,as Phillips claims,a conceptual question given our
'acceptance' that there is a physical world. To ask a question
about the reality of God is also a conceptual question given
the existence of 'religious language games' and 'forms of life'.
Now we are instructed that rather than regarding the question
'Does God exist?* as parallel to the question 'Does this
physical object exist?' we should rather regard the question
'What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects?' as
being parallel with the question 'What kind of reality is
divine reality?' Now my fundamental worry and difficulty with
this approach is this. When one talks of the reality of
physical objects - when one asks what kind of reality it is -
one is inquiring about the reality of tables, desks, chairs etc.
It is to ask what it means to affirm or to speak of truth and
falsity in the physical world - the world of tables, desks etc.
But note,the term 'physical object' functions as a kind of
class term which has as its members particulsirs, such as tables,
desks, chairs etc. To talk of physical objects is merely to
talk of tables, chairs, etc. - that is what such talk comes to.
One cannot encounter, meet, be obstructed by a physical object
unless one means one is encountered by, meets, or is obstructed
by a table or a chair etc. The reality of God however is very
different from this. The terra 'God' functions very differently
in the language. Indeed the rules governing its application,
in the analogy described by Phillips,are very different from
those governing the application of the term 'physical object'.
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The term 'God' does not function as a class term. One can talk
of God without such talk being about something else. One could
be said to 'encounter God,' 'meet Him', 'experience Him'. In
fact,the term 'God' seems to function in the language much more
like the term 'table' or 'chair', such that the question of the
divine reality seems to be more closely parallel to the question
'Does this particular object exist' rather than the question,
'What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects?' The
question as to whether God exists, whether God is real, seems
to be more like a question of fact,rather than one requiring
merely conceptual elucidation.
What I have just said is very tentative,but if I explain
what are the implicit presuppositions behind Phillips' thinking
here then I think things will be a little clearer. For
Phillips,the common assumption that there is one world, one
reality, in which questions of existence can arise must be
attacked. Now within this conception of one world,one can ask
whether,for example,this particular table exists (i.e.
physical object) and whether God exists. Now this common
assumption that there is one reality is denied by Phillips;
rather there are different concepts of reality - different
'language-games'. There is the 'religious language-game', the
'physical object language-game' etc. Now within the 'physical
object language-game' it is intelligible to ask whether a
particular object exists,but the general question of whether
or not there really are physical objects is not askable within
the'language-gamel Heither can it be asked from outside,for to
do so would be to stand within anotherlanguage-game'and question
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the reality of another'language-game - the physical object one.
Rather,the question,whether or not there really are physical
objects,is understood as being concerned with the kind of
reality found in the physical world and becomes instead a con¬
ceptual question requiring an elucidation of the concept of a
physical object. Within the 'religious language-gamethe
question,'Does God exist?' becomes impossible. The question,
'Does this physical object exist or not' is possible,as we saw.
and can be asked within the 'physical object language-game'
because (a) before v/e know what we are being asked some speci¬
fication must be given as to what physical object one has in
mind, i.e. a table, a chair, etc. and (b) within the 'physical
object language-game' there are many different physical objects
- tables, desks, chairs - the term 'physical object' functioning
merely as a class term. Such a function is not open to the
term 'God', because to question the existence of God is to
question the very existence of that 'language-game' of which
the reality of God is a presupposition. Thus,if one wishes to
inquire as to the kind of reality talked about here, the proper
question5as Phillips sees it,is to inquire as to the kind of
reality divine reality is and such an inquiry demands a con¬
ceptual elucidation.
However,once one begins to question, as I have already
done, whether or not there is any parallel or analogy to be
drawn between the 'physical object language-game' and the
'religious language-game', once one begins to plot the role
and the significance of such phenomena as atheism, agnosticism,
conversion, loss of faith with reference to the 'religious
language-game', once one begins to see the fundamentally
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'insecure*position the 'religious language-game' has within the
then
'family of language-games/the assurance that there is a
reality articulated and expressed in the 'religious language-
game' begins to evaporate. One begins to see.not only the
possibility of asking the question,'Does God exist?* - as
opposed to the question 'What kind of reality is divine reality?*
- but also the necessity of asking the question. Talk of
different realities is not going to save the day here. Given
the lack of common acceptance of 'religious language-games', it
is this kind of question which requires to be asked, though
this, of course, is not to claim that God is .just or merely
one more object in the world.
Now I can imagine Phillips protesting here; 'Surely you
cannot imagine that the question 'What kind of reality is
divine reality? must be neglected and attention be given rather
to the question 'Does God exist?', a question paralleled by the
further question 'Does this physical object exist?' God is no
physical object and if you think so you are guilty of extreme
religious insensitivity.' But I have not said that God's
reality is in any way like the reality of a physical object.
All I have said is that the question 'Does God exist?' is an
intelligible one and a question which should be answered.
'God' is not of course the name of a physical object but it
must,in some sense,refer to some existent being if we are to
claim that the term 'God* refers to amy existent reality.
'Well,' Phillips might retort here, 'there are only two points
I would like to reiterate. First of all,I have said there cam
be no question of an empirical verification of God, no question
of an empirical identification of God. Questions of
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experimentation are irrelevant in this area. Secondly, I did
say that 'coming to see that there is a God is not like coming
to see that an additional being exists' - that would extend
'one's knowledge of the facts but not one's understanding'.
Rather, to discover that belief in God is meaningful is to dis¬
cover a 'universe of discourse that one has been unaware of'.
'To have the idea of God is to know God.' 'To know how to use
this language (religious) is to know God.'' I would like now
to explore the issues raised by these last two comments. First
of all,in the next section,I would like to explore Phillips'
arguments with reference to the question of identification as
it applies to the term 'God'. Secondly,in the section following,
I would like to explore Phillips' arguments as to exactly what
is meant when it is claimed that 'to know how to use religious
language is to know God'.
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iii
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION
First of all,let us try and see what the particular prob¬
lem or issue is here. Nielsen expounds what is at issue here
in the following way:
"At issue here is whether the putative referring
expression 'God' actually applies to anything.
Recall that the God of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition is said to be an 'individual, yet
everything else is dependent on him, infinite,
though no part of the universe, but still trans¬
cendent to the universe while at the same time
remaining the saviour and redeemer of all men.•
Given these very extraordinary defining charac¬
teristics, extraordinarily conjoined, there is
... no escaping the question: 'How could we
identify the Being so specified?' How could we,
for example, identify an absolutely independent
being? Given such a response to the question
'What is this God?' the question of identifica¬
tion becomes acute." (67)
That is,the term 'God' functions in the language as a
'putative referring expression' and the problem is, given the
'defining characteristics' normally stated, how can or could
the referent of the term be identified? Now this problem is
crucial.because,as Flew points out:
"Until and unless this can be answered, there
can be no question of existence or of non¬
existence: because there has been no proper
account of what it would be for him to be or not
to be; of what, in short, he would be." (68)
Indeed, given that the word 'God' appears to be a referring
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expression functioning within the context of Christian belief
and language and referring to,or standing for,some kind of
entity or individual, we do seem to be faced with a difficult
problem of identification. As, for example, Professor Hepburn
States:
"If God is to retain the status of individual
which some parts of Christian discourse
undoubtedly accord him, we need not only a role
in the language for •God', like a set of rules
for the King in chess, but also an intelligible
procedure for referring to God, a set of criteria
for identifying him. And this is a demand of
logic ..." (69)
The problem is, as Flew reminds us,
"... does or could the word God apply to any
object ... 'Does, or could, this term God have
application?'" (70)
It may well be true,as Durrant has pointed out,that
"it is not possible to offer a coherent account
of the logical status of 'God' as an item of
Christian language as a whole, since 'God'
exhibits differing and indeed incompatible
status - in short that 'God' exhibits radically
incompatible logics." (71)
Durrant came to this conclusion by critically examining the
role or roles the term 'God' has in religious language; i.e.
whether the term 'God', as an item of religious language,is a
proper name, a definite description or whatever. For Durrant
"any attempt to set out a scheme in which 'God'
has a single logical status ... is doomed to
failure. No such scheme can cope with the mani¬
fold and inconsistent logic of 'God'." (72)
As I said,Durrant's conclusions with regard to this 'quasi-
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syntactic question' (73) niay well be correct - but space does
not permit an examination of these issues here - and, if
correct, they would pose a serious difficulty or embarrassment
to any philosopher committed to upholding the possibility of
offering a coherent account of the logical status of 'God'
within, in particular, Christian 'language-games'. However,
let us assume that a coherent role can be given to the term
'God' whether as a proper name, a definite description or what¬
ever within Christian language and let us further,briefly,
explore the problem of identification as already illustrated.
Within traditional Christian belief it is assumed that
God is a transcendent being. Nov; to say that God is a trans¬
cendent being is to claim that God 'exists' apart from the
universe, 'above' material existence. It is also, I believe,
to claim that God exists outside of what is perceived or pre¬
sented in experience. Indeed the descriptions that are
presented as uniquely characterising God,such as 'a necessary
being', are such that it seems impossible in principle for
anyone to claim to know what it would be like to refer to and
identify such a being; and thus there is a lack of identifying
reference. To claim that God is, a transcendent being seems to
come very close to claiming that God is beyond comprehension.
Indeed,if God is a being transcendent to the universe.it would
seem that,as a matter of logic,he cannot be literally
perceived, encountered or observed. To understand the term
'transcendent being' is to realise that there logically cannot
be any method by which one can identify that to which it
allegedly refers. Indeed isn't this where the problem is most
acute? If one stresses the transcendence of divine existence,
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stresses the wholly otherness of God from the world, one is
not merely referring to the quality or kind of existence
enjoyed by God, but also referring to the wholly otherness of
God's nature and of the attributes that one can predicate of
Him, such that God seems to be beyond comprehension.
Traditional Christian theology,however, seems to require
as
that God be thought of/in some sense an entity, an individual,
but this further entails that we must have displayed how "what
is specified in our definition of the word 'God* could in
principle be identified." (7*0 And this is the problem, God
is omnipotent, omniscient, all loving, creator of the world
but what could it mean to identify the referent here? As
Nielsen states:
"we must have some idea of what it would be like
for 'God* actually to make reference or fail to
make reference. But this is just our puzzlement.
We seem to have no way of identifying the
referent of 'God'." (75)
And this is surely a difficulty for Christian belief or thought.
For God is. there described as being in some sense a transcendent
entity or individual, a Being who can in some sense be
encountered, of whom one can be aware of being in Wis presence,
who can be met with, talked to etc.. And yet,it would seem that
there is no way one can,even in principle.specify criteria of
identification to enable the referent of the term 'God' to be
identified.
How would Phillips respond to such reasoning? I suspect
his argument would go something like this. 'Well, now it is
really spelt out. When you claimed, in your last section, that
God must be thought of as in some sense an entity, an object,
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although not a physical object - and now we hear that this
means he must be thought of as a kind of transcendent object,
entity or individual - my objection to this was that this was
to conceive of God as an object, an 'existent among existents'.
Now,however,we are told there is some peculiar difficulty for
Christian belief in that God,in fact,is thought of as a trans¬
cendent Being - an entity or individual in that sense - but.
given such a conception,there are in principle no criteria for
identifying the referent of the term 'God'. But let us look
at the kind of criteria you have in mind. You have referred to
Nielsen's work on this topic; well,let me present you again
with a sample quote, already illustrated,from Nielsen. When
discussing the reasons why belief in fairies and witches have
been given up,Nielsen claims: as we Reflect on the criteria
we use for determining whether various entities, including
persons, are or are not part of the spatio-temporal world of
experience, we came to give up believing in fairies and witches.'
Now couldn't it be objected here that if Nielsen thinks, from
the use of this example, that there is any parallel or analogy
with the question of the reality of God, then he is simply
exhibiting the error of conceiving of God's reality as in some
way akin to the reality of persons or objects. Indeed isn't
this the problem with the argument here? What is required or
demanded for identification - the identificatory criteria one
has in mind here - of the alleged referring term 'God' are
essentially empirical criteria. One is,in a sense,demanding
that what is referred to by the referring term 'God' be in
some sense empirically identifiable. One demands an empirical
identification of the object of God-talk. Further,one finds
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that as God, within traditional Christian thought, is thought
of as transcendent, as 'wholly other from the world', it is
impossible in principle to specify such criteria. One then
concludes that there is some difficulty or problem here for
Christian belief. Why should one draw this conclusion"?
If it is the case, sis I believe, that God is thought of,
suid thought of quite rightly, within Christian belief sus trans¬
cendent to the world, as 'other than the world*, why, rather
than imposing criteria of identification which it is impossible
in principle to -meet in this situation, should one not
explore more fully what is meant, within religious talk, by
God's 'otherness from the world', by his reality? Why not
explore,from within the language (religious), what is meant by
tsilk of God's reality rather than imposing alien criteria from
without - criteria which not only presuppose there could be an
empirical identification of God but also demand it as necessary,
if the alleged referring expression 'God' is to function ade¬
quately in the language. Indeed as R. F. Holland stateS:
"... what could entitle any experience to be called an
experience of God!" (76) Or as R. Rhees maintains: "you
cannot have experience of that." (77)
Indeed the question here is crucial.because haven't I
said that the question of how one "would decide the identity
of God is connected in many ways with what it means to talk of
divine reality." (78) And to explore this question one has to
see the "internal relation of theology to religion and the
religious tradition as the means of identifying God." (79)
Let me expound this in two ways.
"One cannot have religion without religious dis-
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course. This is taught to children through
stories by which they become acquainted with the
attributes of God. As a result of this teaching
the child forms an idea of God. We have far
less idea than we sometimes suppose of what the
nature of the child's idea is, but for our pur¬
poses its content is irrelevant. What is rele¬
vant to note is that the child does not listen
to the stories, observe religious practices,
reflect on all this, and then form an idea of
God out of the experience. The idea of God is
being formed in the actual story-telling and
religious services. To ask which came first,
the story telling or the idea of God, is to ask
a senseless question." (80)
It is in contexts like this that the kind of reality which God
has is taught and learnt. It is here too,in such contexts,
that one learns to identify God. Further, consider this:
"If there is a disagreement over whether t\*o
persons are talking about the same third person,
there are, in principle at least, ways of
removing the doubt. But the identity of God is
not like the identity of a human being. To say
that one worships the same God as someone else
is not to point to the same object, or be con¬
fronted by it. How did Paul, for example, know
that the God he was worshipping was the God of
Abraham? What enabled him to say this was not
an empirical method of verification as in the
case of two astronomers who wonder whether they
are talking of the same star. What enabled Paul
to say that he worshipped the God of Abraham was
the fact that, despite the many changes which
had taken place in the concept of God, he and
Abraham stood in a common religious tradition.
To say that a god is not the same as one's own
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God involves saying that those who believe in
him are in a radically different religious tradi¬
tion from one's own." (81)
Or as Hhees states:
"Questions about 'meaning the same' in connexion
with the names of physical objects are connected
with the kind of criteria to which we may appeal
in saying that this is the same object - 'that
is the same planet as I saw in the south last
night', ... Supposing someone said 'The word
"God" stands for a different object now.' What
could that mean? ... Consider the way in which
we learn the meaning of 'God'. It is not by
having someone point and say 'That's God*. Now
this is not a trivial or inessential matter. It
hangs together in very important ways with what
I call the grammar of the word 'God'. And it is
one reason why I do not think it is helpful just
to say that the word is a substantive." (82)
With this I would concur for haven't I said "God has no bio¬
graphy." (83) '
How can one respond to such arguments and conclusions?
In an important sense it seems to me Phillips has missed the
point of the earlier criticisms or, I suspect,not so much
missed the point as deflected the problem and difficulties
involved into another problem and difficulty. Knd the suggestion
is that the answer or response given to this latter problem
will somehow serve as an adequate answer or response to the
original problem. However,before articulating my reasoning
here in detail,let me explore, first of all,Phillips' reference
to, understanding of and use of the concept of a religious
tradition.
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Paul knew that he worshipped the same God as Abraham
because they both stood in a common religious tradition - a
tradition which still retained its identity despite the many
changes 'which had taken place in the concept of God'. And I
presume,by parity of reasoning,it could be argued that a
Christian believer today could say that he worshipped the same
God as Abraham and Paul because they all three stood in a
common religious tradition - and this despite changes in the
concept of God. Thus in this context the notion of a common
religious tradition is crucial,for it is by reference to the
tradition, what is involved in belonging to a tradition,
despite changes in the concept of God which occur over time,
that one is enabled to identify the God worshipped as the same
God.
Consider however this example of Phillips':
"If a man said that God had told him to sacri¬
fice his son, no matter how much he tried to
convince us, we should not be prepared to say
that this was the will of God. ... What if the
man replied to us by saying, 'If God can ask a
father to sacrifice his son once, why cannot He
do so again?' If God asked Abraham to sacrifice
his son, why cannot He ask this of our next-door
neighbour? The first matter to question is
whether God is asking for the same thing in the
two instances. It is confused to assume that
what God did in asking Abraham to sacrifice his
son, is the same as what He would be doing in
asking our next door neighbour to sacrifice his
son. What Abraham did can only be understood,
if understood at all today, by reference to the
community of his day, the religious nature of
the family, Abraham's position in the tribe, and,
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of course, the practice of child sacrifice
itself. These factors are not incidental to the
action, but give it its meaning. That is why in
saying that God could not ask anyone today to
sacrifice his son the 'could not' is a logical
'could not'. It is not as if God could, but
chooses not to, but that we should not know what
it would mean for God to ask anyone to sacrifice
his child. ... What can conceivably be said to
be the will of God is determined by prevailing
beliefs about God. In short, God's nature is
the grammar of God's will." (84)
Prevailing beliefs about God (which can of course,
Phillips has warned,us,change over time) determine God's will
(shouldn't this be our concept of God's will) or what can be
said to be God's will. Further,as God's nature is the grammar
of God's will,it would seem that what is identified as God's
nature is determined by prevailing beliefs about God. But in
what sense do these prevailing beliefs about God determine
what can or cannot be said to be the will of God? They do
this in the sense that whatever is said to be the will of God
only gains intelligibility when seen against the background of
these prevailing beliefs. And these 'prevailing beliefs' them¬
selves only gain intelligibility when they are seen as
functions*; of certain prevailing sociological and institutional
frameworks,i.e. the notion of community, tribe, the practice of
child sacrifice. It is the existence of these institutions,
and the beliefs about God which are developed and nurtured
within them,that give requests and actions,based on such
beliefs,their very intelligibility. That is why saying that
God could not ask anyone today to sacrifice his son, the''could
- 193 -
not' is a logical 'could not'.' Divorce this context from the
belief and one would not even know what it 'meant for God to
ask anyone to sacrifice his child.' However, if this is true,
if it is only by reference to a certain institutional and socio¬
logical framework, which provides an intelligible context for
prevailing beliefs about God - God's nature being determined by
■prevailing beliefs about God - then what kind of sense and con¬
tent can we give to the claim that Abraham and, for example, a
Christian believer living to-day share a common religious
tradition? Indeed what sense can be given here to the very idea
of a common religious tradition? Further and more fundamentally,
what sense can even be given to talk of a religious tradition?
However let us assume that Phillips can provide an
intelligible context for the use of the term 'religious tradi¬
tion'. Can he justifiably employ this notion to answer the
particular problem of divine identification which I set out at
the beginning of this section! I have already suggested that
Phillips has tried to deflect the problems and difficulties
involved here into another problem and difficulty,with the
suggestion that the answer or response,given to the latter
problem,will serve as an adequate answer or response to the
original problem. The problem of identification as Phillips
sees it,is how one could identify the God of Abraham as being
the same God as the God of Paul. And he quite rightly points
out that religious believers do determine whether or not they
are talking about the same God by reference to the question of
whether or not they share in a common religious tradition. No
question of pointing to the same 'object' is involved as there
v/ell might be, in fact could be, if two people are disputing
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whether a person they are talking about is the same person.
Now this is true as far as it goes but it certainly does not
go so far as to take seriously,and provide an answer to,the
original problem of what would constitute the making of an
identificatory reference within a religious context. What was
at issue in our original problem was whether the 'putative
referring expression' 'God', the subject of religious discourse,
actually does or even could apply to any reality? Given our
understanding of the term 'God', how could the referent of the
term be identified? What would count as a referent for the
terra, how could we even understand what identifying reference
'God' makes or what any possible referent of the term 'God'
would be like? To be told (a) that one establishes whether or
not the same God is being worshipped by looking and seeing
whether a common religious tradition is involved and (b) that
what is involved in identifying God is learnt by participating
in religious practices, learning stories, sharing in reli¬
gious services,is simply to ignore or sidestep the issue of
of
ontological reference and7more fundamentally?/whether onto-
logical reference is at all possible. As we saw Professor
Hepburn claim, we need not only a role in the language for
'God' but also some hint of a procedure for how God is to be
referred to,if the term 'God'is to refer to some kind of
reality or existent. Does,or indeed could,the terra 'God'
really stand for or refer to any kind of reality or existent
individual?
And here of course is the nub of the difficulty. 'Well
of course,' I could imagine Phillips replying, 'if you want to
persist in seeing God as some kind of existent or individual,
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some kind of object or reality in your sense of the term, then
you are going to be left with the difficulties and doubts you
have suggested. Of course you will then find my accounts
inadequate.' But it is not simply m^ persistence in seeing
God as some kind of individual that is at stake; surely it is
traditional Christian belief which accords God the status of
an individual, an entity of some sort? 'But,' Phillips might
retort, 'youi* difficulty only arises because you pay too much
attention to the 'surface grammar' of such belief and not
enough to the 'depth grammar'. Look and see the role
expressions of belief in God play in the lives of believers.
There you will see that God is thought of as eternal, not as
an existent being. (35) Don't stipulate, look and see.
Furthermore,with reference to your comments on God's trans¬
cendence or the conception of God as a transcendent Being,!
have said, quoting approvingly from Marcel,that
"not only does the word 'transcendent' not mean
'transcending experience', but on the contrary
there must exist a possibility of having an
experience of the transcendent as such, and
unless that possibility exists the word can have
no meaning." (86)
God is. 'other than the world' but his 'otherness from the
world' does not refer to his existing as some kind of entity
or individual who 'dwells' in some transcendent realm.'
It is obvious then that we shall have to explore what
Phillips means here by God being 'other than the world*, what
it means to have an experience of the transcendent as such,and
this I will examine in section (v). Before examining this,
however,I want to turn, as already promised, to examine, among
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other clairaB, Phillips1 remark 'that to know how to use reli¬
gious language is. to know God.'
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iv
LANGUAGE, WORSHIP, BELIEF, UNDERSTANDING AND LOVE
For Phillips, as we have seen, 'coming to see that there
is a God is not like coming to see that an additional being
exists.' This is so because,if God were an 'additional being',
there would be an extension of one's knowledge of facts, but
no extension of one's understanding. Rather,for Phillips,'to
have the idea of God is to know God' and this phrase finds its
proper expression in the further claim that to discover that
'belief in God is meaningful' is. to 'discover that there is a
universe of discourse one has been unaware of'. And, not only
is it the case that the discovery of such a universe of dis¬
course constitutes what it means to find belief in God
meaningful,but,further 'to know how to use this language
(religious) is to know God'.
Phillips himself comments on this last claim in the
following passage:
"I was referring there to the way in which reli¬
gion is taught, the way we come to see what is
meant by God, through stories, pictures etc. ...
It might be said that when children form con¬
ceptions of God they have a primitive theology
which determines v/hat can and what cannot be
said about God. The theology is implicit in
religious language. ... When I said that 'to
know how to use this language is to know God' I
was referring to the language of worship, con¬
templation and religious practices. To use this
language is to worship, to believe in God." (87)
Or as Rhees says: "To know God is to worship him" (88) and
- 198 -
Holland ,too,echoes this sentiment when he claims, "the know¬
ledge of God is related to the love of God." (89)
But surely to use religious language as a participant or
know how to use it is to make either explicitly or implicitly
a claim to know God,not to know God? To use religious language
may involve worshipping, expressing one's love of God, but
does God, the object of the religious response or attitudes
really exist? Surely this question is at least an intelligible
one and indeed a possible one here? For Phillips,however, one
of the cardinal mistakes of philosophers,who discuss the ques¬
tion of God's alleged existence or non-existence,is that they
assume that "the meaning of worship is contingently related to
the question whether there is a God or not." (90) That is,
those philosophers who, in searching for reasons to believe in
%
God, assume that
"one could settle the question of whether there
is a God or not without referring to the form of
life of which belief in God is a fundamental
part." (91)
Rather,in
"learning by contemplation, attention, renuncia¬
tion, what forgiving, thanking, loving etc. mean
in these contexts, the believer is^-participating
in the reality of God; this is what we mean by
God's reality." (92)
The 'believer is participating in the reality of God'.
This is what 'we mean by God's reality'! In learning in a
religious context, and by 'religious means', what it means to
love, thank and forgive in religion is to participate in
the reality of Godi It may be to participate in religious
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practices, it may be to understand what particular nuances of
meaning are given to particular terms in a religious context,
but it most certainly is not to participate in the reality of
God as normally understood. And,furthermore,it is most
certainly not what Christian religious believers mean by God's
reality. If this is what Phillips means by God's reality it
is perhaps not surprising that he displays such little concern
as to how referential expressions,within religious discourse,
are to be understood. However,for Phillips,
"once philosophers begin to ignore religious
criteria of raeaningfulness .. an unbridgeable
logical gap is opened up between religious
experience, worship and religious discourse on
the one hand and the reality of God on the other."
(93)
One is tempted to reply here that the 'unbridgeable gap' only
disappears because religious criteria of meaningfulness, as
understood by Phillips, identify the reality of God with what
it means to take part in the religious 'form of life! The gap
is closed,not by providing a new or better bridge,but by
denying the existence of the gap in the first place.
For Phillips,however, there can be no "theoretical know¬
ledge of God ... The man who contrues religious belief as a
theoretical affair distorts it," (9^) and this is so because
"belief, understanding and love can all be equated with each
other in this context." (95) Note,however, that this last
comment is in fact an elucidation of an earlier remark which
reads, "To know God is to love Him, and the understanding which
such knowledge brings is the understanding of love." (96) It
is impossible then for someone to 'know God' without at the
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same time 'loving God'; (loving God is then a neceBsary(?)conditio-n
for knowing God-/how can one love that which one does not
know?) There can be no theoretical, non-affective, knowledge
of God, but is it the case that 'the understanding which such
knowledge brings is the understanding of love.1? One would
have thought that the knowledge which such understanding
brought would be an understanding of,or knowledge of,God.
Unless,of course,Phillips means to suggest that the two terms
here,'God' and 'love', are synonyms, identical in meaning.
Having,however,'equated' belief, understanding and love
in the religious context and particularly belief and under¬
standing, Phillips feels called upon to give some account of
what it could or would mean to re.i ect religious belief. This
is particularly necessary as,just prior to the above comments,
Phillips has claimed that "one cannot understand what
praising, confessing, thanking, or asking mean in worship
apart from belief in an eternal God." (97) That is, it seems
to be a necessary and sufficient condition of understanding
religious practices or concepts that one actually 'believe in
them', in the sense that one actively participate in the reli¬
gious'form of life'within which such practices and concepts
have their intelligibility. What in fact is the particular
problem of rejection involved here?
In a nutshell the problem here seems to be that if it is
a necessary, and indeed sufficient, condition of understanding
religious beliefs and concepts that one actually believe them -
that one actually be a religious believer - how then can one
account for the phenomenon of rejection? People do seem to
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reject religious belief and give reasons for doing so and yet,
if it is the case that one can only understand religious
beliefs and concepts if one is an actual religious believer,
rejecting religious belief must be understood as rejecting
that which,as a non-believer,one does not understand. The
problem becomes particularly acute when the alleged rejection
is made by a believer,or rather ex-believer. Someone is a
religious believer, prays, thanks and worships God generally
and then comes to reject his belief. He no longer believes.
What can be said here? It seems that two possibilities present
themselves, neither of which is satisfactory. First of all, it
could be held that while a believer he understood religious con¬
cepts and beliefs but now that he is a non-believer he no longer
understands them. But this account would seem strange, if not
paradoxical, especially if his expression of his past beliefs are
the same and he can still talk to believers about the nature and
content of their beliefs. Secondly, it could be maintained
that as the ex-believer has now 'rejected' religious belief
this in itself is a clear sign that he never really understood
religious beliefs and concepts in the first place; indeed he
never really was a believer. This is so despite the fact
that what he says about his past beliefs is still the same.
If this is the problem how does Phillips respond to it?
Well,he believes that an account can be given of what it means
to reject religious belief which ijs compatible with holding
that a religious understanding of religious beliefs and
concepts requires an identification of understanding and
believing. He presents his argument,and an example,in the
following way.
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"To begin with, there is a perfectly natural use
of the word rejection which is connected with
the inability of the person who rejects to make
any sense of what is rejected. I can see no
objection to saying that the man who says that
religion means nothing to him rejects the claims
of religion on his life. Apparently, when Oscar
Wilde was accused of blasphemy during his trial,
he replied 'Sir, blasphemy is a word I never use'.
Wilde is rejecting a certain way of talking.
Similarly, the man who says, 'Religion is mumbo-
jumbo as far as I aim concerned,' is making a
wholesale rejection of a way of talking or a way
of life. That way of talking and that way of
life mean nothing to him, but this does not mean
that he cannot reject them." (98)
I presume Phillips has a similar account of rejection in mind
when he also 5-tates,
"to no longer believe in God is not to disbelieve
one thing among many of the same kind, but to
see no sense in anything of that kind. 'What has
1 become meaningless is not some feature of a form
of life, but a form of life as such." (99)
And, as we have seen, atheism and agnosticism,for Phillips,are
best classified and thought of as respectively,a claim that
religion is meaningless,or doubts as to whether religion means
anything.
Let us however look closer at Phillips' argument here
with especial reference to the 'Wilde example'. One can
reject that which makes no sense. It would seem that a
necessary condition of such rejection is that that,which is
rejected,makes sense. A man can reject religion because reli¬
gion 'means nothing to him'. Well,yes,I can see a point in
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talking like this if by 'meaning nothing to him' one means that
the man can see no point, purpose or significance in religious
V-
belief or practice; in that sense the beliefs of relitm may be
meaningless. But surely a necessary condition of rejecting
such a belief as meaningless,in this sense,is that one can
understand the words and sentences used to express the belief;
one can understand the sentences in which the beliefs are
expressed and thus the beliefs are meaningful in this sense.
Astrology, I may dismiss as meaningless or mumbo-jumbo,but
surely in so rejecting astrology, I do not claim
that the sentences which comprise 'astrology language' are
literally meaningless. Surely I am claiming that I cannot
see the point of,or the significance of,astrology. It is, if
you like meaningless or mumbo-jumbo in this sense because it
portends so much and yet is so practically useless. Indeed a
necessary condition of my judgement,that I see no point in it,
being possible, is that I understand what is claimed for it.
Surely in the case of Wilde it is stretching the imagination
being asked to believe that when Wilde says ,'Blasphemy is a
word I never use', he means,I do not know what the word means.
Surely in the case of Wilde it is because he understands reli¬
gious concepts and terms, finds them meaningful in this sense,
that he can claim, as he most certainly seems to be doing,
that he can see no point or significance in using or applying
religious terms and concepts? To say a way of talking, a way
of life 'meansnothing' is surely to claim, in this context,
that one can see no point or purpose in participating in such
a way of life; the way of life is meaningless in this sense.
This is,however,very different from claiming that the words
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and sentences deployed in that way of life are meaningless.
Another problem which faces Phillips in this context,
where belief and understanding are identified,is how can one
provide an intelligible account of,what Phillips himself terms,
'seeking for God'! "That is if one must believe before one
can know God how can one know that it is God one is seeking
for?" (100) Let me expound again,very briefly, what the exact
problem is here.
One can only intelligibly be described as seeking for
something - in this particular case God - if one already knows
that which one is seeking for. I cannot be said to be seeking
for, for example, my pen,unless (a) I know what a pen is,(b)X
know the particular characteristics of my pen. I must be
able to give a description of that for which I am seeking
before I can be intelligibly said to be seeking for it. But
if it is the case, as in the religious example, that I can
only understand what it is I am seeking for when I have
actually discovered it - when I am a believer - then how can
an intelligible account be given of my seeking for God? I
either believe and know God,or, I do not believe and do not
know God. I either believe and thus understand what it means
to know God, understand what the word 'God' means,or I do not
believe and thus do not understand what it means to know God,
do not understand what the word 'God* means. A half-way house
position seems impossible.
Phillips responds to the problem in this way:
"The answer to this difficulty has been given by
Pascal: 'Comfort yourself, you would not seek me
if you had not found me.' One must not think of
belief in God as an all or nothing affair."
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(One is tempted to interject here that it i3 not the objector
who is thinking of belief in God as an all of nothing affair;
this way of thinking seems to be imposed by Phillips' own
ideas on the nature of belief and understanding in religion.
However,to continue with Phillips' reply:)
"Whether the love of God means anything in a
man's life can be assessed, not simply by his
attainments, but also by his aspirations. So
even if a man does not actually love God, his
understanding of what it means to love God can
be shown by his aspirations towards such love."
(101)
One's'understanding of what it means to love God can be
displayed by one's aspirations towards such loveI But how
does this solve the problem? How could one's understanding of
what it means to love God take place outside a context of
belief in God? How can one aspire towards that,i.e. love,which
one does not understand? 'What could it mean to aspire to,
something here? 1'his is the problem, and to elude the diffi¬
culties here it seems that one must either admit that no
account can be given of 'seeking for God' or. do as Phillips
seems to be tending to do, which is,in effect,to deny the
identification of belief and understanding in this context.
Further,note an interesting move made in Phillips' argument.
He begins by talking about the problem of whether 'the love of
God means anything in a man's life'. NoV to talk in this way
is not to talk about what the words 'love' and 'God' mean,but
to talk about the significance or point of the love of God in
the life of a man. It is to inquire of the significance of
God's love in the life of a man, how meaningful it is,in this
- 206 -
sense. But to talk of the love of God in this sense is very-
different from the question or problem which is involved in
understanding 'what it means to love God'. I can,or could be
said to, know what it means to love God - know the meaning of
the words and the sentences used to express them - without the
love of God meaning anything to me,i.e. having any point or
significance in my life. Now Phillips seems to move from
talking about the meaning of the love of God in the sense of
its significance or point to talking about what it means to
love God in the sense of understanding what the words and
sentences mean. Given the context of the problem, the issue
being dealt with should be how it is possible, given the identi¬
fication of belief and understanding, for someone,who is not a
believer,to aspire to the love of God when he can only under¬
stand what the words mean from within the context of belief.
Thus it is unjustifiable for Phillips to confuse or conflate
what the 'love of God means in a man's life', a question about
the significance and point, the meaningfulness in this sense
of a belief,with the question of the understanding involved in
knowing 'what it means to love God', a question about the
meaning of words and the sentences used to express them. (102)
Now in examining Phillips' arguments with reference to
the problems posed by his identification of belief and under¬
standing in religion, i.e. his attempts to give an intelligible
account within this context of what it would or could mean to
•reject' religious beliefs or to 'seek God', we have noticed
that there appears to be a similar conflation in both arguments
of
" * .of i two different senses of meaning; that is/what
is involved in a word or sentence having meaning and what is
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involved in finding a belief, set of beliefs or practice
meaningful -seeing its or their point or significance. Now
the distinction here is an important one to make but it is not
a new or difficult distinction to grasp, and it is difficult to
believe that a philosopher of Phillips' competence should so
easily conflate these two senses of 'meaning'. I know that
the concept of meaning can be difficult to handle,given the
fact that in the English language there exists simply one term
to express different senses or applications of the concept,
and,indeed,with reference to Phillips' work,one could wish that
the concept of meaning was more carefully deployed,given that
it can have many different applications and that many different
senses of 'meaning' can be involved. However despite this,
there still lurks the suspicion, in my mind at least, that the
critical comments I have made with reference to Phillips' con¬
flation of the two senses of 'meaning' may simply reflect the
fact that I have missed the significance of the point Phillips
was making,or indeed that he may have had some other particular
point or points in mind. Indeed my suspicions are confirmed
when,in reply to the objection that he has identified belief
and understanding in the sense that I attributed to him, ('that
only believers can understand the statements made and the con¬
cepts involved in professions of religious belief'), he appears
to deny that he ever did make such em identification. I say
appears because the distinction which is crucial for him in
this context - the distinction between philosophical and reli¬
gious understanding - is applied in a rather strange and
annoying way.
As we saw, Phillips appears to require an identification
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of belief and understanding. Now this seems to entail that
only a believer 'could understand the statements made and the
concepts involved in professions of religious belief.' That
a religious understanding of religious concepts and statements
is only open to a believer. However,Phillips only considers
two possibilities in his discussion of the problem, i.e.
whether he has said a religious believer can have a philoso¬
phical understanding of religious concepts or whether he has
said only philosophers who are religious believers can under¬
stand anything about religious beliefs. (103) He concludes,
quite correctly,that he has not said this. However what is at
issue, to repeat, is whether only a believer can have a
religious understanding of religious beliefs and concepts and
to this question,or problem,Phillips provides no enlightenment.
One suspects the issue or problem has in a way been deflected
or side-stepped. However I want to leave this problem for
the moment but I shall return to examine the issue in detail
later.
However, for Phillips, a ma.ior problem which he feels he
is faced with,if one identifies understanding and belief in
religion,(however one understand the identification involved),
is to account for the phenomenon of the 'religious' rebel.
Here we are concerned not with 'the rejection of religion as
meaningless', but with 'rebellion against God'. How can one
rebel against God and still be counted a believer such that
one can be said to understand that against which one is
rebelling? It seems impossible to be identified as a believer
and a rebel at one and the 3ame time; and even more impossible
when one remembers,for Phillips, that 'belief, understanding and
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love must be identified in religion'. In reply to this
Phillips refers us to a passage from Camus (10^f)
"The rebel defies more than he denies. Origi¬
nally, at least, he does not deny God, he simply
talks to Him as an equal. But it is not a
polite dialogue. It is a polemic animated by
the desire to conquer." (105)
First of all,how can Phillips square this account with
his claims (a) that 'to know God is to love him' and (b) that
'belief, understanding and love can all be equated in religion'?
Phillips himself is aware that some modification of his thesis
is called for but insists that what is not called for is a
"denial of the identification of belief and understanding in
religion". (106) Rather,we are referred to the writings of
Malcolm,and in particular Malcolm's claim that belief in God
can
"encompass not only trust, but also awe, dread
... and perhaps even hatred. Belief in God will
involve some affective state or attitude ...
and these attitudes could vary from reverential
love to rebellious rejection." (107)
What then are the conclusions we can draw from this!
linn'
Obviously the assertion that 'to know God is to love/ is false
- not everyone who believes jni God loves him. Furthermore, it
cannot be the case that 'belief, understanding and love' can
all be equated in religion and,most important of all, as
Phillips himself admits, "belief in God need not entail a
worshipful attitude on the part of the believer." (108) This
last point is especially important considering, as we have
seen, : in particular both Phillips' and Rhees" -
Inslste-nce that religious language, in which is discovered
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the reality of God, has its use in worship, and their suhseyj
criticisms oT those philosophers who assumed that 'the meaning
of worship is contingently related to the question of God's
existence'.
Our rebel, whether he likes it or not is, for Phillips,
a religious believer - he believes in God. (109) "The com¬
munity of believers is wider than the community of worshippers."
(110) For Phillips,
"the rebel must see the kind of relationship
God asks of the believer before he can reject
and defy it. He sees the story from the inside,
but it is not a story that captivates him. The
love of God is active in his life, but in him it
evokes hatred. To say that he does not believe
in God is absurd, for whom does he hate if not
God?" (111)
It may be thought that to include rebellious rejection as
expressive of a belief in God, simply to retain the identifi¬
cation of belief and understanding in religion, is rather
silly. But when one hears that atheism and agnosticism
(earlier described as essentially involving the claim that
'religion is meaningless') must also be considered "religious
phenomena",(112) one wonders if a consistent and intelligible
thesis is being presented at all.
Finally,and very briefly,it would seem, to take a
charitable view of things, that for Phillips the primary,
indeed the only legitimate affirmation of God's existence is
that made from within the 'religious form of life'. This
affirmation can only intelligibly be made by believers - in
Phillips' sense of the term - those who respond with 'passion
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in their souls'. As Phillips states:
"I believe that Kierkegaard says somewhere that
in relation to God there are only lovers - happy
or unhappy - but lovers. The unhappy or unruly
lover has an understanding of what it means to
believe in God as well as the happy lover." (113)
An acceptance of this view would exclude, as we saw, any claims
that there can be 'theoretical knowledge of God' or any
"external reasons (reasons outside the 'form of life') for
believing in God." (11*0 Can we rest content with this
account?
It seems to me that there can be such 'theoretical know¬
ledge of God', that one can intelligibly describe what such a
belief would be like. It may be true that for someone to
affirm God's existence, really believe that God exists, and
not be touched in an affective manner would strike us as odd.
'But do you really believe in God?' may seem an appropriate
"thart
question. But note/what would be in question would be the
sincerity, the rationality of the belief, not the intelligi¬
bility of the belief itself. As B. Mitchell states:
"To believe that there is a God (who is to be
worshipped) is not in itself to worship. A man
who claimed to believe in God and did not
worship him could be criticised as insincere or
hypocritical or irrational or in some way
defective in his attitude; but it would not
follow that he did not believe in God, at least
in the minimal sense of believing that there is
a God." (115)
And yet would this meet the point being made by Phillips'! For
him it is only individuals with 'passion in their souls' who
can have an understanding of what it means to affirm or
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enquire after God's existence. The question, 'Does God exist?'
asked dispassionately would be unintelligible. But surely
even if we allow that for a religious believer, one who
actively participates in religious life, there can be no
question of a non-affective belief in God,this does not entail
(a) that no 'theoretical knowledge* of God is possible or (b)
that no question of the validity of the affirmation of God's
existence made by the believer can arise. Surely this is, as
W. D. Hudson has shown,to "confuse a necessary condition of
religious belief with a sufficient condition of it." (116)
It is to claim that the affective responses somehow 'validate'
the object of the belief, that they in fact constitute the




What then does it mean to talk of divine reality? How
is this reality constituted? Well, Phillips might reply, as
already seen, 'in learning by contemplation, attention etc.
... what forgiving, thanking, loving etc. mean in these con¬
texts ('religious forms of life') one participates in God's
reality; this is what we mean by God's reality.' But can one
rest content with an account of the divine reality which does
not illustrate or demonstrate God's transcendence from the
world, God's complete 'otherness from the world'. His creation?
'Of course not,' Phillips might reply, 'haven't I said that
one can have an 'experience' of the transcendent, that there
is a sense in which God is 'other than' the world,but in this
context it depends very much on what you mean by God's other¬
ness, His transcendence. And in particular it depends very
much on whether you have a 'naturalistic' or a 'supernaturalistic'
concept of God in mind.' As Phillips states:
"What surprises me is that so many Christian
philosophers (and I presume he also intends this
point to apply to atheistical philosophers too)
seem to be talking about a natural, as opposed
to a supernatural God; a God who is an existent
among existents, and an agent among agents." (117)
Indeed,for Phillips,the demand for a 'naturalistic* conception
of God expresses itself in
"the hankering after the old spatial model, in
terras of which God's reality is likened to the
externality of the planets." (118)
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Or again:
"The model they (the naturalists) wish to retain
is that of an anthropomorphic conception of God,
a God whom one could address as one could address
the moon - or better - the man in the moon." (119)
To say that, for Phillips, God is 'other than the world' or
that indeed God created the world ' would not be to put forward
a theory, hypothesis or explanation of the world." (120) The
dependence of the world on God "is not logical or causal, but
religious dependence." (121) But how is 'religious dependence'
to be understood?
Specifically Phillips develops his answer to this ques¬
tion in a critique he deploys of Cosmological Arguments for
the existence of God,as they are normally understood. This
seems a plausible way to proceed because Cosmological Arguments,
normally understood, are attempts to demonstrate the existence
of God from the existence of the world. The arguments seek a
transcendent explanation: they attempt to account for the
existence of the world by reference to something other than
the world - i.e. God. Phillips further hopes in his critique
to point to,at least,one way we should regard the matter (other
than normal interpretations) if we desire to ascertain what
might be meant by claiming that 'God is other than the world.*
Let us examine his argument.
Phillips' major difficulty with Cosmological Arguments
centres on the notion of what it could mean to claim that God
is the explanation of everything there is. He states:
"If we say that 'everything' may cease to exist,
we seem to be assuming that the world can be
regarded as a thing or as a class of things.
- 215 -
One of the difficulties of thinking of the world
as a class of things has to do with the criteria
by which we determine whether things belong to a
particular class or not. ... But there are no
common criteria to determine what is to count as
belonging to the world. 'Everything' is not a
class of things. This conclusion is underlined
by noting that the notion of class entails the
notion of a limit, and a distinction between
things inside and outside the limit. But when
we speak of things being in the world, we do not
mean to contrast them with other things which
are outside the world. If we ask whether there
are certain things in the world, is not this
another way of asking whether these things are
real? But if inclusion in the world were akin
to inclusion in a class, we should have to
assume that certain things do or could exist
outside the world, which would amount to saying
that unreal things do or could exist." (122)
This argument seems conclusive and fair enough, and Phillips
continues in similar vein.
"Any object or group of objects is individuated
against a background of other objects. But
against what background do we individuate the
world? If 'everything' is thought to be a thing,
•- C , ~ * we cannot answer
the question, 'This thing as distinct from what?'"
(123)
The point here is indeed reminiscent of earlier difficulties
that we have discussed,only then the reference was different -
it was to God not the world. And there does seem to be no
doubt that the difficulty or problem would be very similar in
both cases, viz. what criteria could be deployed to identify
and differentiate God or 'Everything' from any other 'thing'?
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Phillips* conclusion here is unequivocal.
"How can there be anything other than the world?
Until this question is answered, it is difficult
to see what meaning can be given to the request
for an explanation of the world's existence."
(124)
Considering this negative polemic against certain attempts to
illustrate what is meant by God's 'otherness from the world',
Phillips' problem then is to show that there is a sense in
which God can be described as 'other than the world' which is
not affected by any of the particular problems so far presented.
This he proceeds to do.
Phillips states:
"When someone asks why there is anything at all,
he need not be asking for the details of any
process or development. His question may be
about the sense, meaning or reality of every¬
thing." (125)
I doubt whether those philosophers or theologians interested
in the Cosmological Argument have thought themselves to be
asking for the 'details of a process of development'; rather,
what has struck them is the sheer factual contingency of the
world and they have seen in God an answer to their problem.
But have they been interested in the meaning of the world as
such? Well I suppose in one way they have, though I don't
think that to say that their question was one of the 'meaning
of the world' is to provide a very adequate characterization
of their concern or puzzle. However this 'problem' glides
into insignificance when one is further informed by Phillips
that
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"in this context, questions about the meaning of
the world and questions about the meaning of
life are one and the same. Coming to see that
there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in
one's life." (126)
Now if we refer back to my earlier section on the Tractatus it
will be remembered that Wittgenstein said something very
similar there to the point Phillips is making.
"What do I know about God and and purpose of
life? I know that this world exists ... That
life is the world ... That my will is good or
evil. Therefore that good and evil are somehow
connected with the meaning of the world. The
meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world,
we can call God. ... To believe in a God means
to understand the question about the meaning of
life ... To believe in God means to see that
life has a meaning." (127)
But what Wittgenstein is saying here is,however, significant
insofar as, as I have already tried to show, it is possible to
provide an intelligible context for Wittgenstein's remarks -
they are part of if you like a 'philosophical vision'. One
can see why he wants to say, is justified in claiming, that
'life is the world', that 'to believe in God means to see that
life has a meaning'. However this framework is not present,
is not given with Phillips' remarks and, this being the case,
it seems totally artificial, arbitrary and unjustifiable to
claim, as he does,that questions about the meaning of the
world are one and the same with questions about the meaning of
life. In point of fact it is simply untrue that all those who
have been puzzled about the meaning of the world have been
puzzled about the meaning of life.
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Indeed as the argument advances, further difficulties
present themselves. Consider this remark.
"But are we rid of the objection ... if instead
of asking, "What is the cause of everything?' we
ask, 'What is the meaning of everything?' We
know how to cope with questions which ask for
the meaning of this or that ... We know the kind
of questions they are. But what are we asking
for when we ask for the meaning of everything?
If we want to give an adequate explanation of
the meaning of this, we must refer to something
other than this. But if we ask for the meaning
of everything what can we refer to which is
other than everything?" (128)
It would therefore seem, as Phillips himself admits, that in
questions about causality and meaningfulness when the world is
what is referred to, we are faced with exactly the same
difficulty. "The difficulty of asking of the world the same
questions that can be asked about particular things." (129)
If it does not make sense to ask what the cause of the world
is,it would seem that it does not either make sense to ask
what the meaning of the world is. Phillips however has other
ideas. He states!
"Does it follow that it is meaningless to ask
for the meaning of the world? No; all that
follows is that the meaning cannot be located
outside the world." (130)
Well yes, given the argument which has gone before and the
account of meaning already stated, it would seem obvious (a)
that it would be unintelligible to talk of the meaning of the
world as being 'located outside the world', but it would also
seem obvious (b) that the conclusion that ought to be drawn is
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that it is unintelligible to talk of a meaning of the world in
any sense of the term. Unless of course Phillips is working
with different senses of •meaning' here, which seems possible
when we consider the continuation of his quotation. He states:
"This difficulty is not insuperable, since,
often, what is held to make life meaningful and
worthwhile is not something other than or beyond
life, but an emphasis of certain features of
life itself." (131)
Now one would not want to deny this claim but I think that it
should be pointed out to Phillips, as Professor Grant does,
that "this must be a different sense of •meaning* from that in
which the meaning of x must be something other than x." (132)
But how does the point Phillips is making elucidate or
solve the difficulty he is struggling with,i.e. to present a
sense in which God is 'other than the world' which escapes the
difficulties he himself has stated? To be told that the prob¬
lem of the meaning of the world is in fact a problem about the
meaning of life,which can find or be given a solution in an
emphasis of certain features of life,is all very well but it
does not seem to advance our understanding of this other
alleged sense in which God can be considered as 'other than
the world', or indeed help us to appreciate what Christian
believers want to claim concerning the relationship between
the world and God. To take this last point,isn't it the case
that Christian believers do want to claim that the meaning of
the world lies outside it - in God? Now Phillips does see a
difficulty here,but he does want to insist that such a claim
is not, despite appearances,of 'religious importance'. As he
States with reference to Hume (and in particular Hume's
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Dialogues Concerning Natural Heligion (133)) who maintained
that ways of talking which are only intelligible within the
world cannot be extended to include reference to a God or
Being not in the world - who is 'other than' the world.
"But why should anyone think that it is reli¬
giously important to show that Hume is mistaken?
What if Hume's objections could be overcome, and
we were able to think of another world which is
a logical extension of this one, of a God who is
the cause of everything in some way akin to the
ways in which other causes cause particular
things, and of a divine agency which operates
beyond the world in a way akin to human agencies?
Why should any of this be thought important to
religion? If this world is meaningless, why
should another world, which is a logical exten¬
sion of it, be any less meaningless?" (13^)
Why indeed,one may ask,given the description or the
characterization of Christian beliefs which Phillips has pre¬
sented us with. Surely for the Christian believer God is not
•another world', 'another cause*, •another agent'in anything
like the sense that the world is the world or an agent an
agent? Surely it is because God is believed to be qualita¬
tively different or superior in every way that He is an object
of religious significance? What Phillips has said here is a
travesty of Christian beliefs. Interestingly enough he does
later admit that if one pays attention to 'great religious
teachers' and what they say about the
"relation between this world and another world
which is said to be the true reality, we sire not
struck by the continuity between them. On the
contrary, what strikes us is the radical
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discontinuity of the relation." (135)
However,Phillips sees this pertinent remark as having no
bearing on his earlier comments, but only serving as a prelude
to his own account of what it means to talk of God's 'otherness
from the world* - what it means to find life meaningful.
Initially we are referred to the 'analogies of birth and
death'. Phillips states:
"It is said that before a man can see this world
in the light of a reality which is beyond it, he
must undergo a radical change. The analogies of
birth and death are used to stress the nature of
this change. Before a man can enter the world,
the kingdom of God, he must die to this world.
Or, to express the point in terms of the other
analogy: before a man can begin to comprehend
the reality which is beyond the world, he must
be born again." (136)
But what sense does this way of talking have? What does
Phillips mean by 'dying to this world' or 'being born again'?
Here, Phillips refers us to Plato's discussion in the
Phaedo where, we are told, Plato speaks of the strivings of
the soul to turn away from the temporal to the eternal. Plato,
according to Phillips,
,"calls the turning away from the temporal to the
eternal a form of purification or the practice
of dying, and wants to contrast things seen from
the world's point of view with things seen from
the standpoint of the eternal." (137)
These last phrases are crucial here in understanding what
Phillips is sayingj "that is,the opposition between 'things
seen from the world's point of view' and 'things seen from the
standpoint of the eternal'. It is only in terms of a 'religious
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morality' which transcends 'normal morals or ethics' that one
can fully understand Phillips' claims here. As Phillips states:
"The man who pays attention to moral considera¬
tions will not worry if he does not attain the
worldly advance which immoral action would have
brought him. Still, he does have certain moral,
expectations. He has certain rights which may
or may not be satisfied. Sometimes he will see
that his rights ought not to be satisfied, and
that competing rights have stronger claims. At
other times his rights are wrongfully neglected.
At times such as these, he will feel harmed, and
expect some kind of restitution. Thus, in their
different ways, the man whose aim is to satisfy
his desires and the man who upholds certain
moral principles are both concerned about how
the world is treating them. 3oth in Wittgenstein's
phrase, see 'objects as it were from the midst of
them' and in so doing see things from the world's
point of view. Much of what is meant by seeing
things from the point of view of the eternal can
be grasped by understanding what it means to die
to the expectations created by desire or moral
rights. ... in this attitude people are seen,
not as the world sees them, but as God sees them."
(138)
First of all,it does seem rather strange to talk of the
moral man as 'seeing things from the world's point of view',
as demanding 'restitution'. It seems even more strange to
hear him talked about and classed along with the man 'whose
aim is to satisfy his desires'. What Phillips, it appears,
wants to draw here, is a contrast between a religious morality,
a selfless morality, on the one hand,and a secular or 'ordinary'
morality on the other. Note again the reference to a phrase
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from Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus periodwhich we have already
examined. The man who wishes to satisfy his desires and the
moral man 'both SSe. objects as it were from the midst of them'
and their position is contrasted with that of the upholder of
a religious morality. Is this however a legitimate use of
Wittgenstein's phrase in this context? Let us look back
briefly at the Notebooks,and to the particular reference
Phillips has in mind, and fill in the background to the quota¬
tion. It then reads,
"the work of art is the object seen sub specie
aeternitatis; and the good life is the world
seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the con¬
nexion between art and ethics. The usual way of
looking at things sees objects as it were from
the midst of them, the view sub specie aeterni¬
tatis from outside."
Combine this with this further quotation.
"Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics
must be a condition of the world." (139)
Now it would seem illegitimate, given this understanding, to
say of the ethical man that he sees 'objects from the midst of
them'. Rather,the ethical position is contrasted with that of
'seeing objects from the midst of them'. The ethical life
consists in 'seeing the world' sub specie aeternitatis, 'ethics
is a condition of the world.' Indeed,if we recall too that
for Wittgenstein 'to believe in God means to see that life has
a meaning* and 'good and evil are connected with the meaning
of life', we can see that,for Wittgenstein,the only possible
kind of morality or 'ethical vision' was a religious morality.
Religious morality constitutes the ethical for Wittgenstein
- 22*f -
there can be no possible contrast, despite Phillips' claims,
for Wittgenstein, between,if you like,a secular and a religious
morality. Despite this particular confusion on Phillips' part
however, I think one should note the similarity between
Phillips' and Wittgenstein's accounts of religious morality.
Further,we have been informed that 'in this attitude
people are seen as God sees them'. What does this mean; to
see people as God sees them? What is involved here,for
Phillips,is that
"one must not fix one's attention on how people
are: useful or useless for one, desirable or
undesirable, morally deserving or undeserving,
but on the fact that they are ... Eternal love,
love of human beings as 3uch, ... cannot suffer
defeat." (1^0)
To speak thus,for Phillips,is to give content to what 'some
religious teachers' have understood by a concern for others
which is 'other than the world'.
Again here,note the important use made of the Wittgen-
steinian Tractarian distinction between 'how' - how the world
and people are and 'that' - that the v/orld and people are; the
latter representing the religious attitude. And this distinc¬
tion is brought into play again when Phillips attempts to
trace a parallel between a "love for other people which is
'other than the world'" and what the 'same religious teachers'
wish to say about "the fortunes and misfortunes which may
befall one." (1^1) Here too, we are informed, "there is an
all-important distinction between how things are, and that
things are." (I*f2)
It is to the book of Job, rather than to the theodocies
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that Phillips turns for his illustration. He states:
"Job, I believe, is a good example of a profound
dependence on a supernatural God. It would be
difficult to imagine more tragic circumstances
than those depicted in the Book of Job. ... If
one attributes goodness to God by an inference
from the events of one's life, /such a God would
by definition, for Phillips, be a natural Go<|7
it is difficult to see how Job could have avoided
saying that God is evil ... But we do not find
Job doing this. Instead, he prays: ... the Lord
gave, and the Lord have taken away; blessed he
the name of the Lord." (143)
The distinction between a supernatural and natural God is
crucial in this context. A natural God would be socVt that
"no matter how varied our moral opinions might
be, we do know what would count against calling
such a God "good" in many instances. If our
possessions were plundered, our servants killed
... the condemnation of most of us would be
immediate if it could be shown that a God on
whom we were causally dependent were responsible."
(144)
Initially Job himself had desired an explanation of the
disasters which had overtaken him but,in coming to see that the
disasters had no explanation.he became freed from his
'dependence' on them. What indeed,Phillips claims,
"Job came to was the possibility of loving the
world as such, to what the mystics have called
love of the beauty of the world. The beauty of
the world in this context does not admit of a
contrast with the ugliness of the world, since
it comprises both its beauty and its ugliness
understood relatively. The absolute beauty of
the world can be equated with the sense of the
world." (145)
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•Hot how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it
exists.' Or,as Rhees expresses the point:
"Why is there anything at all? What is the
sense of it? an expression of wonder at the
world. (Isn't it extraordinary that anything at
all should exist?) Which easily passes into
reverse at the wonder of it - the wonder at
there being anything at all." (1*4-6)
But why call this religious view of the world .'other than'
the world? What specific content is given to the phrase 'other
than' here? Well,for Phillips,
"the reason why love of God is said to be other
than the world is ... because it entails dying
to the world's way of regarding things. On one
level, this can be regarded as dying to the
world. On another it can be called love of the
world. This is because 'world' in the first
sense refers to what we have called 'seeing
objects from the midst of them'. The love of
God, which involves dying to this world, does
not mean that the believer has no regard for the
world. On the contrary, the love of God is mani¬
fested in the believer's relationship to people
and things. In this sense, he can be said to
have a love of the world. To see the world as
God's world, would, primarily, be to possess
this love." (I*f7)
Now ih case it has been forgotten,it must be emphasised
that in expressing these claims Phillips is attempting to
articulate what is meant by, as he understands it, God's
•otherness from the world'. That is, he is trying to arti¬
culate a model of transcendence which would escape the, for
him, insuperable difficulties pertaining to Cosmological
Arguments, but at the same time indicate one direction in
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which we could look if we desire to understand what might be
meant by saying that God is 'other than the world', transcen¬
dent to the world, or, God is the source ot creator of the
world. He is presenting a model of religious transcendence as
opposed to a model of metaphysical transcendence. And to
accept such a model seems to involve accepting certain conse¬
quences. For example,with reference to seeing the world as
God's creation,Phillips feels constrained to state the
following.
"To see the world as God's creation is to see
meaning in life. This meaningfulness remains
untouched by the evil in the world because it
is not arrived at by an inference from it." (1^8)
Before commenting critically on Phillips' model of religious
transcendence I think it is interesting to note that,for
Phillips, despite the difficulties, which he feels Cosmological
Arguments face, their attempt to move from the fact that
"anything exists to the reality of God has
within it the seeds of the religious beliefs we
have been grappling with - namely, the insis¬
tence that it is by contemplating the existence
of human beings and natural events as such that
one comes to see what is meant by God's being
other than the world." (1^9)
Thus we have displayed Phillips' •supernaturalistic'
concept of God, displayed in direct oppositiemto a
'naturalistic' or 'anthropomorphic' concept of God. First of
all,is an 'anthropomorphic' conception of God identical with
that of a 'naturalistic' conception of God? Phillips seems to
think that they are but I doubt whether he can justify his
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claim. By an 'anthropomorphic' conception of God what is
normally meant is a concept of God which is described or con¬
ceived in a human form or with human attributes. By a
'naturalistic' conception of God Phillips seems to mean a
conception of God whose nature "depends on one's fortunes in
(1SO)
this life."/ That is, insofar as evil abounds this seems to
tell against describing such a God as good. One may still
want to call such a God good despite the evil - one may think
there are 'putative reasons' for the evil - and,even so,to
call such a God good is very different from saying that ttlis
goodness is identical to human goodness. I think that to con¬
ceive of God anthropomorphically may well involve conceiving
of God 'naturally', in Phillips' sense of the term, but a
'naturalistic' conception of God does not seem to entail God
being conceived of in an anthropomorphic fashion - or,at least,
not necessarily. However, perhaps for Phillips a 'natural'
God would be an anthropomorphic God by definition,but I think
it should be noted that,before such a claim should be accepted,
some argumentation should be presented to justify what is being
claimed.
However,it is a *supernaturalistic' concept of God
Phillips is interested in; a God whose nature is independent
of 'one's fortunes in life', independent of consequences. But
surely this is where the difficulties begin? Is God's indepen¬
dence not construed in such a way that it is difficult to see
what could be meant in this context by the 'reality' of such a
God, by God's otherness from the world - in short,the
ontological import or significance of such a God? Now I could
imagine Phillips replying in the following way to this question.
229 -
•I see your difficulty here. You feel I am denying a certain
metaphysical reality to God, you suspect that for me God is
not an object, an entity or being of any kind. And of course
you are right. If you plot the depth grammar of religious
belief this is what you will discover.* Yes, one may feel like
replying, but have you (a) really adequately plotted the depth
grammar of Christian religious belief as you claim to be doing,
and (b) even if one accepts your account,wouldn't or shouldn't
there be a radical change in Christian concepts or terms?
Sorely, if your account is correct, it is very obvious that
their meaning is very different from what normal Christian
believers believe them to mean. 'Well, to take your last
point,' Phillips might respond, 'haven't I said that to 'come
to see that there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in
one's life' and again, 'to see the world as God's creation is
to see meaning in life.' I see no reason why one should not
continue to talk in this way; terms like 'God*, 'creation'
have a role in the language and I fail to see why they should
not continue to play that role in the language. All I have
achieved is to provide you with a proper understanding of such
concepts - I have plotted their depth grammar.'
Can one rest content with this account however? Consider:
'To see that there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in
one's life.' What does 'involves' mean here"? It may mean that
believing in God is a necessary condition for finding life
meaningful. But this cannot be true because people can find
life meaningful who cannot,at the same time, believe in God.
It does not seem to be the case that to find life meaningful
there is a logical dependence on belief in God. Nor,
- 230 -
alternatively, is it true that believing in God is a sufficient
condition for finding life meaningful. One could believe in
God and,because of this belief in God,find no meaning in life.
One may find that one's belief in God is a barrier to finding
life meaningful. Imagine the cry: 'Oh, if only there were no
God, I could accept life.' I suspect,however,that Phillips
has more in mind here than the presentation of conditions.
Rather,he wants to maintain that believing in God is identical
with finding life meaningful.
To examine what is involved here let us look at a state¬
ment of Phillips', already quoted, which is more specific in
its presentation and import. 'To see the world as God's
creation is to see meaning in life." Again,Phillips cannot be
talking here about merely a sufficient condition of finding
life meaningful. To see the world ais the creation of God does
not necessarily mean that life will be seen as meaningful.
There is no contradiction involved in claiming that one
believes God created the world and,at the same time,denying
that life is meaningful. However, if Phillips is identifying;
what is involved in 'seeing the world as God's creation' with
'finding life meaningful' then surely one must object? This
claim can only be true if 'seeing the world as the creation of
God' and 'finding life meaningful* mean the same, which they
most certainly do not. However,if what is_ involved is rather
the recommendation or stipulation that instead of talking about
the world as being created by God we should rather talk about
what is involved in finding life meaningful, then we have a
very radical change of meaning and reference in Christian reli¬
gious language. Within traditional Christian belief,to say
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that 'God created the world' is to say that an entity called
God, by a special act, brought into being or existence the
world. If, however, what the believer ought to mean by this state¬
ment about God is that he finds life meaningful - not even that
he finds life meaningful because he believes God created the world
- then it surely is true that we are presented with a very radical
change in meaning of Christian terms and concepts. As Holland
States,when discussing statements which acknowledge God as
the creator of the world, "I should prefer it to be said that
they are statements not so much about God as about the believer."
(151) And,insofar as this is the import of what Phillips is
saying,I doubt whether he can validly claim that he is merely
plotting the depth grammar, understanding properly, r
specifically Christian beliefs. As R. 'Trigg has stated:
"In Christianity it seems to be a tautology that
God created the universe, but clearly human
commitment to God did not create it." (152)
It is certainly true that within Christian theology and
belief there is often the danger of plotting the grammar of
God such that God is 'objectified', seen merely as an agent
among agents, a cause among causes. But though that danger
exists, and needs to be pointed out, it is surely wrong to
maintain, as Phillips does, that the real mistake in this con¬
text is to believe that within Christian thought and belief
God requires to be thought of as, for example, any kind of
agent at all, any kind of entity. Surely one must agree with
Professor Hepburn's comments on Phillip's reference to Job as
an example of an authentic Christian believer:
"In the case of Job surely the idea of a
- 232 -
non-intervening God is intelligible only if it
is allowed to remain conceivable that he might
intervene. It is intelligible that Job should
say, 'The Lord gave, and the Lord have taken
away; blessed be the name of the Lord' - intelli¬
gible because of the many instances or examples
of God's providential care and goodness in non-
problematic contexts i.e. the situations from
which in the Judaic tradition, he learns and
sees that God is good, not evil. In other words
believing against the appearances is intelligible
only if there is also such a thing as believing
with the appearances. Thus I doubt if Phillips
makes good his claim that authentic Christian
beliefs about God are altogether different,
logically, from the beliefs Hume attacked in the
Dialogues. The beliefs Hume attacked do not
exhaust the content of authentic Christianity:
but neither can Christianity dispense with all
of them." (153)
It would appear that the 'naturalistic' concept of God,
which Phillips derides so much,must be thought of as very much
an integral aspect of any concept of God which is to be recog¬
nised or identified as consistent with traditional Christian
conceptions or beliefs about God. It simply will not do to
claim the following,as Rhees does when discussing the relation¬
ship between the world and God or the Eternal.
"Someone may say that religion turns from the
temporal towards the eternal. And although the
notion that 'Love is Eternal' is important ...
the love of man and woman is not centred on the
eternal, on this world's relation to it, as
religion may be. 'To think in that religious way
is to have a certain view of human life; I do
not think there is any thought about 'the world'
apart from that." (15^)
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If one presents an analysis of the nature of a 'super¬
natural* God in the way or manner which Phillips does, it
becomes very difficult to state or claim some of the things
which are normally stated and claimed of God within the
Christian tradition. This is because God has ceased to be the
centre of attention as any kind of object, cause or agent and
what has occupied the centre of the stage is the believer
himself. Now, insofar as I have already criticised Phillips'
critique of the 'naturalistic concept of deity', I have already
argued that Christian orthodoxy requires that this 'strand of
the logic' of the concept of God be retained. Furthermore, if
we examine certain Christian doctrines it seems to me that the
kind of things which are maintained there, which are believed,
are unintelligible unless one presupposes or assumes that - in
the case of the two doctrines I shall be examining - God is an
agent in some sense of the term.
The two doctrines I have in mind are (a) Petitionary
Prayer and (b) Miracle. Phillips, in the case of Petitionary
Prayer, believes an intelligible account can be given of what
it means to petition God which is consistent with his meta¬
physical atheism - although there is an inconsistency in his
thesis - and Holland, in his discussion of what it means to
identify an event as a miracle, believes an intelligible
account can be given which makes no reference to the notion of
God as agent, as the agent of the miracle. I wish now to




For D. Z. Phillips the great difficulty which certain
accounts of petitionary prayer present is that they elucidate
petitionary prayers as presenting specific requests to God
which, on occasions, are answered favourably, such that it can
be maintained that God is responsible for bringing about one
event in the world as opposed to another. And the problem,for
Phillips,would then be that if such accounts were accepted
"must we not say that the relation between
prayer and God, or between God and the world, is
causal, and that prayer is a way of getting
things done." (155)
and such a conclusion is anathema to Phillips.
For Phillips,however, such an account of petitionary
prayer can be dismissed because the suggestion is "that the
efficacy of a prayer is like the efficacy of a spell. Prayer
is thought of as incantation." (156) Or,"one believes in a
necessary connection between what one asks for, and what one
gets." (157) In such a situation ,for Phillips,it would be the
case that
"the content of what is said is contingently
related to the effect obtained. The meaning of
what is said is subordinate to the results of
the spell." (158)
Now all this seems to be a gross caricature of what
certain religious believers have claimed about the causal
efficacy of prayer. Surely, rather than emphasising any
necessary connection between the petition and the answer to
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the petition is it not the case that all petitions end with
the proviso that 'Thy will be done'? A petitionary prayer
must be in keeping with the Divine will if it is to be
answered as the petitioner requests. To describe such am
activity as on a par with 'a spell, an incantation' is to
grossly misrepresent what is involved,for religious believers,
in petitioning God. To pray, petition God, is to request that
a certain x will occur, it is not to invoke a form of words
which will necessitate its occurrence.
For Phillips, however, insofar as such prayers can be
thought of as incantations, they are superstitious. But they
are superstitious,not merely because they presuppose the
existence of certain causal links which are in fact non-existent,
quasi-causal, but more fundamentally because, in an important
sense, for Phillips, such prayers and accounts of prayer have
been divorced from their proper religious context. This can
occur in two ways. First of all,a prayer can be divorced from
the rest of the life of the individual who is praying. As
Phillips states:
"The importance of prayer, to a large extent,
depends on the role it plays in the life of the
person who offers it. If the prayer is an
isolated occurrence, having little or no rela¬
tion to the life of the individual prior to or
after the act of 'praying', one tends to doubt
whether what has been said can illustrate what
prayer is. One might put forward a general
thesis that the more tenuous the relation between
the prayer and the rest of the person's life,
the more suspect the prayer becomes; the likeli¬
hood of superstition increases." (159)
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Unless prayer plays an important role in a person's life "it
is not characteristic of the religious role of prayer in the
life of the believer." (160)
Secondly then,accounts of prayer can be divorced from
the role of prayer in the religious life and,if this occurs,
"one is back in the realm of superstition." (161) Thus for
Phillips,
"in order to understand the language of prayer,
which in this case means understanding what it
means to ask God for something, one must take
account of the relationship to God within which
the prayer is made. The point is not that God
cannot answer requests unless there is a
spiritual relation between the believer and
Himself, but rather, that in order to understand
what we mean by asking, receiving, and thanking
in this context, one must understand the
ppiritual relationship." (162)
What then does it mean to ask and receive in a religious con¬
text?
Consider an example where a child is seriously ill.
Medical science has been taken to the limit but to no avail.
The doctors inform the parents there is nothing more they can
do, that things are in 'God's hands'. A silly phrase cer¬
tainly, but one which may be intended to express the limits of
their science - not every disease or ailment can be cured - or,
perhaps,the implied suggestion that while their methods and
techniques have failed one could always try 'God's method or
technique'. In this situation the parents pray to God to save
the child, knowing the seriousness of the situation. What
does it mean here to pray to God to save the child? Well,for
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Phillips,if the parents are religious
"they meet the possibility of things going either
way in God. They recognise their own helpless¬
ness, that the way things go is beyond their
control, and seek something to sustain them
which does not depend on the way things go,
namely, the love of God. If the child recovers,
the recovery occasions the prayer of thanks¬
giving. If one thinks in terms of causing God
to save the child, one is nearer the example of
non-religious parents who pray '0, God, save our
child' where the thought behind the prayer is
that God could save the child if He wanted to.
The prayer is an attempt at influencing the
divine will. In short, one is back in the realm
of superstition." (163)
Two points may immediately be made here. First of all, surely
Phillips, given his earlier comments, should classify the
non-religious parents' prayer not as a prayer but as a 'prayer'?
Secondly, much use is made in this context of the term 'super¬
stition' . Now surely the criteria of what constitutes the
superstitious, in any particular context,are very much depen¬
dent on what are considered to be the criteria of truth in
that self-same particular context. Thus, before one can
validly identify any activity as superstitious, i.e. praying
to a God believed to be causally active, one must have some
idea of what would constitute truth and,in the example in
question,a'true* petition to God. And for Phillips a 'true' or
valid petition to God is best understood "not as an attempt at
influencing the way things go, but as an expression of, and a
request for, devotion to God through the way things go." (16*0
The account he wishes to give is best summed up in the
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following passage.
"When deep religious believers pray for some¬
thing, they are not so much asking God to bring
this about, but in a way telling Him of the
strength of their desires. They realise that
things may not go as they wish, but they are
asking to be able to go on living whatever
happens. In ... prayers of petition, the
believer is trying to find a meaning and a hope
that will deliver him from the elements in his
life which threaten to destroy it: ... his
desires." (165)
Consider the case of the religious parents praying for
their child to live. Now, according to Phillips,they are not
so much praying 'for something', in the sense that they are
asking God to bring a certain something about, but rather
•telling Ilim of the strength of their desires'. Thus the
petition 'God please save my child' is not to be understood as
a request for God to intervene,but rather as an expression of
their desires and feelings with regard to their child. The
child means so much to them, they cannot contemplate losing
her and when they say 'God save my child' they are simply
giving expression to their desires and feelings with regard to
their child. Nov; is this analysis acceptable? First of all,
is it true that all prayers of petition flow from desires that
threaten to prevent one going on living? Secondly, can one
accept in the case of the parents that their prayer for their
child to be saved means they are simply telling God of the
strength of their desires? Certainly it is true that the
strength of the desires may be an indication of the fervour of
their request for their child to be saved. One may be tempted
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to say that unless petitions were in line with one's desires,
expressive of one's desires, they would not be real petitions.
But that does not entail that when the religious believer
'prays for something' this means that he is simply telling God
of the strength of his desires. He is surely,in any normal
sense of the term,requesting God to act in a particular way.
For Phillips this last point cannot be the case,because
such parents realise, while petitioning, that 'things may not
go as they wish'. It is God's will which is important here ,
not their desires or wishes. Now of course it is true that
religious believers conclude their petitions to God by adding,
j?ut Thy will be done,not mine'. But does the fact that
reference to God's will is included in the petition,justify
Phillips' conclusion that this indicates that
such believers are not asking God to act in a particular way?
The fact that petitions to God may not be answered in keeping
with the requests made of God is simply an indication to the
religious believer that his petitions did not cohere with
God's will, Xt is not an indication that no specific request
to God to act in a particular way was made in the first place.
Furthermore,if Phillips' account is correct, if this is
the significance of petitionary prayer, why do such prayers
have a point or purpose for believers? Now Phillips himself
sees a difficulty here for his analysis of what is meant by
petitioning God. That is,
"if 'Don't let her die', simply means, 'Thy will
be done', why on earth should one bother to make
the specific request in the first place; why not
simply say, 'Thy will be done'?" (166)
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First of all,how would such an account differ from a
fatalistic account? Now for Phillips there is a difference
here because fatalism, for Phillips, is "a belief in what must
be the case. Praying to a God for whom all things are possible
is to love God in whatever is the case." (167) 'To love God
in whatever is the case' entails for Phillips that "the
meaning of the specific request is internally related to the
expression of readiness to accept the will of God." (168)
Secondly,if this is all Phillips had to say here I think at
least we would be presented with an intelligible,coherent
thesis. That is, with reference to our above examples A
request or petition to God 'to save the child' is not so much
expressive of a request that God intervene or act in the world
to save the child,but is rather a statement of the parents'
desires, the strength of their desires, and a recognition on
their part that what is the will of God will prevail, not
their will or desires. But Phillips wants to say more. Not
only do the parents 'realise that things may not go as they
wish' but,further,'they are asking to be able to go on living
whatever happens'. They are asking for a 'meaning and a hope'
that will deliver them from their desires. As Phillips
states: "the believer is asking that his desires will not
destroy the spirit of God within him." (169) However,if this
is so, if this is what is requested, why should the original
specific request gain any mention at all? Phillips' reply
here is tentative as he states:
"I think that since a man is concerned with hope
and meaning in his life, it is the desires which
he actually does have which he wants to bring to
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God. After all, it is these desires and not any
others which threaten to overwhelm him, and
through which he must seek God." (1?0)
But this poses a new difficulty. In what does the
asking consist here? Surely a request here to be able 'to
go on living whatever happens', 'to find meaning and hope'
despite one's desires,is to request of God that he actively
intervene! It iss to request of God that he act, not,however.
in the sense that he bring about certain extra-mental events
but that he produce a certain state of mind, a certain attitude
or attitudes. And this,as W. D. Hudson has correctly stated,
is to request of God that
"he produce an effect in the natural world. The
fact that the effect is the preservation of a
certain psychological condition within the peti¬
tioner himself does not make it any less an
effect in the natural world." (171)
What then,given this,are we to make of Phillips' claim that
when 'deep religious believers' pray for something they
are not asking God to actively intervene in the world or
assuming that God can actively intervene in the world?
Look again at the argument as Phillips sees it,with the
example of the grief stricken parents in mind. Their prayer,
'God save my child', is not a request nor believed to be a
request, a petition to God to causally intervene to save the
child,because (given Phillips' understanding of the inviolate
nature of causal links) such a request it is known need not
necessarily be causally efficacious, answered in accord with
the petition. It is God's will which is important and crucial,
not the petitioner's. Given this understanding for Phillips,
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the nature of the petition is best expressed as an articulation
of the strength of the petitioner's desires and, furthermorea
request that the petitioner 'be able to go on living'*, that,
despite his desires he will be given a 'meaning and a hope'
that will deliver hira froa his desires.
Nov; if God can be the agent who causally produces certain
mental conditions or attitudes,why can he not equally well
produce effects in extra-mental reality? If causal links
are possible in one case, if God can be an agent in one case,
why cannot God be a causal agent in the other? On the one
hand we were told that a mistake was being made if, in relation
to prayers of petition, we thought of God as any kind of
special causal agent producing effects in the world. On the
other hand Phillips' very own analysis of what it means to
petition God seems to demand that we just so conceive God.
The understanding of what is meant in a religious sense by
petitioning God seems to involve petitioning God to causally
intervene in the world. It would seem, despite Phillips'
claims, that an account of petitionary prayer cannot be given
which is compatible with an understanding of a God who is not
a causally active agent; that an understanding of what it
means to petition God demands that He be thought of as a
causally active agent. At the very least Phillips' account
does not falsify this contention, and,further,his account is




Within traditional Christian theology God is thought of
as the sustainer of the universe.as, if you like, a necessary,
but not a sufficient,condition of all events in the world. A
further necessary condition of events in the world, it is
believed, are the causal antecedents of such events; the world
being thought of as a causal nexus. Thus,God's sustaining
activity and antecedent causal conditions are individually
necessary conditions and jointly a sufficient condition of the
occurrence of any event in the world. However.it is believed
that,on occasions,certain events can occur which are the
product of direct divine activity in the world -"the action of
God being seen not only as a necessary but also a sufficient
condition of such events. Such events are described as
miracles. That is, as events which are brought about by
direct action of God they violate not only all known natural
laws and processes;but also, as God is their sole author^they
are events which are naturally inexplicable in principle.
Nature,if you like,left to its own 'devices' could never
produce such events. Furthermore.as these events are believed
to be caused by a personal God, a God of love and compassion
etc., it is believed that God must have a reason for causing
such events to occur; the events must be in keeping with the
divine nature.
Thus within Christian theology a miracle is defined as
an event which i3 naturally inexplicable in principle,brought
about by direct divine activity and in keeping with the divine
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nature and furthering divine purposes for the world. Note,
however, the crucial importance which must be given to the fact
that miracles, as events, are caused by direct divine activity
in the world. It is because direct divine activity is involved
that events, classified as miracles, are thought of as events
which must be naturally inexplicable in principle and,further,
events, the nature of which must be in conformity with the
divine nature. Further one cannot observe divine activity and
most certainly not direct divine activity in the world. I can
observe, know what it means to observe e.g. my son acting,
hitting his friends, untidying his room etc. But what would
it mean to say that I observed God acting? God's actions are,
rather, mediated through certain events in the world. As N.
Kemp Smith states:
"We never experience the Divine sheerly in and
by itself: we experience the Divine solely
through and in connexion with what ia other
than the Divine." (172)
Now this problem is especially crucial when one tries to
ascertain what would be involved in identifying a particular
event as a miracle, as miraculous. If one cannot observe
direct divine activity as such,how can one identify an event
as being brought about by God's direct action? It seems
impossible. And yet, such events,if they occur, will be events
which are naturally inexplicable in principle, events which
violate natural laws and events which are in keeping with the
known will and nature of God. Perhaps here we can discover
some criteria of identity? A miraculous event will be an
event which is naturally inexplicable in principle, an event
which violates not only all known but all possible natural
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laws. Perhaps we could have criteria to identify such an
event? Also, a miraculous event will be an event which is in
accord with the known v/ill and nature of God and surely, given
the existence of a theological tradition, it should be possible
to provide criteria such that we could identify such an event.
R. F. Holland believes such criteria can be provided,so let us
turn to examine his argument.
Holland begins his article by claiming that the concep¬
tion of the miraculous as a violation of natural law is
inadequate (a) because "it is unduLy restrictive" and (b)
because there is a sense "in which it is not restrictive
enough." (173) Such a conception is 'bfldoly restrictive* for
Holland because he believes there can be such a thing as a
'contingency concept of the miraculous'. And such a concep¬
tion is not restrictive enough, because being a violation of a
natural law is merely a necessary but not a sufficient condi¬
tion of the miraculous. The 'extra' which is required is
reference to a "religious background". (17^) Let us see,first
of all,what Holland has to say about the conception of
miracles as violations of natural law and deal later with his
'contingency concept of the miraculous'. Holland states:
"though I do not take the conception of miracles
as violations of matural law to be an adequate
conception of the miraculous, /for the reasons
given/ I shall maintain that occurrences are con¬
ceivable in respect to which it could be said
that some law or laws of nature had been
violated - or it could be said equally that
there was a contradiction in our experience: and
if the surrounding circumstances were appropriate
it would be possible for such occurrences to
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have a kind of human significance and hence
intelligible for them to be hailed as miracles.
I see no philosophical reason against this."
(175)
In developing his argument Holland considers two
possible objections which if true, would seem not merely to
count against the possibility of identifying; a particular
event as a violation of natural law but, more fundamentally,
would illustrate the logical incoherence of the concept of the
miraculous understood as a 'violation of natural law'. The
first objection Holland considers is that well-known difficulty
put forward by Hume which is apparently concerned with the
problem of how the 'testimony of others' could be assessed
when the event testified to is allegedly miraculous. Consi¬
dering, as Hume : states:
"There must be a uniform experience against
every miraculous event, otherwise the event
would not merit that appelation. And as a
uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is
here a direct and full proof, from the nature
of the fact, against the existence of any
miracle." (170
Now Holland feels that the problem here is not merely one of
how the testimony of others could be assessed but is much
better appreciated if it is generally understood as a "single
problem of evidence." (179) Taken thus however,Hume's problem
would appear to highlight the particular difficulties atten¬
dant upon identifying a particular event as miraculous.
However,Holland suspects there is more to the argument than
this. He states:
"For if Hume is right, the situation is not just
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that we do not happen as a matter of fact to
have certitude or even good evidence for the
occurrence of any miracle, but rather that
nothing can count as good evidence: the logic of
testimony precludes this. ... Squally it must
follow that there can be no such thing as
(because nothing is being allowed to count as)
discovering, recognising, becoming aware, etc.
that a miracle has occurred ... no such thing as
failing to find out ... that a: miracle has
occurred either; no such thing as a discovered
or an undiscovered miracle ... en fin, no such
thing as a miracle. So Hume's argument is,
after all, an argument against the very possi¬
bility of miracles." (178)
Taken thus,Holland believes the argument fails,but he asks us
to consider the second objection which can be made here
attacking the logical coherence of the concept of the miracu¬
lous understood as a violation of a law of nature. He believes
that the arguments dovetail here to such an extent that,by
juxtapositing them together,we shall be enabled to get a
better understanding of what is actually involved in describing
a particular event as a violation of natural law.
The second objection Holland examines is the old,familiar
objection that by describing a particular event as a violation
of natural law one is confusing a law or laws of nature with
judicial laws. It makes sense to talk of breaking the laws of
the state because they merely prescribe rules of conduct.
However,laws of nature are not prescriptions. They rather
describe; they describe the occurrences of whSft they are
about. And if any event occurs which is not in accord with
known laws of nature, this event must falsify those self-same
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laws of nature. Thus,
"the relation between an occurrence and a law of
nature is different then from a man's relation
to a law of the state, for when the latter is
deviated from we do not ... say the law is wrong
but rather that the man is wrong - he is a
criminal. To suggest that an occurrence which
has falsified a law of nature is wrong would be
an absurdity: and it would be just as absurd to
suggest that the law has been violated. Nothing
can be conceived to be a violation of natural
law, and if that is how the miraculous is con¬
ceived there can be no such thing as the miracu¬
lous. Laws of nature can be formulated or
reformulated to cope with any eventuality, and
would-be miracles are transformed automatically
into natural occurrences the moment science gets
on the track of them." (179)
Now Holland is not satisfied with this account because,
not only do laws of nature describe what has happened,they
also predict what will occur. Thus,as Holland sees it,legal
laws and laws of nature have this feature in common; with
regard to future events or behaviour they
"both stipulate something. Moreover the stipu¬
lations which we call laws of nature are in so
many cases so solidly founded and knitted
together with other stipluations, other laws,
that they come to be something in the nature of
a framework through which we look at the world
and which to a considerable degree dictates our
ways of describing phenomena." (180)
However,if one responds to the second objection in this
way the difficulty is that the response seems to reinforce the
critical point being urged by Hume, which was considered in
the first objection. That is;once one begins to consider laws
- 2^9 -
of nature as constituting a kind of 'framework' by which and
through which the world is observed,then isn't the Humean
point reinforced,because
"surely it must seem that our reluctance to
throw overboard a whole nexus of well-established,
mutually supporting laws and theories must be so
great as to justify us in rejecting out of hand,
and not being prepared to assign even a degree
of probability to, any testimony to an occurrence
which our system of natural law decisively rules
out." (181)
Now Holland believes we do not have to accept such a
conclusion because,for the very obvious reason, if we deny any
kind of certainty to an individual event, we shall be unable
to .count how our nexus of laws were developed and set up.
However once this is said, once it is claimed that we can
"upgrade the probability of natural laws into
certainty ... and in the interest of good con¬
ceptual sense ... upgrade ... the probability
attaching to particular events ... so as to
allow that some of these ... can be certain and
really known to be what they are " (182)
we are, as Holland conceives it, at the very least beginning
to see what may be involved in describing a particular event
as a miracle, as a violation of natural law. If a particular
event occurs which appears to 'violate' certain known natural
laws and we are certain that the laws obtain and equally
certain that the event has occurred we are then committed to
say, if we wish to describe the event as a miracle,tkaft (a)
it is. impossible and (b) it has happened. Holland expresses
the point in this way:
"a conflict of certainties is a necessary though
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not a sufficient condition of the miraculous.
In other words, a miracle, though it cannot only
be this, must at least be something the occur¬
rence of which can be categorised at one and the
same time as empirically certain and conceptually
impossible. If it were less than conceptually
impossible it would reduce merely to a very
unusual occurrence such as could be treated
(because of the empirical certainty) in the
manner of a decisive experiment and result in a
modification to the prevailing conception of
natural law; while if it were less than empiri¬
cally certain nothing more would be called for
in regard to it than a suspension of judgment."
(183)
First of all,in comment here,note Holland's description
of the event as conceptually impossible. A more natural
expression to use would surely be physically impossible. And
of course that which is physically impossible is not concep¬
tually or logically impossible. It may be physically
impossible - given the law of gravity - for me to float upwards
if I jump from the ninth floor of a tower building, but it
surely is not conceptually or logically impossible. We shall
have to explore this use of the term 'conceptually impossible'
further. Also,why should anyone want to talk in the way
Holland has described, why should anyone want to talk of a
'contradiction in their experience'? Why not, if they are
certain that a particular event has occurred, rather than
claiming the event is empirically certain and conceptually
impossible, just say the occurrence of the event falsifies
certain natural laws such that the event, although once
thought to be impossible, is in fact not so, and the proper
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course to adopt is to search for the natural cause of the
event? Indeed,how could one ever validly claim that no
natural cause of the event could ever be found, which Holland's
account seems to demand?
Holland believes he can answer these difficulties.
First of all,he claims:
"the idea that one cannot establish the absence
of a natural cause is not to my mind the
unassailable piece of logic it might seem at
first glance to be. Both our common under¬
standing and our scientific understanding
include conceptions of the sort of thing that
can and cannot happen, and of the sort of thing
that has to take place to bring about some other
sort of thing." (184)
What.however,can Holland have in mind here? What does the
reference to a common understanding as well as a scientific
understanding signify? V/hat indeed is meant by, in this con¬
text, a common understanding? Holland gives us this example.
"Suppose that a horse, which has been normally
born and reared, and is now deprived of all
nourishment (we could be completely certain of
this) - suppose that, instead of dying, this
horse goes on thriving (which again is something
we could be completely certain about). A series
of thorough examinations reveals no abnormality
in the horse's condition: its digestive system
is always found to be working and to be at every
moment in more or less the state it would have
been in if the horse had eaten a meal an hour or
two before. This is utterly inconsistent with
our whole conception of the needs and capacities
of horses; and because it is an impossibility in
the light of our prevailing conceptions, my
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objector, in the event of its happening, would
expect us to abandon the conception - as though
we had to have consistency at any price. Whereas
the position I advocate is that the price is too
high and it would be better to be left with the
inconsistency; and that in any event the pre¬
vailing conception has a logical status not
altogether unlike that of a necessary truth and
cannot be simply thrown away as a mistake - not
when it rests on the experience of generations
... and especially not when one considers the
way our conception of the needs and capacities
of horses interlocks with conceptions of the
needs and capacities of other living things ...
These conceptions form part of a common under-
v
standing that is well established and with us to
stay." (185)
To demand that one continue to look „ . • ' for a
natural explanation of this strange occurrence would,for
Holland,be 'too high a price' to pay for consistency. The
prevailing conception,which is an integral part of our common
understanding.has a logical status not unlike a necessary
truth. Perhaps it is now becoming clearer why Holland refers
to events described as miracles as conceptually impossible,
given that the 'prevailing conception', which they contradict,
has a status not unlike a necessary truth. Further,does the
regard we pay to our 'common understanding* mean that we can
reject scientific discoveries and conceptual changes if they
are in conflict with our 'common understanding'? Holland is
slightly equivocal here. He states;
"Any number of discoveries remains to be made by
zoologists and plenty of scope exists for con¬
ceptual. revision in biological theory, but it
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is a confusion to think it follows from this
that we are less than well enough acquainted
with and might have serious misconceptions about,
what is and is not possible in the behaviour
under familiar conditions of common objects with
which we have a long history of practical
dealings. Similarly with the relation between
common understanding and physical discoveries,
physical theories ... The objector who thinks
there is a loophole in it for natural explana¬
tion strikes me as lacking a sense of the absurd."
(186)
He may lack a sense of the absurd but until Holland
claims definitively that we can rely on the understanding pro¬
vided by our 'common understanding' in opposition to the
discoveries and conceptual changes which can take place in
science and, if this is claimed, provides us with an under¬
standing of what would be meant by such a 'common understanding'-
which on the one hand seems to include reference to scientific
understanding but is at the same time immune to certain
scientific changes and developments.-it would appear that to
continue to search for a natural explanation would be the
rational thing to do. What other reference can there be than
to the laws and theories of science when the event is des¬
cribed as 'conceptually impossible'? And,furthermore,given
the developments and advances which can occur in scientific
theory there jLs surely a 'loophole' here for the objector who
believes the event may yet receive a natural explanation - a
natural cause for the event may yet be found. Thus,I think,we
would have to disagree with Holland when he claims that he has
pinpointed circumstances
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"in respect to which the expression 'occurrence
of something which is conceptually impossible'
would have a natural enough use ... or ... the
expression 'violation of a law of nature' could
also be introduced quite naturally in this
connection." (187)
Holland has failed to provide us with an understanding of 'con¬
ceptually impossible' that would achieve his task and thus he
has failed to provide us with criteria such that we could
identify a particular event as a violation of natural law.
For Holland, as we saw, 'a conflict of certainties is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition of the miraculous'.
The other necessary condition is provided when reference is
made to "the religious background". (188) What does Holland
mean here by a 'religious background*? Is it a reference to
the divine agency involved in a miraculous event? Hardly,
because as Holland informs us:
"It is not part of my case that to regard a
sequence of events ... as miraculous is to con¬
strue it as if it were a sort of action, or to
see the invisible hand of a super person at work
in it." (189)
Indeed,as M. Diamond has pointed out,this illustrates the
interesting twist in Holland's argument. That is:
"Instead of arguing from within the religious
framework by insisting that 'To God all things
are possible' he argues for the supernaturalist
interpretation on the basis of the well being of
the scientific enterprise. He insists that bio¬
logical and physiological theories of nourish¬
ment are so well established that they are
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fundamental to our common sense conceptual
schemes ... To sacrifice the fundamental prin¬
ciples and theories of nourishment in the effort
to square scientific theory with this utterly
aberrant observation would ... be too high a
price to pay." (190)
What then is involved in a reference to a religious background?
'To illustrate this Holland asks us to imagine him levitating.
"Suppose, however, that by rising into the air
I were to avoid an otherwise certain death: then
it would against a religious background become
possible to speak of a miracle just as it would
in what I called the contingency case." (191)
But surely part of this 'religious background' would include a
belief in the possibility of direct divine activity in the
world and, in the specific case mentioned, a belief that it
was due to the direct causal activity or intervention of God
that Holland violated natural laws, rose into the air. And
further,the criterion employed to identify such an event as a
miracle or an act of God would be discovered by reference to
the known will and nature of God. That is, God being a good
and compassionate God, the relief of suffering, distress etc.
would be the kind of acts that he would perform. Now with
regard to the employment of such a criterion Holland says
nothing,though he does refer us to his discussion of his
'contingency concept' of the miraculous where apparently he
has gone into the matter in more detail. So let us turn,first
of all,to see what Holland understands by a 'contingency con¬
cept of miracle', and then examine further what he has to say
about the religious background to such events. Holland
provides the following example.
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"A child riding his toy motor-car strays on to
an unguarded railway crossing near his house and
a wheel of his car gets stuck down the side of
one of the rails. An express train is due to
pass with the signals in its favour and a curve
in the track makes it impossible for the driver
to stop his train in time to avoid any obstruc¬
tion he might encounter on the crossing. The
mother coming out of the house to look for her
child sees him on the crossing and hears the
train approaching. She runs forward shouting
and waving. The little boy remains seated in
his car looking downward engrossed in the task of
pedalling it free. The brakes of the train are
applied and it comes to rest a few feet from the
child. The mother thanks God for the miracle;
which she never ceases to think of as such
although, as she in due course learns, there was
nothing supernatural about the manner in which
the brakes of the train came to be applied. The
driver had fainted ... and the brakes were
applied automatically as his hand ceased to exert
pressure on the control lever. He fainted ...
because his blood pressure had risen ... and the
change in the blood pressure caused a clot of
blood to be dislodged and circulate. He fainted
at the time when he did on the afternoon in
question because this was the time at which the
coagulation in his blood stream reached the
brain." (192)
Note that everything that occurs has a perfectly natural
explanation. There is a natural explanation for the train
stopping where it did and a natural explanation for the child
being where he was.
"The spacio-temporal coincidence ... the fact
that the child was on the line at the time when
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the train approached and the train stopped a few
feet short of the place where he was, is exactly
... a coincidence." (193)
But it is an impressive and significant coincidence "because
the life of a child was imperilled and then, against expecta¬
tion, preserved." (19*0
First of all,it is obvious that the event or rather
series of events were not brought about by direct divine
activity in the world. As Holland himself says: "it cannot
without confusion be taken as a sign of divine interference
with the natural order." (195) If we are going to talk of God
as an agent at all in relation to this series of events we
must be thinking of God as the sustaining agent of all there
is, as a necessary condition,in this sense,of these events
occurring. But note,however, that in this sense God is not
only the necessary condition of these particular events
occurring but He is also the necessary condition for the
occurrence of all events. Again.if it is argued that God as a
provident sustaining God so arranged for this coincidence to
occur then,in this sense,it must be acknowledged that all
events are equally ordained by God.
What then could be meant by identifying such an event or
series of events as a miracle? We are told the mother does
identify the event as a miracle even though she knows there is
a perfectly natural explanation or explanations of the series
of events. Obviously then she does not believe there has been
a violation or violations of natural law. But what criteria
could she employ to identify such a series of events as miracu¬
lous? It seems obvious that she would then be identifying
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such a series of events as miraculous because she believes the
occurrence of these events would be in accord with the nature
or character of God. God, being the kind of God He is.would
'produce' the kind of events which have occurred. Evidence
that such criteria must be the criteria employed here to
identify the events as miraculous could be found if we imagine
Holland's example differ slightly in detail. Allow the
train not to stop just prior to the child's position on the
track but a few feet the other side of where the child is. Or,
an even more remarkable coincidence, the train stops right on
top of the child. Now obviously the mother would not regard
such an event as a miracle, an event for which she thanks God.
Such an event would not be in keeping with the known character
or nature of God. God, the all good and compassionate God,
could not be the agent of such an act.
Now note this difficulty if such a criterion is being
employed here. God, in this example, is no more the agent of
these particular series of events than he is for any other
series of events - there is no direct divine activity involved -
and to say God is an agent in any sense here is simply to
refer to the sustaining activity of God,by which He can be
regarded as a necessary condition for the occurrence of all
events. Thus given the non-existence of direct divine activity
violating the natural order to bring about a desired series of
events it seems that it would be impossible or indeed quixotic
to claim to be able to identify such a series of events as
indeed instances of miraculous events by reference to the
character or nature of God. God is no more responsible
for bringing these particular events about than any other
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event in the world or, the reverse of the coin, God is
every bit as much responsible for bringing about all events
and not just certain alleged special events. Thus in the
absence of direct divine activity, if the events which have
occurred are not violations of the natural order, it would
seem to be impossible to validly employ criteria which claim
to be able to identify events as miraculous inasmuch as they
are in keeping with the known will and nature of God. Further,
it would seem pointless to thank God for the occurrence of
such particular events unless one was prepared to thank God
for all events which occur.
What does Holland have to say about the religious back¬
ground to such coincidences? He states:
"The significance of some coincidences as
opposed to others arises from their relation,to
human needs and hopes and fears, their effects
for good or ill upon our lives. So we speak of
our luck (fortune, fate etc.). And the kind of
thing that, outside religion, we call luck is in
religious parlance the grace of God or a miracle
of God. But while the reference here is the
same, the meaning is different. The meaning is
different in that whatever happens ... by a
miracle is something for which God is thanked or
thankable ... all of which can only take place
against the background of a religious tradition."
(196)
But surely, to repeat,if 'God is thanked or thankable'
this is so because,as the 'religious tradition' would inform
us, God is in some sense thought of as the agent of the act,
as responsible for the act. Certainly,too,while it is true
that the relation of such coincidences to human needs, hopes
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and fears is important,something more is needed to identify
such coincidences as miracles. Surely it is because it is
believed (a) that God is active as in some sense a causal
agent and (b) that such coincidences are the kind of events
which are in keeping with the divine nature and will that such
coincidences are identified as miraculous. The beliefs may be
mistaken beliefs here, for the reasons already given, but they
do illustrate that it is because it is believed that the
'reference' is different that the 'meaning' is claimed to be
different too.
For Holland such 'coincidence miracles' do not involve
'divine interference with the natural order' and the contrast
is then made with the 'violation concept' of miracle and the
clear implication, although unstated, is that miracles which
involve 'violations of the natural order' are products of
divine interference in the world. And yet, as we have seen,
for Holland, it is a mistake to see such events as if they
were a product of some kind of action, as if some 'super person'
were at work here. Indeed for Holland generally, the puzzle
is to understand "what difference would (the existence of a
special existent) make to the character of the practice (of
religion)" (197) and I suppose, in particular, in the case of
a miracle, what difference would the existence of a 'special
agent' make to our desire and ability to identify events as
miraculous. One is inclined to say 'Everything'. Because
surely it is only if it is believed that a personal God is or
can be active in the world as an agent, can act directly in
the world violating the natural order, that criteria could
even conceivably be employed to identify whic£ particular
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events are to be thought of as miraculous. (Whether or not
the 'violation concept of the miraculous' is a possible con¬
cept or whether or not the criteria mentioned can be in fact
employed to identify miraculous events understood in this
sense, should I suspect, be answered in the negative.) Thus
I do not think that Holland has made good his claim that an
intelligible account can be given of the notion of miracle
which makes no reference to the idea of God as an agent.
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A MODEL OF TRANSCENDENCE
Perhaps,however, the greatest worry one has about such an
account of God's 'otherness from the world' is not merely
whether Phillips has plotted the logic of 'God' correctly,
whether his so-called 'supernaturalistic concept of God' is an
adequate conception of the God to be found in the Christian
tradition; but, more fundamentally, has he not denied the
objective reality of God?
Now Rhees considers the objection that the account of
the reality of God which he gives denies God's objective
reality. He states:
"You say that 'I deny that the terra 'God' stands
for any objective reality in the literal sense.'
I cannot have said just that, because the phrase
•objective reality' is one which I can almost
never understand, and I try to avoid it. I have
not denied the reality of God (I can make
nothing of the phrase 'in the literal sense':
certainly I was not introducing any * figurative
sense'). I have said that if we do speak of the
reality of God, this is not like speaking of the
reality of the milky way, any more than it is
like speaking of the reality of flying saucers.
I probably said something like 'God is not an
object'. And this is a grammatical proposition,
of course ... By'an object1 I was thinking first
of all of something life a galaxy or a sound."
(198)
Phillips, however, considers the issue rather more
seriously and postulates three possible accounts of the objec¬
tion. First of all, he asks, is the objector
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"suggesting th%t the believer creates his belief
... This is obviously not the case. The believer
is taught religious beliefs. He does not create
a tradition but is born into one." (199)
This is fair enough except it is hardly the point which the
objector had in mind. The second 'account* of the objection
which Phillips examines is that ivhich claims that, if what
Phillips says is true,"it is impossible to be mistaken about
the nature of God." (200) Again,however, Phillips rejects what
is claimed here,having in mind I presume some such passage as
the following;
"The individual, then, cannot say that anything
is the will of God. What can conceivably be
said to be the will of God is determined by pre¬
vailing beliefs about God. In short, God's
nature is the grammar of God's will." (201)
Jf it is a passage like this Phillips has in mind one
wonders if,in an important sense,there is not a point to the
objection? Thirdly,Phillips considers the objection as
referring to a "statement which I should support - namely the
statement that God is not an object. That is a statement of
grammar." (202) Now of course God is not an object in the
sense in which tables and chairs are objects,but surely He
must be thought to exist in some sense independently of his
creation, the world, and the objects existing in the world?
Surely what is meant by God's 'otherness from the world'
cannot adequately be articulated in terms of what is involved
for an individual to display eternal or selfless love? Indeed,
as R. Trigg correctly comments on Phillips' argument here:
"The most interesting point in all this is that
he does not consider the most natural interpre-
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tation of the objection, which is that the
existence of God is in no way dependent on our
individual or our collective thought. This is
an indispensable part of the concept of the
Christian God." (203)
Further, in a discussion with J. K. Jones,Phillips,
using the term 'picture' in very much the same sense as
Wittgenstein uses it in his Lectures on Religious Belief,puts
forward the claim that we can talk of a picture of the divine.
Further, he also claims that it is nonsense to believe that
"independently of the picture, we have a notion of divinity."
(20*0 Or indeed,furthermore, and crucial in this context,it is
equally nonsense to believe these pictures are "pictures 'of'
anything." (205)
"So the difference between a man who does and a
man who does not believe in God is like the
difference between a man who does and a man who
does not believe in a picture." (206)
Now there surely is an immediate difficulty here for Phillips,
because,as Jones points out, could this claim
"have the implication that when the picture,
which is a picture of the divine, as it were,
which is God ... is corroded by doubts and
scepticism then the picture can be said to have
died; but that when the picture dies ... that in
a sense, on your own presuppositions, God could
be said to have died." (207)
Now Phillips appreciates the difficulty here but suggests,
first of all,that the desire to say "that God dies is literal
mindedness attempting to reassert itself." (208) By that com¬
ment I take Phillips to mean that the mistake here being made
is that the objector is thinking of the picture as a picture
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'of' something - a literal picture. (209) But if Phillips
responds in this way isn't he only emphasising the point of
the original difficulty? Isn't he committed to saying that if
the picture dies, God in a sense dies? Phillips replies:
"The point is that from within the picture some¬
thing can be said now about such a time, that is,
a time when people might turn their backs on it
altogether. What can be said is that in such a
time, people will have turned their backs on God.
In other words, if people believe, there is
nothing within belief which allows them to say
that God can die. What they say is that there
may come a time when people will turn their
backs on God." (210)
But surely they can say more here? It isn't merely the case
that people have turned their backs on God, but, given that
the divinity, what it means to affirm God as real, is
constituted by the picture or pictures held, if the pictures
die, God dies. Of course people who believe now may refer to
this as people turning their back on God,but if the implica¬
tion of saying this is that God exists, whether or not people
believe in Him or use the pictures of divinity, then it
certainly cannot be allowed given Phillips' characterization
and use of the term 'picture'. Furthermore,as R. Trigg has
pointed out,
"the very picture which according to Phillips,
allows believers to talk of people turning their
backs on God itself presupposes that God can
exist when people ignore Him. Although he wants
to avoid thinking of God as existing apart from
the pictures which believers have, the pictures
themselves demand that this happen." (211)
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Now Rhees feels that in general terms he has an answer
to this problem if it is presented as an objection to the kind
of account both he and Phillips wish to present. It seems to
be the case that,if we accept the account of the reality of
God both Phillips and Hhees wish to present us with,we must
deny that the term 'God' stands for or refers to any extra-
mental reality. Hhees says:
"If you ask, 'Well, when we are talking about
God, does our language not refer to anything?'
Then I should want to begin ... by emphasising
something of the special grammar of this
language. Otherwise it is natural to think of
the way in which our physical object language
may refer to something."
But what is the special grammar of this language? To illus¬
trate this special grammar Rhees continues:
"I should want to say something about what it is
to 'talk about God', and how different this is
from talking about the moon, or talking about a
new house, or talking about the Queen. How
different the 'talking about' is, I mean. That
is a difference in grammar." (212)
But it is just here where we most need enlightenment
that both Phillips and Rhees are at their most disappointing.
What is raised as a serious issue for discussion appears to be
deflected into mere hints or suggestions for argument and dis¬
cussion. One would like a more positive account of the
'special' grammar involved here. Discussions are too often
cut short with remarks like 'That is a statement of grammar',
•That is a difference in grammar' etc.
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Indeed,Phillips' account and argument here has led one
philosopher, A. Brunton, in a recent article (213) to suggest
that there may be a close affinity or analogy between the work
of G. Ryle in The Concept of Hind (21*f) and the analysis of
religious language Phillips presents us with. What prompts
Brunton to make this claim is that he believes that what Ryle
presents us with in The Concept of Mind is an adverbial model
for the concept of 'mind'. That is, Brunton states:
"I call this a model, since to understand Ryle's
book without its wealth of detail is to under¬
stand a radical change-over from •mental' concepts
understood substantially - the Will, the Mind,
the Imagination - to those same concepts under¬
stood adverbially - wilfully, intelligently,
imaginatively." (215)
Now the analogy which Brunton claims to see between this
'adverbial approach' of Ryle and Phillips' work he expresses
in the following manner.
"All I wish to suggest is that, if we interpret
Phillips' statements about God adverbially, with
the corresponding modifications for religious
thought in general (the concepts of 'prayer',
'eternity', 'Judgement', 'Heaven', 'Hell' would
all be affected), then we shall be logically
illuminated." (216)
That is, what Brunton is suggesting is that,
"just as Ryle argues that there are not Minds
and Bodies, but rather persons who act intelli¬
gently, stupidly, imaginatively, woodenly,
Phillips argues that there are not persons and
God (Himself either a Person or else a strangely,
non-finite, non-three-dimensional Super-Person)
but rather persons who have the divine spirit
(know God), and those who don't." (217)
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And of course to have this divine spirit is, as we have seen,
to express eternal love, love in a selfless way.
Now it appears to me that this analogy is not only
imaginative hut also enlightening. But is it fruitful?
Brunton believes it is fruitful in two respects. First of all,
it is fruitful in that
"a bold acceptance by Phillips of the adverbial
model would put paid, once and for all ... to
the criticism (already stated) of the wide gap
between Phillips' views and what is actually
believed by the Saints, Church Fathers and pro¬
fessing Christians in general." (218)
That is, Christian believers have normally believed that their
faith made assertions both about the nature of man and of the
world. Their faith consisted of belief in an actually existing
God, the creator of the universe. At least, as Brunton states,
"if we accept the adverbial analysis we shall see more clearly
where we stand." (219) And to be honest Phillips' writings at
times do make it reasonably clear where he stands. I have in
mind such statements as
"God's reality is independent of any given
believer, but its independence is not the
independence of a separate biography;"
"For the believer, love itself is the real
object of the relationship between himself and
another person. This love is the Spirit of God,
and to possess it is to walk with God."
Or again,
"God is not contemplated directly, but through
... forms of the implicit love of God. One such
form is love of one's neighbour:"
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"Seeing that there is a God is synonymous with
seeing the possibility of eternal love ... To
possess this love is to possess God." (220)
What,however,is often annoying with Phillips' work is that he
still retains the descriptive grammatical form of religious
assertions ,/though Rhees, at least, admits that he does not,as
we saw, lay 'emphasis ... on the fact that 'God' is a substan¬
tial
tivey such that the impression is often given/' it is the case,
despite appearances, that what is being described or talked
about is some kind of entity called God.
However, if we remain with and accept the adverbial
account we shall at least see the futility of attacking
Phillips' views because they either do not meet some standard
of orthodoxy or appear to conflict with the actual beliefs of
Christian believers. Though,given Phillips' claim that he is
merely articulating what certain religious beliefs mean within
the Christian tradition to Christian religious believers,
Brunton's admonishment here is timely:
"Whether this is a plausible view will depend
both on what Jesus and many other individuals
have said and on our interpretation of their
words. Here one, including Phillips, can only
be honest and remember to distinguish between
what we take to be the beliefs of individuals
and what we regard as the most profound elements
in these beliefs and the best way of interpreting
them." (221)
The second way in which Brunton considers his analogy to
be fruitful is that,if applied, it can help to explicate in a
fuller fashion the nature of the difficulties which Phillips
himself finds in his own position. The particular difficulty
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vrhich Phillips articulates, and Brunton refers to, is the
following.
"I wanted to say that the man who loves God
cannot be touched by the world, by how things
are. ... The biggest objection to this way of
talking comes from the fact that affliction can
destroy the possibility of loving God. So it
seems that the believer cannot say that all is
well no matter what happens, since if certain
things happen he pan no longer believe. On the
other hand, would believers say that God had
deserted a man, if the affliction which destroys
his faith is itself the consequence of loving
Godl" (222)
The sentence which Brunton believes would be particularly
clarified,if his analogy were applied here,would be the last
sentence of the quotation. It would then read:
"'Would believers say that a man who loves
unselfishly has ceased to love unselfishly if
whatever destroyed his love wa3 itself the conse¬
quence of this love?' There is only one answer,
'Yes'." (223)
Thus I think on both counts we can regard Brunton's
as
analogy/not only fruitful but also enlightening. But, having
said that,doesn't that commit me to claiming that Phillips is
presenting a reductionist account of religious belief and
language, and in particular reducing religious belief and
language into moral belief and language? And of course the
writings of R. B. Braithwaite came to mind here. For doesn't
Braithwaite reduce religious belief to moral belief when he
states:
"A moral belief is an intention to behave in a
certain way: a religious belief is an intention
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to behave in a certain way (a moral belief)
together with the entertainment of certain
stories associated with the intention in the
mind of the believer." (224)
Now can we rest content with classifying Phillips and
Braithwaite here together? Hasn't indeed Phillips claimed,in
opposition to the position of Braithwaite,that "the very
reason behind the believer's dependence on God is the recogni¬
tion of the limits of moral resolution"? (225) Indeed there
is a sense here in which one is tempted to say that while
Braithwaite 'demotes' religious belief into moral belief,
Phillips 'elevates' a certain kind of moral belief into reli¬
gious belief.
P. Helm,aware of this difficulty here,suggests two
senses of reductionism in religion which may help to clarify
the issue. He suggests that the Phillips type reductionism
would be a
"thesis analysing transcendent terms into
immanent terms. Such an analysis does not
necessarily involve any denial of the transcen¬
dent character of God, but offers a certain
model as an elucidation of the transcendence of
God."
This account should be read with Helm's remark that "onto-
logically speaking, Phillips does not wish to get rid of
anything." A Braithwaitian-type reductionism would be
"a thesis analysing transcendent terms into
immanent terms without remainder. This is not
simply to offer a model of transcendence ... but
to claim in effect, that the transcendent-
sounding language of religion means nothing over
and above certain immanent states of affairs."
(226)
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Now while I can sympathise with Helm's attempts to
differentiate the different senses in which Phillips' and
Braithwaite's accounts of religious belief are reductionist.I
cannot agree with his classification as it stands. Phillips
we are told, 'ontologically speaking does not want to get rid
of anything'. Well,I know his writings are at times
obscure , but, with reference to the reasons already given,
it does seem that he wants to deny the reality of God under¬
stood as any kind of individual entity or being. Now I
suspect Helm might reply here that all Phillips is trying to
achieve is
"to correct or reform religious language
according to the supposed 'grammar' of religion.
This reductionist!! is a proposal within religion,
and amounts to the provision of a new model for
the understanding of, for example, divine trans¬
cendence, given the (for Phillips) unacceptable
model of classical theism." (227)
However the 'fact' that the attempt to reform religious
language is allegedly internally based does not detract from
the fact that the new model of transcendence,provided by
Phillips,essentially involves reducing statements allegedly
about God into statements of moral beliefs and attitudes. I
suspect Helm is guilty here of allowing Phillips to (to put
the matter colloquially here) have his cake and eat it.
Thus,while one must and should be aware of the differing
intentions, aims and indeed understandings of religious beliefs
and practices As exemplified in the work of Phillips and
Braithwaite one should not gloss over the full implications of
their analyses. If, as for Phillips, 'seeing that there is a
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God' is synonymous with, 'seeing the possibility of eternal
love', which would appear to suggest that for Phillips the
statement 'God exists' means or is identified with the state¬
ment 'Internal love exists', then, surely, we do have a reduction
of religious language and belief to moral language and belief —
a. reduction,indeed, very similar in kind to Braithwaite's when he
states "I believe in God" means "I intend to follow an aga-
peistic way of life". (228)
Indeed the reductionist nature of Phillips' thesis is
seen most clearly in his remarks on Immortality and,in parti¬
cular, in his specific rejection of belief in survival after
death as being a necessary component of a religious belief in
Immortality. I want now to turn to examine Phillips' elucida¬
tion of the nature of Immortality, his account of what it
means to believe in Immortality or eternal life. In particular
I think the following point will be illustrated. Just as
'coming to see that there is a God' finds its expression in
certain moral beliefs, "coming to see the possibility of such
love amounts to the same thing as coming to see the possibility
of belief in God," (229) so, similarly, 'participating in
Immortality', for Phillips, also finds its expression, its con¬
tent, in moral beliefs, in the very same moral beliefs. There
is a "certain kind of love, to possess which is to know God
and to have eternal life." "To possess this love is to know
God, to have eternal life, to become subjective." (230) Thus,
what it means to believe in God, what it means to believe in
eternal life or Immortality are conflated. In practising a
self-less morality one is 'participating in God's reality', one
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is participating in Immortality - this is what for Phillips
Immortality means. One is viewing life under a certain moral




"Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal
immortality of the human soul, that is to say of
its eternal survival after death; but, in any
case, this assumption completely fails to accom¬
plish the purpose for which it has always been
intended. Or is some riddle solved by my sur¬
viving for ever? Is not this eternal life as
much of a riddle as our present life?" (231)
"Christianity speaks of overcoming the world.
But in what sense is it overcome? According to
Christianity, it is overcome by a certain kind
of love, to possess which is to know God and to
have eternal love." (232)
For D. Z. Phillips the greatest mistake possible which
can be made i^i religious discussions of the Immortality of the
Soul is to assume that a belief in Immortalityyin eternal life,
entails some kind of belief in survival after death. All such
ideas of existence after death,whether that existence be thought
of as the existence of a physical body, a non-material body or
a disembodied existence,face insuperable difficulties. For
Phillips the notion of Immortality,understood as entailing sur¬
vival after death,is the product of a number of mistakes:
"mistakes about the grammar of concepts such as 'self*, 'I',
'existence', 'death', 'personal identity' etc." (233) And yet,
as Geach reminds us:
"The traditional faith of Christianity, inherited
from Judaism, is that at the end of this age
Messiah will come and men rise from their graves
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to die no more. That faith is not going to be
shaken by inquiries about bodies burned to ashes
or eaten by beasts; those who might well suffer
just such death in martyrdom were those who were
most confident of a glorious reward in the
resurrection. One who shares that hope will
hardly wish to take out an occultistic or philo¬
sophical insurance policy, to guarantee some
sort of survival as an annuity, in case God's
promise of resurrection should fail." (23^)
Now Phillips rejects Geac'n's characterization of the
Christian belief in Immortality. Rather, he asks:
"what if belief in the immortality of the soul
so far from being the product of prudence, has
close connections with moral beliefs? What if
belief in the immortality of the soul does not
entail belief in survival after death?" (235)
Phillips, in other words,wishes to develop an account of Immor¬
tality which is consistent with his rejection of the possi¬
bility of surviving death.
In developing his account of Immortality Phillips asks us
to consider such expressions as 'He was a good soul' or 'I'm
sorry for the poor old soul'. He continues:
"To say of someone, 'He'd sell his soul for
money' is a perfectly natural remark. It in no
way entails any philosophical theory about a
duality in human nature. The remark is a moral
observation about a person, one which expresses
the degraded state that person is in. A man's
soul in this context, refers to his integrity,
to the complex set of practices and beliefs
which acting with integrity would cover for that
person. Might not talk about the immortality of
the soul play a similar role?" (236)
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But before one can talk about the state of a man's
soul should one not establish that he has a soul to be in such
a state,and,furthermore,surely it is only when we have esta¬
blished that souls do exist, that we can then proceed to discuss
their state or whether, for example, they can survive after
death? Now for Phillips such objections are based on a radical
confusion. This is so because such an assertion as
"'Every man has a soul' has been construed as if
it were akin to 'Every man has a heart'. Once
this has been done, the endless qualifications
begin: it is a substance, but an incorporeal one,
and so on. The questions also begin: 'Show me
the soul - can its position be located?"'
Rather, Phillips claims:
"if we ask ourselves when we would consider
whether a man has a soul or not, we see that
this has nothing to do with any kind of
empirical question. It is not like asking
whether he has a larynx or not ... an investi¬
gation as to whether a man has a soul or not,
or into the state his soul is in, has nothing
to do with the location or examination of an
object. Questions about the state of a man's
soul are questions about the kind of life he is
living ... The relation between the soul and how
a man lives is not a contingent one. It is when
a man sinks to depths of bestiality that someone
might say that he had lost his soul ... Talk about
the soul, then, is not talk about some strange
sort of 'thing'. On the contrary, it is a kind
of talk bound up with certain moral or religious
reflections a man may make on the life he is
leading." (237)
Thus it would appear that,for Phillips,to ask a question
about the state of one's soul is to ask a question about the
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state of one's life. But how is the state of one's soul to be
assessed in a religious sense? "For the believer," Phillips
claims,
"the state of his soul has to do with its
possession or lack of spirituality, this
spirituality being assessed in terras of the
person's relationship to God ... The state of a
believer's soul is seen by him in the light of
its relation to beliefs in the Fatherhood and
Love of God. The notions of the fatherhood and
love of God constitute eternal life, the life
of God, towards which the soul aspires." (238)
Further, just as in discussing the nature of God's otherness
from the world, so here too,when discussing what it means for
the believer to aspire to eternal life, Phillips makes reference
to Plato's work in the Phaedo and once again emphasises the
notion of purification as turning from the temporal to the
eternal.
"The man who is a prey to the temporal, for
Plato, is the man who is at the mercy of his
desires and passions ... Plato speaks of the man
who is at the mercy of his desires as one who
lacks order in his soul. Order is given through
bringing to bear an unchanging demand on the
flux of desires. This demand is the demand of
decency." (239)
Accepting this account we can now see why,for Phillips,it
would be foolish to speak of eternal life as some kind of extra
bonus or addition to human existence, something which happens
after human life on earth is apparently over. Rather, "eternal
life is the reality of goodness, that in terms of which human
life is to be assessed." (2^0) The difference between the man
who desires eternal life in this sense and a man who does not
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would not be anything like the difference between a man who
believes he will survive death and a man who does not think that
he will survive death. The difference, rather, will be dis¬
played in the attitudes they hold to their respective lives.
"In one man, his desires and appetites would be,
or would be aimed at being, subordinate to moral
considerations, while in the other they would
reign unchecked. Just as in the case of deter¬
mining the state of a man's soul, so in the case
of determining whether someone has a regard for
the eternal what needs to be examined is the
kind of life he is living." (2^1)
Given this context in which "one kind of talk about eternal life
and Immortality has its home," one can see how puzzles concerning
whether or not one can survive death are irrelevant".
"Eternity is not an extension of this present
life, but a mode of judging it. Eternity is not
more life, but this life seen under certain
moral and religious modes of thought." (2^2)
However,Phillips is not altogether happy with this account
of eternal life primarily because the conclusions reached "are
insufficient as sua analysis of religious conceptions of eternal
life and the immortality of the soul." (2^3) It is not so much
that what has been said so far about Immortality has no rele¬
vance to religious belief, that is certainly not the case: but,
for Phillips,the specific religious notions of Immortality are
"closely connected with the idea of overcoming death" and it is
to an analysis of this specific idea that Phillips feels he now
must turn. ( 2M+)
How then is death overcome in this religious sense? Not,
as we might expect, by 'surviving death', as it were. To think
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in this way, for Phillips, would be to reduce the status of
death to the status of a kind of sleep from which one hopes to
be aroused to a new and better life.
"Then the lesson religious believers see in
death is lost, since death no longer reveals the
fact that there is to be no compensation, but is
seen as an additional fact for which compensa¬
tion must be sought." (2^5)
Rather,
"death's lesson for the believer is to force him
to recognise what all his rational instincts
want to resist, namely, that he has no claims on
the way things go." (2^6)
The specific religious notion of Immortality, for Phillips,
is best expressed in terms of the contrast between the desire
for compensation and the religious conception of dying to the
self. This representing the contrast between the temporal (the
concern with self), and the eternal (the concern with self-
renunciation). That is,
"the immortality of the soul ... refers to a
person's relation to the self-effacement and
love of others involved in dying to the self.
Death is overcome in that dying to the self is
the meaning of the believer's life." (2^7)
What,in effect,Phillips is suggesting is that
"eternal life for the believer is participating
in the life of God, and that this life has to do
with dying to the self, seeing that all things
are a gift from God, that nothing is ours by
right or necessity." (2^8)
And the connexion between the Immortality of the Soul and
eternal life is the following.
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"The immortality of the soul refers to the state
an individual is in in relation to the unchanging
reality of God. It is in this way that the
notion of the immortality of the soul and of
eternal life go together." (2^9)
"Eternity is not more life, but this life seen
under certain moral and religious modes of
thought. This is precisely what seeing this
life sub specie aeternitatis would amount to."
(250 )
But all this tells us something only about the relation of
an individual to 'God' during this life. Nothing is said of the
'destiny of the soul after death', andssince this is an impor¬
tant part of what has been meant by the Immortality of the Soul
in the Christian tradition, the account offered must surely be
rejected as inadequate. One might be tempted to say, bearing
in mind the traditional belief that Immortality entails survival
after death, that if the philosophical analysis of the notion of
Immortality given by Phillips is anywhere near the truth, the
whole notion is an illusion. For both the believer and the
unbeliever the end will be the same. Neither are going to
survive their deaths. Now Phillips accepts this,but asks:
"Why should we assume that the difference between
a believer and an unbeliever consists in this?
The objector may see no point in living according
to God's commands unless there is such a
difference. In that case, we are back to the
desire for compensation. When Jesus saw men
eaten up by pride, he said that they have their
reward; that is, that is all their lives amount
to; they are wedded to the temporal." (251)
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Thus,just as to 'see there is a God' is to 'see the possi¬
bility of eternal selfless love',so,to 'see the possibility of
eternal selfless love' is to see what Immortality or eternal
life means. Yet even if such an account were accepted by philo¬
sophers of what it means to have a religious belief in
Immortality, of what it means to say there is a God, what could
it mean to say that such beliefs are true? What would it mean
to ask whether,e.g., a belief in the Immortality of the Soul was
true or not? With reference to the argument already presented
by Phillips, we can see that the question of truth in this con¬
text has little to do with believing it to be the case, a fact,
that people do, survive death. Many philosophers of religion,
however, would believe that if this fact is not a component of
the belief this would prevent such a belief from being classi¬
fied as in any way a true belief. Furthermore, as Phillips
himself relates, they may feel
"that if religious believers were told that
belief in Immortality was divorced from such an
expectation and independent of it, the belief
would lose its hold on them immediately." (252)
Thus I would like to explore what Phillips has to say concerning
the status of truth claims for religious beliefs. What does it
mean to say,for Phillips,that belief in Immortality is a true
belief? But before discussing this, and as an aid to our dis¬
cussion of religious truth, I would like to analyse Phillips'






"The saint and the atheist do not interpret the
same world in different ways. They see
different worlds." (1)
This is a rather startling claim made by Phillips. What
could it possibly mean to say that the 'saint and atheist see
different worlds'? Perhaps his meaning will be a little
clearer if I expand the above quotation a little more. The
quotation then reads:
"Philosophers speak as if one had some constant
factors called the 'phenomena', of which reli¬
gion and humanism are competing interpretations.
But what are these phenomena? Religious language
is not an interpretation of how things are, but
determines how things are for the believer. The
saint and atheist ..."
Now two things are clear from this. First of all..religion
does not provide an alternative interpretation of the pheno¬
mena which somehow competes with the interpretation of that
same phenomena given by humanism,and,secondly religious
language determines how things are for the believer. The
clear implication appears to be here that it is most unlikely
that there is any one agreed account of the facts, the pheno¬
mena. Rather, in the case of religion, religious belief
determines how things are and in the case of humanism, humanis¬
tic belief determines how things are and,this being the case,
they cannot possibly both be competing interpretations of one
and the same set of facts.
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Other remarks of Phillips which seem to be relevant in
this context are: "The beliefs (religious) assess the facts,
not the facts the beliefs"; "worship of God makes the
believer's relationship to other people and the events which
befall hira substantially different"; and an approving quote
from Winch which reads, "the concepts we have settle for us
the form of experience we have of the world." (2)
Now P. Sherry (3) in his discussion of these remarks
maintains that he finds it difficult to grasp Phillips' argu¬
ment here. He states:
"Phillips is using ontological terms like
'things' and 'world', yet he makes no attempt at
ontological analysis (similarly, he asserts that
the meaning of terms like 'exist' and 'real' is
context dependent, but he does not relate the
different uses to each other). Phillips is
clearly right in insisting that our beliefs may
affect the way we experience the world and, in
some cases, the way things happen (particularly
in the realm of human relationships). All the
same, there are certain facts which are the case
regardless of how we think, feel or behave:
facts about historical events, nature and the
basic requirements of human life. Phillips ...
is wrong in suggesting that our responses can
somehow change them ..." (k)
Now Sherry's critical comments here are well taken
especially when we further see Phillips' claim, concerning the
religious believer, that "without his belief he could not be
said to ... experience the same events." (5) Indeed Phillips'
remarks here have led certain philosophers to claim that
Phillips is advocating a form of 'conceptual relativism'.
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Conceptual relativism, or what is meant by being a conceptual
relativist-, is
"to argue that what is to count as knowledge,
evidence, truth, a fact, an observation, making
sense and the like is uniquely determined by the
linguistic framework used and that linguistic
frameworks can and do radically vary. What we
can know about the world and what we will take
to be intellgible and the basic facts in the
case is completely moulded by the linguistic
framework we use." (6)
And for K. Nielsen, Phillips is a representative conceptual
relativist. Again,R. Trigg has identified Phillips as such a
conceptual relativist (7) and for him, sin implication of a
conceptual relativist position is that "different concepts ...
mean a different world, so that what the world is like is
relative to a conceptual system and the language of the system."
(8) Indeed, it is in particular by referring to the original
passage quoted from Phillips /the saint and atheist/ that
Trigg specifically attempts to justify his assertion that
Phillips is such a relativist.
However,I think Phillips' position is rather more com¬
plex than either of these philosophers have realised or indeed
I have as yet portrayed. So far I have interpreted Phillips'
remark that the saint and the atheist see different worlds as
meaning that there can be different accounts of the 'facts' -
there is no one agreed account of the facts - the saint
provides his account and the atheist his account. Neither
account is in competition with the other, providing a competing
interpretation, because that would presuppose that there was
some common phenomena of which their accounts would be in
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competition. However,contrast this account of what it means
for the saint and the atheist to see different worlds with this
further passage from Phillips:
"Both with the love of nature and love of human
beings, the attitude of the deeply religious man
is not determined by looking at things from the
midst of them. To say that his attitude is
other than this is what is meant by saying that
his attitude is other than the world's way of
regarding things. His view is of the world as
a whole and determines the nature of the world
for him. His world is a different world from
that of a man who sees objects from the midst of
them. How the world is is the same for both of
them, but what they make of the world is
different. This phrase, 'what they make of the
world', has led some philosophers to speak of
religious beliefs as attitudes to life. ... The
believer's worship 'must make the world a wholly
different one'. The world must, so to speak,
wax or wane as a whole. As if by accession or
loss of meaning." (9)
'How the world is is the same for both of them', 'but
what they make of the world is different'. This statement
would seem to imply that the facts of the matter, how the
world is. is common to both the religious and non-religious
man and,further,that their 'seeing different worlds' is a
function of 'what they make of the world', their attitude to
the world. Thus, in the case of the original passage quoted,
the mistake made by 'certain philosophers' is to suppose that
religious beliefs offer an interpretation of the phenomena.
Indeed to say that 'religious language determines how things
are for the believer' is simply to give expression to the
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claim that the attitude of the religious man is an attitude or
view of 'the world as a whole' and in this sense 'determines
the nature of the world for him'. In the case of the religious
man his attitude is not 'determined by looking at things from
the midst of them' but is rather 'other than the world's way
of regarding things'. His view is of the 'world as a whole'
and his world is a 'different world' insofar as the world must
'wax or wane as a whole, as if by accession or loss of meaning'.
Now I would like to pause here to note a very interesting
point. The above phrases 'looking at things from the midst of
them', the 'world must wax or wane as a whole' are most
certainly obscure but they are not, I should hope, unfamiliar.
Because, as we saw, they represent the kind of viewpoint
Wittgenstein felt in his Iractatus period of philosophy was
definitive of a mystical attitude to life. They represent
some of the mystical themes in the Tractatus. Now it seems to
me that what D. Z, Phillips offers us in his 'religious philo¬
sophy' is a 'marriage' of the later philosophy, the later
epistemology of Wittgenstein, with certain of the mystical
themes of the Tractatus period. Let me explain more fully
what I have in mind here. In Wittgenstein's Tractatus period
the only significant propositions were factual propositions,
propositions which were about 'what is the case', propositions
which were in fact identified with the propositions of the
natural sciences. There could be, as we saw, no significant
religious or ethical propositions because religious and
ethical claims were not concerned with 'how the world is*, the
facts - which are contingent, accidental - but with 'that
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there is a world' - that which is 'higher' - that which is
mystical. But Wittgenstein was 'under the oppressive tendency'
to give content to, a characterization of the religious and
ethical attitude and this account I have already presented.
Now with the development of the later philosophy in the
Investigations, factual statements ceased to be the only signi¬
ficant statements, the 'meaning of a word was its use in the
language-game' and,accepting this, religious assertions could
once again be re-admitted to significance. Religious sentences
are apparently as verbalisable and meaningful as any other and
are the content of the 'religious language games'*, which 'games'
themselves are an integral part of,or component of, the
'religious form(s) of life'.
Now in suggesting that Phillips' philosophical position
should be viewed as a 'marriage' of the later philosophy or
epistemology of Wittgenstein with certain of the mystical
themes of the Tractatus period I am simply suggesting the
following. Insofar* as Phillips accepts the later theory of
meaning, religious sentences being as meaningful as any other,
an essential component of 'religious language games' and the
religious form(s) of life and all that entails, he accepts the
later philosophy. But there still remains the problem of
giving a content to, a characterization of,the 'religious
form(s) of life', of what it means to participate in this
'form of life'. The 'form of life' is distinctive.it is not
reducible to any other, it constitutes part of the 'given'.
But what constitutes seeing the world in a religious manner?
Now insofar as Phillips accepts certain of the mystical
passages and themes of the Tractatus and Notebooks as giving
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an adequate characterization, a skeleton framework if you like,
of what is involved in having a religious attitude to the
world, I am suggesting he is accepting certain of these
mystical themes of the Tractatus as giving a 'content' to the
'religious form of life', as providing an elucidation of what
it means to view the world in a religious manner or way. Thus,
in identifying Phillips' 'religious philosophy' as a 'marriage'
of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein with some of the
mystical themes of the Tractatus this is all I am intending to
claim, or point out.
Now of course,in one sense, once the theoretical frame¬
work of the Tractatus is rejected, once the theory of the
significant proposition and its relation to the facts is over¬
thrown, certain or most of the so-called mystical themes, it
would appear, must go too, or at the very least the precise
articulation of them as given in the Tractatus and Notebooks.
Indeed, as already noted, certain of the phrases used to give
expression to certain of the mystical themes are hardly
intelligible when divorced from the total context of the
Tractarian philosophy. This much is true but, as already
pointed out, for example, when Wittgenstein claimed that there
were no significant ethical or religious propositions this did
not follow from nor was it a mere consequence of the 'picture
theory of meaning' unless the non-contingent nature of ethics
and religion was antecedentally accepted. Thus there is a
substantive ethical-religious position presupposed in the
elucidation of the Tractatus theory and it is this position
which Phillips elucidates and uses along with the Tractarian
terminology in which it is expressed.
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Indeed it seems to me that Phillips' characterization of
the religious view of the world as seeing things 'sub specie
aeterni', his identification of the question of the 'meaning of
the world' with the question of the 'meaning of life' - a
meaning which is not dependent on how things are - and so on,
are all explicit uses of certain of the mystical themes in the
Tractatus and Notebooks to illustrate what it means to parti¬
cipate in the 'religious form of life' and to view the world in
a religious fashion. Indeed, Phillips' use of some of the
mystical themes - such as the 'idea of the world waxing or
waning as a whole as if by accession or loss of meaning' -
are hardly intelligible unless one is at least aware of the
fuller articulation and expression given to them in the
Notebooks. This, indeed, is one reason why I took time to
expound the mystical themes in Section 1, Part A. Further, it
surely was obvious, when I was expounding Phillips' position
on such issues as what is meant by God's 'otherness from the
world' or what is meant by 'Immortality', how indebted Phillips'
accounts in fact are to certain of the mystical themes of the
Tractatus period.
Now having made these points I would like to return to
the issue I was discussing. If the world of the religious man
is a 'different world' from the world of the non-religious man
and if this difference is constituted by the fact that the
world is 'meaningful* for the religious man (whichTfollowing
2_S
Wittgenstein,/we have seen Phillips claim, means that life is
meaningful, i.e. questions about the meaning of the world and
life are one and the same), then to say that 'the world is
different' for the religious man is to say neither more nor
less than that he finds life meaningful. Phe 'different world'
of the religious man, the meaningful world or life, is not
determined by or dependent on. how things are in the world -
or,more importantly, by" a different 'account of the
facts' - but rather is determined by the attitude or response
of the religious man to the world as a whole^"the whole of
life". (10) He finds life meaningful or, to use
Wittgenstein's phrase,v . he view*the world or life 'sub
specie aeterni'; being in agreement with the world,accepting
the 'brute' factuality of the world. There is of course more
to conceptual relativism than this, but,if being called a con¬
ceptual relativist entails that one maintains there can be no
'agreed account of the facts', no 'agreed knowledge claims',
then Phillips is most certainly not a conceptual relativist.
Rather ,for Phillips, it is not the case that there sire
'different accounts of the facts' but rather that there can be
different responses to the facts. Or as Rhees states: "To
think in a religious way is to have a certain view of human
life; I do not think there is any thought about 'the world'
apart from that." (11)
292
Phillips also refers to religion as a response not only
to the 'whole of life' but also to events like bitth or death.
(12) He : states:
"Consider ... the example of the mother who
reacts to the birth of her baby boy by an act of
devotion to the Virgin Mary. It is true that
the act of devotion could not be what it is
without the birth of the baby, which, after all
occasioned it. It is also true that the connec¬
tion between the religious act and the baby's
birth must not be fantastic. It must be shown
not to be superstition." (13)
What does Phillips mean when he claims that the connec¬
tion between the religious response, the act of devotion, to
the birth of the baby and the physical fact of the baby's
birth must not be fantastic? What indeed does Phillips mean
when he says the religious responses must not be fantastic?
He states:
"Peligion must take the world seriously ...
religious responses are fantastic if they ignore
or distort what we already know. What is said
falls under standards of judgment with which we
are already acquainted. When what is said by
religious believers does violate the facts or
distort our apprehension of situations, no
appeal to the fact that what is said is said in
the name of religion can justify or excuse the
violation and distortion." (1*0
Well certainly, this is clear confirmation, once again,
that,for Phillips,the saints 'different world' is not a world
in which his belief 'creates' or 'discovers' or indeed deter¬
mines what are to be called facts. The facts are there -
given - known to all, and religious belief is a response to
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the facte. But what are the criteria by which we can determine
whether a given response is fantastic or not? Well, I presume,
obviously, responses are fantastic if they violate the facts,
violate what we already know, and the criteria as such must
then
"not be in dispute. For example,some religious
believers may try to explain away the reality of
suffering, or try to say that all suffering has
some purpose. When they speak like this, one
may accuse them of not taking suffering
seriously. Or if religious believers talk of
death as if it were a sleep of long duration,
one may accuse them of not taking death
seriously. In these examples what is said about
suffering and death can be judged in terms of
what we already know and believe about these
matters." (15)
It should be noted that similar arguments would illus¬
trate that a response was superstitious for Phillips. What
would characterise an act or response of devotion, on the
birth of a baby, to the Virgin Mary, as superstitious? If
there was
"trust in non-existent, quasi-causal connections:
the belief that someone long dead called the
Virgin Mary can, if she so desires, determine
the course of an individual's life, keep him
from harm, make his ventures succeed." (16)
But why should this response be superstitious? It is super¬
stitious because blunders and mistakes are being made
"regarding causal connections of a kind. We can
say that the people involved are reasoning
wrongly, meaning by this that they contradict
what we already know. The activities are brought
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under a system where theory, repeatability,
explanatory force, etc. are important features
and they are shown to be wanting, shown to be
blunders." (17)
First of all,some comment on these remarks. I do not
believe that those philosophers who have seriously examined
the problem of evil as instanced in suffering,and developed
theodocies, can be accused of not treating suffering seriously.
Surely, in a very important sense, it is because they have
treated suffering seriously that they have felt the need to
attempt to account for it, to explain it. To explain suffering,
to say that 'suffering has some purpose' is not to explain
away suffering, or not necessarily. Secondly,the kind of reli¬
gious responses which Phillips here labels as fantastic or
superstitious represent the beliefs of traditional Chris¬
tianity - the belief in a divine purpose or plan, the belief
in divine agency, the belief that men do survive death. I
would have thought that,for Christians,these beliefs would not
be characterised as responses, never mind fantastic responses,
but as beliefs in certain facts being the case; facts about
the world and God's relationship to the world on the one hand,
and facts concerning the eternal destiny of man on the other.
The fact that such religious beliefs may contain a factual
component isn't by itself sufficient to justify classifying
such beliefs as superstitious. And furthermore,whether or not
the factual components of such beliefs do 'violate' already
known facts is just what is in dispute. It is certainly not
commonly accepted. Indeed one suspects that,for Phillips,7
what would constitute superstition or 'fantastic connections'
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with regard to religious beliefs is not merely that the
factual components of such beliefs may violate 'already known
facts', but the very existence of factual beliefs either as
components of or necessary conditions of religious belief.
But if it is clear that the saint's 'different world' is
i
not a world in which the saints beliefs 'create the facts',
what then is the relationship between the facts and the reli¬
gious response? Is it perhaps the case that the facts in the
world, known by all, determine or even perhaps provide the
evidence to justify the religious response? To this claim
Phillips responds in the following manner:
"... it is also important to stress that the
birth is not evidence from which one can assess
the religious reaction to it. People react to
the birth of a child in various ways. Some may
say that the birth of a child is always a cause
for rejoicing. Others may say that whether one
rejoices at the birth of a child should be deter¬
mined by the physical and mental health of the
child ... Others may say that one should always
give thanks to God when a child is born ... All
these reactions are reactions to the birth of a
child, and could not mean what they do apart from
the fact of the birth. But it does not follow
that the various reactions can be inferred from
the birth, or that they are conclusions for
which the birth of a baby is the ground. All
one can say is that people do respond in this
way. Many who respond in one way will find the
other responses shallow, trivial, fantastic,
meaningless or even evil. But the force of the
responses cannot be justified in any external
way; it can merely be shown." (18)
The facts of the world,then,cannot provide evidence in
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favour of or against the validity of the religious response.
Religious beliefs or responses are not justified by, nor can
they be inferred from, the facts in the world. Allow me to
explore a little further the nature of these religious beliefs
or responses as Phillips sees them and their relation to the
facts ifi the world. Phillips states:
"To construe these beliefs (religious) as hypo¬
theses which may or may not be true is to falsify
their character. As Wittgenstein says: 'The
point is that if there were evidence, this would
in fact destroy the whole business.'" (19)
Now,in fact,Phillips believes it correct here to distin¬
guish between external and internal evidence for a religious
belief. The first kind, external evidence is illegitimate but
the second kind, internal evidence, is quite legitimate.
Phillips claims:
"For the most part, in recent philosophy of
religion, philosophers, believers, and non-
believers alike, have been concerned with dis¬
covering the grounds of religious beliefs.
Philosophy, they claim, is concerned with
reasonsj it considers what is to count as good
evidence ofor a belief. In the case of reli¬
gious beliefs, the philosopher ought to enquire
into the reasons anyone could have for believing
in the existence of God ... Many philosophers
who argue in this way seem to be seeking for
evidence or reasons for religious beliefs
external to belief itself. It is assumed that
such evidence and reasons would, if found, con¬
stitute the grounds of religious belief." (20)
®y 'internal evidence' or reasons for belief in God
Phillips seems to mean evidence or reasons which "come from
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within religion, they presuppose the framework of Faith, and
therefore cannot be treated as (external) evidence for reli¬
gious belief",(21) and thus 'have not interested philosophers
very much*. Examples of internal evidences or reasons given
by Phillips are the following. "'I have had an experience of
the living God', 'I believe in the Lord Jesus Christ', 'God
saved me while I was a sinner', or 'I just can't help
believing'." (22) We really do seem to have a motley collec¬
tion of 'reasons' here. Let us briefly examine them.
With regard to the first,'! have had an experience of
God*, it certainly does provide a reason for belief but I doubt
if it has simply or generally been regarded as an instance of
an 'internal' evidence or reason for belief in Phillips' sense.
Certainly, many philosophers have taken seriously the claim that
an experience of God could constitute evidence or grounds for
belief in God and have analysed the assertion accordingly.
With regard to the second, 'I believe on the Lord Jesus Christ',
this seems more like an affirmation of faith than a presenta¬
tion of a reason for belief,whether internal or external. It
is difficult to know why Phillips includes this assertion here.
'God saved me while I was a sinner' certainly gives a reason
for belief. It states 'I believe in God because He saved me'.
And it certainly seems to be an 'internal' evidence or reason
because it is only within the 'framework' of faith that one
could identify oneself as a sinner who requires saving. But
then a difficulty arises. Because,surely one already has to
see a use for, see significance in religious concepts and
terms,i.e. sin, save, God, before one can feel the need to be
saved from one's sins. But this is already to participate in
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the 'religious form of life' and»if this is so,it seems diffi¬
cult if not impossible to claim that one believes in God
because he saved one. Finally, 'I just can't help believing'.
It is difficult to see how this can be thought of as providing
a reason for belief - rather it seems to point to the cause of
one's belief. Indeed,if offered as a reply to the question,
'Why do you believe in God?' it would be talcen, rightly, as a
deflection of the question, as a refusal to answer either with
an internal or external reason or evidence.
However,despite our difficulties with Phillips' examples
of internal 'evidences' or reasons for belief in God,let us
reflect back to his original remark on the question of evidence.
There,we saw, he quoted approvingly Wittgenstein's remark that
evidence, if it could be obtained, would 'destroy the whole
business' of religious belief. (23) This remark wa3 prefaced
by the further claim that to classify religious beliefs as
'hypotheses', which, in the nature of the case, 'may or may not
be true', is to misidentify the character of religious beliefs.
"this
Now I take it that the force of the argument here is^ classify
religious beliefs as hypotheses and you will construe such
beliefs as beliefs for which evidence can or ought to be
sought, beliefs for which evidence is relevant. Now this is
certainly true,but are beliefs thought of as hypotheses the
only kind of beliefs for which evidence can or ought to be
sought? Can there not be beliefs about the facts for which
evidence can be sought,but such beliefs would be misdescribed
if they were thought of as hypotheses? Surely the belief I
have,that I am now holding a pen writing,is a belief about
what is the case, a belief for which there can be evidence7.But
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such a belief,which I hold, is surely not in any sense of the
term &n hypothesis! Further,if Phillips does have in mind the
claim that all beliefs.for which there can be evidence, are
hypotheses,then,such a claim would surely depend,as V. Pratt
has pointed out,on the
"extraordinary doctrine that all contingent
truths - truth 'dependent on what happens to be
the case' - are hypotheses only to be believed
tentatively by the sensible person. And this
would obviously be untenable." (2*f)
However,leaving aside the question of evidence and the
'facts' which constitute such evidence for the moment, let us
turn to note a remark of Pratt's, 'Hypotheses are only to be
believed tentatively by the sensible person'. What constitutes
a belief as an hypothesis is not only that a proposition is
put forward which can or must be tested in accordance with the
facts or the evidence /the 'objective''aspect of an hypothesis/
but also the tentative and conjectural nature in which it is
held or ought to be held by the person who holds the belief
/the 'subjective' aspect of an hypothesis/. How behind the
desire to claim that religious beliefs are not hypotheses for
which there can be evidence or lack of evidence,there is, if
you like, for Phillips,a 'deeper' concern. Hypotheses are
believed conjecturally, treated tentatively because the
'object' of the belief may or may not be true,but,for Phillips,
religious beliefs are not like this - they are absolute? for
the believer. (25) Heligious beliefs and responses are not
held tentatively, they are firm and unshakeable for the
believer and this is so because
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"the force of the responses cannot be justified
in any external way; it can merely be shown.
This is true of religious responses, the reli¬
gious beliefs which have an absolute character
or value." (26)
But what does it mean for a religious belief or response
to have an 'absolute character or value'? Phillips states:
"Beliefs are not testable hypotheses, but abso¬
lutes for believers insofar as they predominate
in and determine much of their thinking. The
absolute beliefs are the criteria not the object
of assessment." (27)
And they are the criteria of assessment insofar as, and here
Phillips explicitly follows Wittgenstein, they "regulate my
thinking. It is firm in that it is to this picture that I
appeal in such situations as these." (28)
First of all, is it enough to distinguish religious
beliefs from hypotheses to say that religious beliefs regulate
one's life? Surely Mitchell is correct when he claims that
the fact
"that religious beliefs have this regulative
function does not, then, in itself rule out
their being hypotheses, requiring like other
hypotheses the support of evidence. A man may
reasonably regulate his life according to a
hypothesis which he recognises to be open to
dispute. He may, indeed, stake everything on
it, in which case the belief would have for him
the absolute character upon which Phillips
insists, while still remaining, from a purely
epistemological point of view, a hypothesis." (29)
Further,surely the kind of phenomenon which Phillips is
obliquely referring to in this context is the notion or idea
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of commitment — 2lcommitment which in a Christian context can
be (a) commitment to a 'Person' or (b) commitment to believe
despite the facts! One believes, one's belief is an absolute,
because of one's trust in a 'Person', God; or. in holding fast
to one's belief one demonstrates the strength of one's belief,
one refuses to question one's belief despite possibly contrary
evidence-rather one holds to one's belief despite the facts.
To lose one's belief in this context because of the facts would
be a sign of weakness. Kierkegaard comes to mind here: "If I
wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent
upon holding fast the objective uncertainty." (30) However,it
is doubtful if Phillips can have either of these two senses of
commitment in mind. First of all,no use or mention is made of
the personal nature of the focus or object of worship,and,
secondly,it cannot be the case that the absolute nature of
one's faith is displayed in holding fast to one's faith
despite the facts, despite the 'objective uncertainty'.
Hather,for a religious person the "beliefs assess the facts"
(31) and they do this insofar as they are responses to the
facts and cannot be assessed as correct or incorrect by the
facts, keligious responses for Phillips are the 'criteria of
assessment not the object of assessment'.
For Phillips rather, following Wittgenstein in referring
to the entertaining of a religious belief or response as the
entertaining of a 'picture',
"believing in the picture means, for example,
putting one's trust in it, sacrificing for it,
letting it regulate one's life and so on. Not
believing in the picture means that the picture
plays no part in one's thinking." (32)
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Further,these religious pictures /myths, visions (33)7 insofar
as they are not "pictures 'of' anything" (3^) "were not esta¬
blished by means of evidence and ... cannot be overthrown by
means of evidence either." (35) To lose a religious picture
is not to lose it because of the evidence against, but rather,
claims Phillips,to lose it because it has become 'senseless',
"the belief is meaningless". (36)
It is interesting at this point of the discussion to
note that, in the context of an account of loss of belief in
religious pictures, Phillips feels compelled to say something
about Braithwaite's use of the term 'picture'. Two points he
believes, among others, serve to distinguish their use of the
term; the first concerning the importance of the religious
picture and the second concerning what is involved in saying
the picture is true. He states!
"When such moral or religious pictures do
decline, there is often no substitute for them.
This is why the role of such pictures is trivia-
lised if one considers them to be mere stories
which serve as psychological aides in adhering
to moral truths whose intelligibility is indepen¬
dent of them. This is to speak as if the
pictures were something people could use or
dispose of at will, according to whether they
served their purpose. It is also to speak as if
one had a notion of truth apart from the
pictures, by appeal to which they are measured.
I have been stressing, however, that for the
believer, it is the pictures that measure them.
Wittgenstein stressed in his lectures that 'The
whole weight may be in the picture'. The picture
is not a picturesque way of saying something
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else. It says what it says; and when the picture
dies, something dies with it, and there can be no
substitute for that which dies with the picture."
(37)
Braithwaite is wrong, and only in these ways,it should be
added, if he believes that the religious 'picture' or 'vision'
is contingently related to religious belief,and he further
errs if he believes the 'truths' represented by the pictures
can be understood independently of the picture.
Absolute faith,for Phillips,is then a way of meeting and
assessing events in the world - it is not a product of the way
things go. The 'truth' of religion cannot then depend on the
way things go in an individual's life. Religious beliefs are
not only not hypotheses,they are not any kind of factual belief
either (38); religious beliefs are not empirical propositions.
(39) They are not beliefs whose truth must "wait on a further
external check" CtO) or beliefs which would have a point "only
if certain consequences follow". (M) Perhaps the best way to
display what Phillips takes absolute faith to mean in a parti¬
cular context is to contrast it with what I take to be the
conception of faith represented in the central Christian
tradition - an account of faith which maintains that what
happens, how the world is, is of crucial relevance for the
significance and truth of religious belief. Phillips con¬
trasts his own account of absolute faith with such a
'traditional account' in the following terms. (Professor
Hick's account of religious belief iS taken as an example
of a 'traditional account of faith'.)
"There are some people the truth of whose reli¬
gion depends on the way things go in their lives.
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Things may not go well here and now, but unless
the ultimate facts, the eschatological situation,
are favourable in some sense or other, faith has
been a hoax and a failure. For Hick the kind of
difference religion makes to life is the
difference betv/een a set of empirical facts
being or not being the case. This belief is
illustrated by a comment I heard a mother make
about her mentally handicapped child: 'Only my
religious faith keeps me going. Of one thing I
am sure: my child's place in heaven is secure.'
On Hick's account, the mother would be saying,
•It is terrible for my child at the moment, but
he is to be compensated later on.' Her hope is
in certain facts being realised.
"Although I sympathise with the mother's hope, I
do not find it impressive religiously. Indeed,
I should want to go further and say that it has
little to do with religion, being much closer to
superstition. Two other mothers of mentally
handicapped children expressed what their reli¬
gious faith meant to them in very different
terms. One of them discussed the view that there
is a prima facie incompatibility between belief
in God and the terribleness of having a mentally
handicapped child. People kept asking her why
such a thing should have happened to her, to
which she replied, 'Why shouldn't it have
happened to me?' I found this answer extremely
impressive, although I suspect that it needs a
certain kind of religious belief to find it so."
(42)
For Phillips, any conception of religious belief which
sees the 'truth' of the belief being determined by what conse¬
quences are the case, which facts are realised rather than
certain others,is "a policy rather than a faith." (43) "Belief
- 305 -
in God," Phillips continues,
"is represented as a means to a further end.
The end is all important, the means relatively
unimportant. Belief in God has a point only if
certain consequences follow. This seems to
falsify the absolute character which belief in
God has for many believers." (kk)
"Hick's eschatological propaganda ... is a requi¬
site for compensation, and as such seems foreign
to deep religious faith." (^5)
And yet, as I have said, Hick's view represents the central
Christian tradition.
Phillips will have none of this. Religious beliefs are
not explanatory,testable hypotheses, not any kind of factual
belief, but ways of reacting to and meeting such situations as
portrayed in the example. Religious faith is a way of respon¬
ding to and indeed accepting good and evil in the world. "The
believer's hope is not hope for anything. ... It is simply
hope, hope in the sense of ability to live with himself." (*f6)
Absolute religious belief or faith or response finds its
ultimate expression in finding the world/life meaningful,no
matter how things are or go in the world - the religious person,
like the mystic in the Tractatus is content with the world, he
accepts fully without any reservations the brute factuality of
the world, he is in agreement with the world, he has no antici¬
pations. The truth of religious faith finds its expression in
the religious faith itself, its truth is not dependent on
certain factual conditions being, or not being,the case.
And yet, to mention truth is to raise a problem. What
could it possibly mean for religious responses or beliefs,as
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Phillips has characterised them,to be true? What could the





"If they ask, 'Is it true?' we should answer:
'It is so beautiful that it must certainly con¬
tain a lot of truth. As for knowing whether it
is, or is not, absolutely true, try to become
capable of deciding that for yourselves when you
grow up.'" (1)
In the middle of a passage concerned with the possibility
of discussion between religions Phillips introduces the
following comments on the topic of religious truth.
"One might object to the above analysis of dis¬
putes between religions on the grounds that it
stresses religious meaning at the expense of
religious truth. The analysis does not indicate
which religion is the true one. But why should
anyone suppose that philosophy can answer that
question? An opponent of religion might claim
that far from leaving the question of religious
truth unanswered, I have guaranteed that any
possible answer is favourable to religion by
insisting that the criteria of intelligibility
in religious matters are to be found within reli¬
gion. This objection confuses my epistemological
thesis with an absurd religious doctrine. To
say that the criteria of truth and falsity in
religion are to be found within religious tradi¬
tions is to say nothing of the truth or falsity
of the religion in question." (2)
Thus the criteria of truth and falsity are to be found
within religious traditions,but to say that, to make that
point, is to give no information as to which religious
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tradition is true and which religious traditions are false.
Now M. Durrant,commenting on such a claim,pinpoints an
alleged major difficulty in Phillips' thesis here. For
Phillips the criteria of truth and falsity in religion are
found within particular religious traditions,but, given that
account, how could it even make sense to talk of the truth or
falsity of a religious tradition or a religion as such? As
Durrant States:
"on his own thesis the notion of 'the true reli¬
gion* is not one which can be sensibly introduced.
Phillips only manages to get the idea of a true
or false religion introduced by emphasising the
mistake of his objector - of course it does not
follow from the thesis that what constitutes
religious truth in any one tradition is deter¬
mined by criteria internal to that religion,
that that religion is itself true, but neither
does it follow from the invalidity of the move
on the part of the objector that Phillips can
introduce the notions of truth and falsity in
connection with a religious tradition itself and
in order for him to allow that religion or a
religious tradition can be sensibly ajudged true
or false he must allow that the norm of truth or
falsity of a religion is to be found outside the
context of that religion ... What Phillips
should conclude from his criticism of the objec¬
tor ... is that a religion itself cannot be
either true or false." (3)
Now this seems like a sound objection,but before com¬
menting on its validity let me explore a little further what
Phillips means when he claims that we can talk of the truth or
falsity of a particular religion or religious tradition. What
does it mean to say that a religion is true? Why can a
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philosopher not attempt to provide an answer to this question?
If the question is an intelligible one why are philosophical
considerations irrelevant? Why can a philosopher not attempt
to discover who the 'true God' is,if any? Well,for Phillips,
this is because of
"the nature of truth in this context. To say,
'This is the true God,' is to believe in Him and
worship Him. I can say, 'This theory is true,
but I couldn't care less about it,' and there is
nothing odd about what I say. On the other hand,
if I say, 'This is the true God, but I couldn't
care less,' it is difficult to know what this
could mean. Belief in the true God is not like
belief in a true theory. To believe in the
former case is synonymous with worship ... In
morality and religion truth is a personal matter."
(k)
Thus,for Phillips,it would seem that to affirm a religion
or a religious tradition as true is not to impose criteria
from outside the religious tradition,or indeed from another
religious tradition,and use these criteria to assess the truth
or falsity of the particular religious tradition in question.
It is not to impose different or other criteria of truth and
ask from the standpoint of these criteria whether a particular
religious tradition is true. Rather,to affirm a religion as
true is to claim that the truths of a particular religious
tradition constitute 'truths' for the person making the claim.
* *
To say,This is the true religion,is not to assess the truth or
falsity of that particular religion from outside the religion,
by imposing criteria of truth other than those presented
within the religion, rather it is to affirm and accept the
religious truths of that particular religion, accept them for
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oneself as constituting; religious truths - 'in religion truth
is a personal matter'.
Now with this account in mind of what it means to affirm
a particular religion as true, let me return to Durrant's
criticism. Durrant's mistake, as I see it, is that he
believes, when Phillips talks of the truth or falsity of a
religion - criteria of truth and falsity in religion having
already been declared to be found within particular religious
traditions - that Phillips is talking about or discussing
alternative criteria of truth which can be found outside
particular religious traditions and which can be used to
assess the truth or falsity of particular religions. And of
course,if this were so, Phillips would be guilty of the incon¬
sistency pinpointed by Durrant. However Phillips,when he
talks of the truth of a religion,is not suggesting either (a)
that such criteria can be found or (b) if found,imposed, but
rather pointing out that what it means to talk of a religion
as true is simply to claim that the truths of a particular
religion constitute truths for me - constitute truths which I
can live by and which cam sustain me. Certainly there are
different understandings, senses of the word 'truth' involved
here. To ask a question about the truth of a particular issue
or doctrine within a religion, appeal must be made to the
criteria of truth and falsity within that religion*, but to ask
whether the religion itself is true, whether the truths of that
religion constitute the truth, is to ask whether anyone is
sustained by those truths, can accept them as his or her own,
can live by them. What is slightly surprising in Durrant's
case is that he fails to see this point here. For earlier in
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Ms article, when discussing and arguing against the Winchian
claim that 'criteria of intelligibility arise out of and are
only intelligible within ways of living', and thus apparently
cannot be applied _to ways of living as such, he makes the
following comment;
"But no one who maintains that modes of social
life can be judged intelligible or unintelli¬
gible wishes to maintain that ... the sense of
intelligibility is the same in both types of
cases. We may both allow that each mode of
social life has its own internal criteria of
intelligibility ... and allow that modes of
social life may themselves be ajudged intelli¬
gible or unintelligible ..." (5)
And by parity of reasoning the same point should apply or be
applied to Phillips' account of religious truth.
P. Sherry is another philosopher who finds difficulties
with Phillips' account. Unlike Durrant it is not the intelli¬
gibility, the very sense of applying criteria of truth and
falsity to religion,when such criteria have been defined as
being discovered internally in each religious tradition.which
troubles him, rather it is the problem of whether or not
Phillips' account is a rational one. As he states, commenting
on Phillips' original passage:
"At first sight all this reads like a gross con¬
fusion, amounting to little more than the
observation that different religions claim
different 'truths' and the logical comment that
they cannot all be really true. One is tempted
to retort that no one is asking Phillips to
arbitrate between different religions. The
whole point at issue is that if the truth claims
of different religions conflict and there seems
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to be no way in principle of resolving such dis¬
agreements, ... then the whole status of
religious 'truth' or 'knowledge' is called into
question. Phillips seems to be admitting the
difficulty and yet saying limply 'Well, it's
none of my business', apparently failing to
realise that it drives a coach and horses right
through his whole argument." (6)
thd.t,
For Sherry the difficulty ia/ix religious truth is to be dis¬
covered within particular religious traditions.,one is acting
irrationally if one then proceeds to claim that, although this
is so,of course not all these 'truths' are really true. But
this is to assume that what Phillips understands by the word
'truth', the sense of the word 'truth', is the same when the
different questions of truth arise. Phillips is not saying, at
one and the same time,'x is true' and 'possibly not x'; rather,
if we bear in mind what it means for Phillips to affirm a reli¬
gion or religious tradition as true,as opposed to what it
means to discover what are the particular truths of particular
religious traditions,^ we shall see that he is not guilty
of the 'gross confusion' as suggested by Sherry. In asking
whether a religion is true or false Phillips is not denying
the truths of any particular religious tradition but asking
whether the truths of a particular tradition are true for
anyone.
I think at this stage it would be useful to do two
things. First of all,elucidate more fully what Phillips means
when he claims that criteria of truth and falsity in religion
are discovered within a religious tradition,and secondly,
examine more closely what it means to affirm a religion as
true or particular religious beliefs as true*, how the word
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•truth' is used in this context. First of all however, how are
criteria of truth and falsity applied within religious belief
or a religious tradition?
Well in one obvious sense it is true within, for example,
the Christian religious tradition, that God is considered to
be a Trinity of three 'persons', false that he is considered
to be a single non-triune God. It is true that Jesus is con¬
sidered to be the son of God, false that he is considered as
merely a very good man. As Phillips states:
"There are various criteria recognised by reli¬
gious believers for what can and what cannot be
said to God and about God. It is not true that
there are no tests for what is truly religious.
Neither is it true that there are no tests for
what is to count as religious as opposed to
hallucinatory beliefs. Doctors do not look on
church-going or worship as symptoms of religious
mania. Furthermore, if a person says he has had
a vision, it does not follow that he has had one.
If a man said that God had told him in a vision
to eliminate all coloured people from the face
of the earth, this would not be accepted by the
Christian community as a vision from God ...
there are criteria within religious traditions
which distinguish between what can and cannot be
said, what is true and what is false, what is
deep and what is shallow." (7)
And,of course,with reference to Phillips' work and with parti¬
cular reference to the role the 'notion of community' plays in
his argument,I do not think it can be disputed that Phillips
can allow for such talk of truth and falsity within a religion
or religious tradition. However, as Phillips himself recog¬
nises, what has excited the interest of philosophers has not
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been disputed questions within a particular religious tradi¬
tion, i.e. whether God should be thought of as three persons or
simply one person, whether one kind or type of prayer is more
truly religious than another kind or type of prayer, but whether
it is the case, is true, there is a God who may or may not be
one or three persons.
Before commenting on Phillips' subsequent argument here
I think it should be noted that R. Trigg is doing Phillips an
injustice when hs claims that Phillips is deflecting the
question of the truth and falsity of religious claims as such
into questions concerned with what is and what is not truly
religious. For Trigg,
"there is a slide from the truth and falsity of
religious claims to what is 'truly religious'.
Phillips seems to think that in talking about
the latter, he is somehow answering the former.
Given his refusal to accept the possibility of
any external justification of religion, he can
only allow for talk of truth within religion,
and his emphasis on the criteria accepted by
religious believers follows from this. There is
then room for talk of true and false religion,
but none for talk of religion as such being true
or false. It is no use pretending that any
point about the truth or falsity of religious
claims can be fully met by merely distinguishing
between what is and what is not truly religious."
(8)
Now,to repeat the point,Phillips is aware that one
cannot deflect questions of the truth and falsity of religious
beliefs as such, into questions concerned with what is or what
is not truly religious. (9) Rather, what he is concerned to
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deny is, to take a phrase from Trigg, the possibility of
giving an 'external justification of religion as such'. As he
states,it "makes no sense to ask whether religion as such is
true or false, if what one has in mind is an external non-
religious or non-moral proof of the truth of religion." (10)
But what is meant here by an 'external non-moral, non-religious
proof of the truth of religion'? Well,I presume that Phillips
has in mind here a conception of religious truth - such as he
finds exemplified in the work of Professor Hick - where truth
is assessed in terms of its agreement with or deviation from
certain facts, certain factual situations. In religion however,
what is called a religious truth "has little to do with veri¬
fying whether a future state of affairs ... is to take place."
(11) Indeed to ask whether religious beliefs are true "as if
they were would-be empirical propositions is to ask the
wrong kind of question.." (12) "'Truth* as used in connection
with empirical statements is different from the notion of
truth often used in religion." (13)
Given,however,that Phillips has displayed how the word
'truth' is not used in religious contexts,what does he have to
say about its actual use; and here we come to our second task.
He states:
"I suggest that /the word 'truth' in religion/
is used in a way akin to that in which it is
used when we say, 'There's a lot of truth in
that', or the way it was used when Jesus said,
'I am the way, the truth and the life.'" (14)
Note that prefacing Phillips* comments here is the claim that
he is expounding how the word 'truth' is or would be used if
we were discussing what could be meant by claiming that there
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is a 'domain of religious knowledge and truth'. Thus to say-
that there i_s a domain of religious knowledge and truth is.,in
terms of the examples given, to express> one's commitment to
it. To see that there is such a domain of truth _is to see it
as true. Again, a further example:
"If a person says, 'I have come to see the truth
of the saying, that it is better to give than to
receive' ... if someone has come to see the truth
of it, that doesn't mean that he has assessed
generosity by means of some measure other than
generosity. What he has come to see is the
beauty of generosity. When he says there is a
lot of truth in it, what this comes to in practi¬
cal terms is that he strives after it and tries
to regulate his life accordingly." (15)
Note,first of all,the use of a moral example to elucidate the
nature and status of a religious 'truth', which should not of
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course be entirely unexpected. Secondly,note^ to say there is
a lot of truth in it is to 'strive after and regulate' one's
life in accord with the belief.
This commissive force of religious truth is best brought
out when Phillips discusses what it could mean to affirm reli¬
gious pictures as true. As Phillips states:
"It is of the utmost philosophical importance to
recognise that for believers these pictures con¬
stitute truths, truths which form the essence of
life's meaning for them. To ask someone whether
he thinks these beliefs are true ... is to ask
him whether he can live by them, whether he can
digest them, whether they constitute food for
him. ... If a man asks, 'I wonder whether it's
all true?' that question, if not confused, is
not a request for a proof, but an expression of
- 317 -
his doubt regarding whether.there is anything in
all this." (16)
In this manner Phillips displays how the word 'truth' is
used when what is in question is the use of the word 'true' in
religion,and it indeed reinforces and explicates his earlier
remark that in 'religion truth is a personal matter'. Now
there are obviously several objections to such an analysis.
The two objections with the most force are, first of all, that
Phillips has failed to adequately describe what it means for
religious believers to affirm their beliefs as true. That is,
for most religious believers, whether in the Christian tradi¬
tion or not,their beliefs are regarded as true, are regarded
as verifiable, as fact-claiming, as true or false in this
sense and more importantly so than any 'ordinary' factual
belief. Secondly, Phillips' analysis does seem to be incapable
of dealing with the fact, as Sherry points out,
"that different religions often have mutually
incompatible beliefs. Now if two people are
nourished by beliefs which contradict each other
then one of them is nourished by a false belief."
(1?)
Phillips does feel the force of these objections and
tries to answer them in the following way. Regarding the first
objection ,which Phillips reads as an objection that he is
denying the literal truth of religious beliefs or pictures,he
states:
"But what is literal truth in this context?
When we say that something is not literally true,
we can compare it with the context where it
could be literally true. But we are agreed that
this is what cannot be done in the cases I am
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considering ... we have no original context of
literal truth which the religious pictures can
distort or deviate from. Once we realise this
we are more likely to consider the use of the
pictures themselves. If we want to speak of
'literal truth* here, might we not say that the
literal truth is ... the role they played in
changing a whole way of life." (18)
The pictures can only intelligibly be described as not literally
true if it is intelligible to imagine a situation where they
could be conceived to be literally true. As, for Phillips,
If
this is not possible, on the one hand/therefore makes no
sense either to describe them as literally or not literally
true,but on the other hand they can be thought of as literally
true if by that is meant they can play a role in a person's
life. One can sympathise with W. D. Hudson's comment here:
"It is hard to dispel the feeling that there is
some sleight of hand in his argument here:
literally they can't be true, so figuratively
they can't be true, so literally they must be
true." (19)
One can hardly feel Phillips is serious in his argument here.
With regard to the second objection,and the possibility
of mutually incompatible beliefs being held by different reli¬
gions, Phillips is inclined to maintain two mutually
incompatible points. On the one hand he wants to say there is
no "objective religious norm" such that we, for example, could
classify "Christianity as being a better religion" (20); we
cannot adjudicate between religions. On the other hand he
wants to claim, quoting approvingly from S. Weil, that "the
various authentic religious traditions are different reflections
of the same truth",(21) which would seem to imply the
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existence of an 'objective religious norm' by which we could
identify the different religious traditions as being different
reflections of the same truth. Once again the argument seems
unsuccessful.
That the arguments are unsuccessful,however, is really
nothing to be surprised at,given the nature and analysis of
religious truth Phillips presents us with. For Phillips,reli¬
gious truth ijs subjective truth, religious beliefs are true
insofar as they 'provide nourishment', 'can be digested',
'constitute food' for the believer. Now Phillips L
is correct to point to the 'salvation aspect' of religious
truth.but where he errs is in claiming that the 'salvation
aspect' constitutes what it means to affirm a religious belief
as true. Rather, with regard to most religious beliefs,it is
because what they proclaim is believed to be true - factually
true - that they are adopted by their adherents as true beliefs
and can thus provide a 'salvation' for those holding them.
A. K. Nielsen states: "... religions such as Christianity and
Judaism do commit their adherents to the acceptance of certain
metaphysical claims." (22) Now if this is the case,can we
rest content with Phillips' claim that philosophy cannot indi¬
cate which religion is the true religion? Surely philosophy
must have some role here? I want now,therefore,to turn to
examine in more detail the role Phillips allots to philosophy






For Phillips it is crucial that philosophers never
"ignore religious criteria of meaningfulness", because once
this does occur "epistemological scepticism about religion is
inevitable." (l) Given that criteria of meaningfulness are
internal to 'religious language-games' it follows that the
role of philosophy "in this context is not to justify but to
understand." (2) That is, there can be "no question of a
general justification of religious belief, of giving religion
a 'sound foundation'," indeed the very idea of religion
"standing in need of justification is confused. ... Philosophy
is neither for nor against religion." (3) Rather,the role of
the philosopher is to seek to "clarify the meaning of religious
statements", but if he wishes to give an account of religious
beliefs "he must begin with the contexts in which these con¬
cepts have their life." (*f) One must distinguish 'philoso¬
phical understanding from religious understanding'. (5)
Philosophy must explore the 'depth grammar' of religious
belief, not the 'surface grammar' and the account it gives can
only be judged adequate according to whether "the given
account does justice to the complex network of behaviour which
the 'religious belief' may refer to." (6) Philosophy is thus
descriptive, "it is neither for nor against religion ... This
fact distinguishes philosophy from apologetics." (7)
Now what I want to examine in this chapter is,first of
all,what notion or idea of meaningfulness Phillips has in mind
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when he claims that the "criteria of the meaningfulness of
religious concepts are to be found within religion itself." (8)
Secondly, examine whether one can validly make a sharp distinc¬
tion, as Phillips does,between philosophical and religious
understanding and further claim that the role of philosophy in
this context is not to justify religious belief but rather to
describe it, understand it, give a conceptual account of it.
Thirdly, I want to examine whether philosophy, in either a des¬
criptive or other role, understood as providing a conceptual
analysis of the depth grammar of religious belief and concepts
in Phillips' sense,does not itself presuppose an independent
religious position, an understanding of the nature of 'true
religion'.
First of all,what notion or idea of meaning is Phillips
referring to when he claims that philosophers only at their
peril ignore 'religious criteria of meaningfulness'. Phillips
first introduces the topic in this way. He states:
"It is common among philosophers today to speak
of the liberation of epistemology from the
narrow criteria of logical positivism. 'The
meaning of a word is to be found in the way it
is used' has become a well-known slogan. Yet,
religion has benefitted little from the so-called
concessions. Philosophers stress that by 'use'
they do not mean any kind of use. ... Many of
the things religious believers say, according to
some philosophers, must be rejected as a misuse
of language. Apparently the mistake is due to
the fact that the way in which religious people
use certain concepts breaks the rules which
govern their use. These rules are determined by
the way in which we ordinarily use words." (9)
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What seems to be in question here is,(a) what is involved in a
word having meaning, and (b) particular difficulties pertaining
to religious concepts and terms such that the functioning of
these terms in the language seems to represent a 'misuse of
language'. Thus, as Phillips continues:
"In the judgement on the meaning of religion,
there is said to be a strain between it and
ordinary meaning. The strain need not be
obvious at first, and the rules need not be
broken in a dramatic way. This, we are told, is
why religious people fail to see their mistake;
their lapse into nonsense is gradual." (10)
To exemplify his point here Phillips refers us to the arguments
of Professors Flew and Hepburn (11).
Now the point,I think,that Professors Flew and Hepburn
were trying to make in raising these doubts about the very
intelligibility of religious language is the following. They
were not concerned to claim that religious language is totally
unintelligible - totally nonsense. Rather, religious concepts
and terms do have a use in language and there are recognised
rules governing the use of these terms in the language.
However,what is questioned is whether or not religious language
can claim, as it apparently does claim, to be fact stating.
That is, what is at issue is not grammatical intelligibility
but factual intelligibility. Are religious statements
factually intelligible? Do statements such as,'God loves all
men', 'God created the world', make genuine truth-claims?
Now Phillips feels that Professors Flew and Hepburn's
arguments can be met and can be answered by drawing attention
to the grammar of religious language, and in particular to its
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depth grammar. He states:
"Flew and Hepburn have paid too much attention
to the surface grammar of religious statements.
They have assumed too readily that words such as
'existence', 'love', 'will', are used in the
same way of God as they are used of human beings,
animate and inanimate objects. Depth grammar is
made explicit by asking what can and what cannot
be said of the concept in question. To under¬
stand the limits of what can be said about a
concept, one must take account of the context in
which the concept is used." (12)
That is,by paying attention to what words mean, how they are
used, how the sentences of which they form a part are used in
religious contexts, Phillips seems to be claiming, we shall be
enlightened as to the intelligibility, the meaningfulness in
this sense, of religious concepts and terms. Thus 'religious
criteria of meaningfulness* seems to refer to what is involved
in a religious terra having meaning^religious sentences having
a sense-in other words to 'word and sentence' meaning. And to
understand what can be said or not said about a religious con¬
cept reference must be made to the religious context in which
the concept has a use. 'The criteria of the raeaningfulness of
religious concepts are to be found within religion itself.'
Now of coursejin one sense^Professors Flew and Hepburn
may be displeased with this reply because what they particu¬
larly wanted to claim was that in an important sense religious
assertions did not meet a particular philosophical criterion
of meaning - a fundamentally empiricist criterion of factual
intelligibility. They would not want to deny that religious
concepts and terms must originally be viewed within the context
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of religious belief and religious assertions ,but what is in
question is whether religious sentences when used as statements
actually do make factual assertions, do make genuine truth
claims? However,I think Phillips would feel here that he has
met their pointy because,he might argue, in tracing out what the
particular depth grammar is of religious statements one would
see the inappropriateness of applying criteria of factual
intelligibility to religious statements. They are not that
kind of statement, they are not meant to be factually informa¬
tive.
However, to continue, not only are the 'criteria of the
meaningfulness of religious concepts to be found within reli¬
gion', but perhaps before one can understand what religious
concepts and terms mean one must actually be a religious
believer. Not only are the criteria internal but one cannot
understand what religious concepts and terras mean unless one
believes in God. And indeed, as we have seen, Phillips does
appear to claim that 'one cannot understand what praising,
confessing, thanking, or asking mean in worship apart from
belief in an eternal God'. Not only are the criteria of
meaningfulness of religious concepts internal but they can
only be known internally too, from the standpoint of a parti¬
cipant. One must believe in order to understand.
Now we have examined the problems involved here before
(Chapter 2, section iv) and found Phillips' reply to the
difficulties which attend any such position,surprising. That
is,if one must believe before one can understand religious
concepts and terms how can an account be given of a rejection
of religious belief? Now Phillips seemed to believe that an
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intelligible account could be given of a rejection of religious
belief here,but what his reply seemed to amount to was that
someone could reject religious belief insofar as they were
claiming they could see no point, no significance, no purpose
in applying religious terms and concepts; religious concepts
and terms were meaningless to them iii this sense. Now this
reply was surprising in that it seemed inadequate to the
difficulties Phillips was facing. To reject concepts and
terms as meaningless,in the sense of failing to see their
point, significance or function is of course possible,but it
is only possible if the concepts and terms, the words, are
understood to have a meaning, have a sense in the first place.
And it was this latter point which was in question with regard
to the example we were concerned with. If one must believe in
order to understand the meaning of the terms,how could one
possibly re.iect the belief and still retain an understanding
of the terms to enable one to do so? Further, we also saw
that Phillips* reference,in this context,to his distinction
between philosophical and religious understanding was of no
help in solving the problem.
Now it seems to me that one way to resolve this problem,
and to make a point which would be logically illuminating in
its own right, would be to claim that Phillips, when he refers
to the 'criteria of the meaningfulness of religious concepts'
being found within religion itself, is not making a point with
reference to what is involved in religious terms and words and
sentences having meaning,but is rather claiming that to see
the religious point, purpose, significance and function of
religious concepts - their meaningfulness in this sense -
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reference must be made to the practice and institution of
religion. rfo understand what prayer means f for example, is_ to
see the meaningfulness of the activity of praying the under¬
standing in this connection not being concerned with the
meaning of the words, terms and the sentences in which they
appear, that go to make up prayers. Let me substantiate my
claim here.
First of all, in further discussion of the points made
by Professors Flew and Hepburn, Phillips states the following:
"But might not the reverse be true, that the
lover of obscurantism is not the religious
believer, but the philosopher who does not ask
himself what religious people are saying, but
who talks in terms of what they must be saying,
if they are to be understood as saying anything
at all? I am not denying for one moment the
conceptual distinctions which Flew, Hepburn ...
have made. It is essential and important to
make them. But once having shown, as Hume
shoived conclusively on so many issues, what
religious activities do not mean, the next step,
surely, is to ask what they do mean, not to
doubt whether they can mean anything at all." (13)
Surely such talk as to what religious activities do or do not
mean is talk of the religious point or significance - the
meaning in this sense - of religious activities? Further,
while it is obviously true that this was not the issue which
troubled Professors Flew and Hepburn it is obvious that
Phillips is interpreting the problem in this way. Also,
Phillips claims that "religion is not some kind of technical
discourse" (1*+)^ indeed, insofar as "religious language must be
learnt, religion is public." (15) Again with reference to
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religious terms, Phillips st-ates: "and yet we know what we
mean by 'God', the word is used frequently enough and meaning¬
fully enough amongst us," (16) and further:
"to be able to come to see meaning in religious
concepts in the sense of being able to use them,
is to come to see what e.g. divine anger means,
is to come to view one's life in relation to the
will of God, and to recognise the horror of
estrangement from it." (17)
To come to see the meaning of a religious concept in the sense
of being able to use it,is a function of coming to see the
religious point or purpose of using or applying religious con¬
cepts, their meaningfulness in this sense. This is surely the
natural interpretation of this last passage. Or again,when
discussing philosophical understanding of religious belief:
"To say what is meant by belief in God, one must take account
of what God means to religious believers; one must have some
feeling for the game." (18) Not what the term 'God' means,
rather,one must take account of the significance or point of
worshipping God, the religious significance or point of reli¬
gious beliefs to religious believers. Further: "Let me try to
sum the matter up in this way: to try to see the meaning of
religious beliefs is not to advocate what meaning they should
have in people's lives." (19)
I think enough has been said to substantiate the point I
am making,but Phillips does provide us with one further
excellent example which by reason of its extreme importance is
worth giving some extensive attention to^ especially as it
involves an account of a rejection of religious belief — a.
problem which, as we have seen^ on the interpretation that by
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criteria of meaning being internal to religion is meant word
or sentence meaning^ appears to pose difficulties for
Phillips,, . \ •
The rejection of religious belief is taken from a story
by Tolstoy and concerns a young man praying in front of his
brother. His brother passes a quite innocuous comment on the
praying of the young man who, although he does not argue with
his brother or come to accept his brother's convictions, comes
to see the senselessness of his praying. Phillips comments on
this passage in the following wayi
"Tolstoy provides an excellent example here of
one way in which religious pictures and prac¬
tices can lose their hold on a man's life.
There is no talk of weighing evidence, etc., but
nevertheless there is talk of senselessness.
What made the practice senseless for the young
man was precisely what they had become in his
life, 'a habit retained from childhood'. That
is all the practice of praying had become, a
routine he went through before turning in at
night. ... He simply discovered in the way
Tolstoy describes, that the beliefs meant nothing
to him. ... The character of the religious prac¬
tices had never developed and the routine was
carried out in a context of indifference. The
practice was not nourished by other aspects of
the young man's life but was independent of them."
(20)
The practice of praying was seen to be senseless because it
was seen to be simply a habit retained from childhood. The
beliefs involved in the praying meant nothing to the young man
because the prayer was divorced from a context of religious
practice. Praying had become senselessynot because the word
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'prayer' had ceased to have a meaning,but because the young
man could not see the religious point or purpose or indeed the
significance, the meaningfulness in this sense,of praying.
Phillips continues:
"The point of interest for us, however, is to
consider what might happen when someone gives an
account of religious beliefs in such circum¬
stances. ... In one sense, the person remains
familiar with his religious belief, but in
another sense, the belief is meaningless for
him." (21)
The person is familiar with the religious belief insofar as he
can, for example, give an account of what the word 'prayer'
means, even what is involved in praying, But he can no longer
see the religious significance or point of praying", the belief
is meaningless for him in this sense. At this juncture
Phillips refers us to the writings of Kemp-Smith because he
believes Kemp-Smith provides an excellent analysis of what
often occurs in such situations,
emp
For K/'Smith,although people
"may have thrown over the religious beliefs of
the communities in which they have been nurtured,
they still continue to be influenced by the
phraseology of religious devotions - a phraseo¬
logy which, in its endeavour to be concrete and
universally intelligible, is at little pains to
guard against the misunderstandings to which it
may so easily give rise. As they insist upon,
and even exaggerate, the merely literal meaning
of this phraseology, the God in whom they have
ceased to believe is a Being whom they picture
in an utterly anthropomorphic fashion - a kind
of Being who even if he were able to say to
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1 himself, 'All things are due to me' would still
of necessity be pursued by the question, 'But
whence then am I?'" (22)
Thus Professors Flew and Hepburn's /J. presume Phillips
ernp
would believe the K/ Smith point applies to them as he is con¬
tinually accusing them of conceiving of God in an anthropo¬
morphic fashion/ difficulties with the factual intelligibility
of God talk arises not from their inability to see what the
word 'God' really means —the meaning of religious concepts and
terms are perfectly clear and open to them in this sense -but
rather from their inability to see the point or signi¬
ficance of participating in religious beliefs and activities.
The belief is no longer meaningful in this sense and because
this is so they ask questions with regard to the application
of the term 'God' which, if they only could see the point or
purpose of religious belief in God, they would see to be reli¬
giously inappropriate. They see the 'surface' as opposed to
the 'depth' grammar.
As Phillips states:
"the picture remains but divorced from its
former use. Since the meaning of the picture is
bound-up with its use, any analysis of the pic¬
ture in which its use is ignored and in which it
is seen as a would-be empirical proposition, is
bound to conclude that the picture is senseless."
(23)
The 'picture' remains, and even if one has rejected it
one still can remain 'familiar' with it, one can still know
the meaning of the terms and sentences used to 'express it';
but in another sense,as the picture is not used, one cannot
see the point or purpose or significance of applying the
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picture. The picture is senseless. That is, as the point or
purpose or: significance of the picture is involved in its
use, this constitutes what makes the picture meaningful, Xf
the picture is not used,this is because no one can see
any point or purpose in using it - the picture becomes sense¬
less in this sense. Given this account of what is involved in
a rejection of a religious belief,I think if we apply this
analysis to Phillips' earlier account of what is involved in a
rejection of religious belief, we can perhaps now see why
Phillips gave the particular analysis of rejection which he
did. Our mistake was to think that by 'religious
criteria of meaningfulness', or 'the criteria of the meaning-
fulness of religious concepts', Phillips is referring to
religious language as some kind of 'technical discourse' or
'esoteric talk'-; that he is concerned with the meaning of e.g.
the word 'God* or the meaning of the sentences that contain
the subject expression 'God'. Bather,when Phillips talks of
the 'criteria of the meaningfulness of religious concepts
being found within religion', what he has in mind is some such
that
claim as/it is only from the standpoint of a religious commit¬
ment that one will be able to see, for example, what it means
to believe in God; see the religious point, significance
or purpose of such a belief, see why, in this sense, such a
belief is meaningful. This, I think, is the Soke substance of
Phillips' claim here.
For Phillips, as we have seen, one must distinguish
between a philosophical understanding of religious belief and
concepts and a religious understanding of religious beliefs
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and concepts. To believe in God does not entail that one
should be able to give a philosophical understanding - a con¬
ceptual understanding or account-of one's belief, or indeed,if
one can give a conceptual understanding,that it be,in Phillips'
sense of the term,a 'good' conceptual account. In this latter
case two possibilities are open. One can either say
"that their philosophy reflects their belief, in
which case they believe in superstition but not
in God, or, taking the more charitable view,
that they are failing to give a good philoso¬
phical account of what they really believe." (2*0
The criterion for assessing whether an account is a 'good* one
or not is whether or not the account is consistent with the
roles of religious beliefs in people's lives. (25) Further,to
give a philosophical account of religious belief one need not
be a religious believer, though this is only true in a slightly
qualified sense. As Phillips states:
"One can see what kind of account religious
beliefs call for without understanding a great
deal about the religious significance of these
beliefs ... One can know the moves in chess
without having a love of the game, and to some
extent this is possible in philosophy of reli¬
gion: one can go far in saying what God cannot
be if any sense is to be made of religion at all,
but to say what is meant by belief in God, one
must take account of what God means to religious
believers; one must have some feeling for the
game." (26)
One suspects here that more than 'some feeling for the game'
would be necessary to give an account of what _is meant by
belief in God,because to see what is meant, i.e. understand
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t'ne religious significance and point of believing in God, is
Is
to believe in God. TYAspoint/made by Phillips himself at one
stage when be spates-: "There is no understanding of religion
without passion. And when the philosopher understands that,
his understanding of religion is incompatible with scepticism "
(27), "though I suspect the position Phillips would prefer to
hold here is well expressed in the following manner. "To make
philosophical observations about the relation of truth and sub¬
jectivity in the realm of faith is very different from actually
attaining this subjectivity or embracing this truth." (28)
And this is so because the mark of a philosophical
understanding is that it is an intellectual understanding
whereas a religious understanding is displayed in a believer's
life. (29)
The role of philosophy then is essentially descriptive;
the role of the philosopher is to give a conceptual account of,
for example, what it means to believe in God, Immortality etc.
Philosophy cannot prescribe, advocate, criticise or indeed
justify religious belief. Philosophy, we are told,leaves
'everything as it is'. Can one,however, rest content with such
an account of the nature and role of philosophical and reli¬
gious understanding? Is it possible to draw a sharp distinction
between what is said iji religion as opposed to what is said in
philosophy about religion? Is the position of 'Phillips'
philosopher', who fails to give a 'good' philosophical account
of his religious belief,but who yet may have, despite this, a
proper religious understanding of his belief, a tenable one?
Can in fact a firm boundary be drawn between what is said in
religion as opposed to what is said about religion? Is not
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religion and the religious understanding impregnated with
philosophical terms and concepts? It would seem impossible to
deny this,especially when one thinks of a religion such as the
Christian tradition. Is the religious understanding logically
independent from the philosophical understanding of these sane
beliefs? (30)
Curiously and interestingly enough,as has been already
pointed out (3*1 Phillips himself comes to doubt the validity
of the account he has given which draws a sharp distinction
between religious and philosophical understanding. As he
states:
"It seems that whatever philosophical views we
hold about perception or the nature of physical
objects, the way people see things, handle
things, etc., goes on regardless. But is it
like this where moral or religious beliefs are
concerned? Can one say that, whatever answers
are given in philosophy, the role which moral
and religious beliefs play in people's lives
goes on regardless? I do not think we can." (32)
Philosophy, which we are told may have already impregnated reli¬
gious belief, can have an influence in different ways - there
can, for example, be the influence of 'bad' philosophy. If
'bad' philosophy influences a person's beliefs this
"may lead to an obscuring of a religious under¬
standing which might have been possible otherwise.
Think, for example, of the philosophical equa¬
tion of immortality, and survival, eternity and
duration, both of which I regard as philoso¬
phically bad. To believe that the only meaning
that the immortality of the soul can have is
that of survival after death. ... If asi h-philoso-
pher, one believes that it makes no sense to
- 335 -
speak of surviving death. Because philosophy
has shown the belief to be meaningless, one is
forced to give it up." (33)
But 'bad' philosophy is not the only kind of philosophy.
Before acquiring a philosophical training a person may believe
that tqlk.of Immortality means talk of survival of death, but
philosophy will soon put the person right. But then,
"one may come to see the possibility of speaking
and thinking of the immortality of the soul in
another way. Now, here, when one speaks of
'coming to understand', 'coming to see it as a
possibility', 'coming to see the point of it',
/note the equation of 'coming to understand'
with 'coming to see the point of it *J is it easy
to draw a sharp distinction between a philoso¬
phical account of belief and believing, between
giving an account of the immortality of the soul
and believing in the immortality of the soul?"
(3*0
Here no definite or general answer can be given but,for
Phillips,
"it may be that in an individual's experience,
coming to see the point of religious beliefs is
at the same time the increase or dawning of
philosophical and religious understanding. What
I mean is that philosophical and religious under¬
standing go together here. The deepening of
philosophical understanding may at the same time
be the deepening of religious understanding." (35)
Indeed in such cases,for Phillips,it would be "artificial to
separate a person's philosophical reflections from his life."
(36) Thus,in this sense, philosophical and religious under¬
standing can go together. But note,however, that this can only
happen when the philosophy is 'good' philosophy; 'bad'
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philosophy does not have this role. As K. Nielsen notes:
"in lieu of a very extensive justification, it
is the grossest form of biased advocacy to
assert that 'good philosophy' justifies belief
by deepening our understanding of how it must be
a true account of the ultimate nature of things
while 'bad philosophy' criticises religious
belief." (37)
One may, however, want to hesitate before stating that the pheno¬
menon Phillips is referring to here is best described as
philosophy justifying religious belief. Still, the logical
independence of the religious understanding from the philoso¬
phical understanding has been denied and,to that extent, it is
difficult to see how Phillips could rule out either a
justificatory or a critical role for philosophy in relation to
religious belief and understanding. Philosophy is not merely
purely descriptive.
However I think there is a deeper point to note here.
Note that the equation 'bad' philosophy makes between immortality
and survival would not only be rejected by Phillips because
it is a product of 'bad' philosophy; rather it would also be
rejected on religious grounds too. Even if philosophy were to
deTnop-strate there was a sense in which one could equate immor¬
tality and survival,Phillips would still want to reject the
equation on religious grounds. As Phillips himself states
when discussing prayer; "True, I must have an idea of what
genuine prayer is before I can give a philosophical account of
it." (38) But he also claims his choice cannot be entirely
arbitrary or egocentric. "My idea of what prayer is must be
justified by showing how it takes account of the complex
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behaviour of religious believers in various situations." (39)
That is; appeal must be made to the 'depth grammar' of the
religious activity of praying. But what constitutes the depth
grammar of the religious activity of praying in this context7.
Surely it is only by reference to Phillips' own idea of what
constitutes 'genuine prayer', that such depth grammar can be
discovered and identified? Indeed,I think,we must concur with
P. Helm's reflections here:
"... Phillips is working with a substantive view
of religion which provides the rules of the
'grammar' of religion. This must be borne in
mind when he appeals to what the believer says;
it is less to what the believer says than to
what he says after this has been tidied up by
appeal to the depth grammar of religion." (kO)
Now,given the acceptance of this point, what can be said
of the alleged descriptive nature of philosophical under¬
standing? 'Philosophy is neither for nor against religion' -
this distinguishes 'philosophy from apologetics'. It seems to
be the case that philosophy,understood in Phillips' sense as
providing a conceptual elucidation or understanding of the
grammar of religious belief, presupposes a substantive religious
position. Philosophy in this sense is neither neutral, nor
descriptive,but prescriptive - stipulative as to the nature
and depth grammar of religious belief. It is not,as B.
Mitchell claims,that Phillips' position is determined "by what
he conceives to be philosophically tenable", (^1) but rather
that his analysis of the nature of the depth grammar of reli¬
gious belief and concepts itself rests and is based on a
'substantive view of religion'.
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SECTION 3 ".
Very, very briefly in this section I wish to look at
certain difficulties facing the Wittgensteinian approach, as
so far outlined, to problems in the philosophy of religion and
suggest an alternative strategy, which could be developed from
the 'later philosophy' of Wittgenstein, and applied to these
same problems.
The first question I want to pose is this. What sense,
if any, can be given to the idea that there is a distinctive
religious language?
"... the religious believer must be a partici¬
pant in a shared language. He must learn the
use of religious concepts. What he learns is
religious language; a language which he partici¬
pates in along with other believers. What I aim
suggesting is that to know how to use this
language is to know God." (1)
What particularly interests me,in the above passage,is
not what Phillips actually means when he claims,'to know how
to use this language is to know God' - that we have already
discussed - but the question of whether or not any sense can
be given to the claim that there is a distinctive language
called religious language. B. Williams suggests there could
be at least "five possible distinguishing marks" (2) to enable
one to distinguish one language from another. That is,
"one language might be distinguished from
another by the types of logical relation holding
within it; by its subject matter, by its use of
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technical terras, by its purposes; or more
generally by the activities with which its use
is associated."
Although he does add that
"it would ... be an illusion to suppose that
these five, even if they were satisfactorily
distinguished from one another, would be compe¬
titors for the position of the one and only
distinguishing mark of one language from another;
it is rather that from the inter-relation of
features like these that we can, in particular
cases, justifiably claim to distinguish one type
of discourse from another." (3)
Now, I believe that Williams is wrong here in thinking
that one can distinguish,in this kind of way,different dis¬
courses or languages from each other. I do not think it makes
sense to talk of religious language as being a kind of distinct
language within Language itself. Let me illustrate this point
with reference to Williams' five criteria. First of all,what
does Williams mean by 'logical relations', and is it conceivable
there are different types of logical relations holding within
'religious language'"? This would seem doubtful,for surely any
language ,to be even identified as a language in the first
place,must subscribe to some such general logical principles
as?for example,the principle of non-contradiction. Secondly,
it is claimed,one could identify 'religious'language' by
reference to its subject matter. Well I suppose one could say
that 'religious language' is language about God,but then not
all religions have as the focus of their worship,God and
further not all sentences which might be characterised as
'religious' are necessarily about God,except perhaps in a very
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oblique way. Thirdly, religious language, we are told, is a
distinct language because it uses technical terms. And it is
true there are technical terms used by religious people;but
(a) not all allegedly religious sentences make specific
reference to such terms?and (b) such technical terms as there
are, e.g. 'salvation', seem to derive at least part of their
meaning and the rules for their use from their employment in
non-religious situations.
Fourthly,we are told it is by 'its purposes' that we can
distinguish 'religious language' from 'non-religious' language.
Certainly it is true that people may have specific religious
purposes in mind when using religious terms and concepts - the
purpose may be to worship God, thank God, petition God. But
would one claim that the same sentence or sentences divorced
from such a context of praise and worship, for example, the
sentence 'God is a good and wise God', affirmed by a believer
in worship and stated by a philosopher about to consider the
traditional problem of evil, belong to different languages?
It seems unlikely that one would,and yet there is a point of
importance here to be noted,which I shall presently come to.
The fifth criterion offered is that we could identify or dis¬
tinguish 'religious language' from other languages by
reference to the 'activities with which its use is associated'.
This criterion is not unlike the fourth criterion and again is
open to objection. Certainly there are distinctive religious
activities; there is praise, worship, the performance of
certain rituals and language is used as part of the performance
of the religious activity. But surely it would again be
strange to claim that the exact same sentence or phrase,
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uttered within the activity of performing a certain ritual and
uttered outside the context of the ritual 0 God' uttered as
an invocation within a ritual and '0 God' uttered as an
expression of fear, alarm or disgust in a non-religious con¬
text/ would belong to different languages! Further, many
apparently religious uses of language occur outside such a
context (t-hough again, as with the fourth criterion,there is
an important point to be noted here^.
Thus I doubt generally whether we have been provided
with a set of criteria to enable us to distinguish 'religious
language' from 'non-religious language'. However, it may be
argued that I have been rather unfair to Williams in ray argu¬
ment because he was not suggesting that any one of the five
criteria would be alone sufficient to enable one to distinguish
•religious language' from 'non-religious' language: rather, he
was suggesting that it was from the 'inter-relation' of
features, such as the ones identified, that one could distin¬
guish one type of language from another. Now this is certainly
true,but I doubt whether Williams' case would be proved if we
did consider the criteria not singly but together. However I
do not,at this stage.wish to argue the point because it seems
to me that the whole direction of Williams' argument is mis¬
placed. That is, it seems to rae that the search for criteria
to identify or distinguish one language from another within
Language, in this case 'religious language' from 'non-religious
language', is futile, because it is a nonsense to claim that
there is such a thing as religious language - and certainly
our examination of Williams' criteria has not helped us to
distinguish 'religious language' from 'non-religious language'
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or given sense to the claim that 'religious language' is a dis¬
tinctive or different language, a separate kind of language,
father,there are distinctive religious uses of language /hot
of religious language , but of language/ This is why I said
there was a point to be noted when discussing Williams' fourth
and fifth criteria,because it seemed to me that it is by
reference to the purposes for which language is employed and
the contexts within which it is employed that we can give
sense to the claim that there are distinctive religious uses
of language.
But surely to talk of religious uses of language is to
talk of what Wittgenstein might call the 'language games' we
play with words and sentences - -the countless different
kinds of use of what we call ... "words", "sentences'" . it
is to spotlight the 'games' we play with language. And indeed
Phillips does refer to the term 'religion' covering a 'family
of language-games', (k) However,he does also refer to the
term 'religion' covering a 'language-game' (5) or 'language-
games/ (6) and indeed,at one stage,he refers to religious
belief as a 'language-game' (7) and,at another stage,to reli¬
gious beliefs as 'distinctive language-games'. (8) The term
'religion' also seems to cover a 'mode of discourse' (9) or
'religious discourse1.(10) Indeed;while noting what can be
covered by the term 'religion*, it might be useful to note that
religion is variously referred to by Phillips as a 'form of
life', (11) as being constituted by 'forms of life' (12) and
indeed on other occasions as 'a way of life' (13) or 'a mode
of social life'. (14) For Malcolm,too,religion is 'a form of
life'. (15)
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I think it might be interesting,at this stage,to pause
in my exposition and note how variegated a use is made of
the 'terms' 'language game* and 'form of life' by Phillips.
One would have thought from my exposition of the later philo¬
sophy of Wittgenstein that the term 'religion' would cover
'a family of language games' and that religion would include
several forms of life. However, as we have seen,'religion' can
also cover a 'language-game*, or 'language-games' and indeed
religious beliefs can be regarded as distinctive 'language
games'. Indeed,further, while Phillips does on one occasion
refer to religion as being constituted by 'forms of life', he
normally refers to religion as a 'form of life'. Now this is
important because terms like 'language-game' and 'form of life'
sure not philosophically neutral - they are not philosophical
innocents. For example,the term 'form of life' is not an
elliptical way of referring to a 'way or ways of life' -
despite the fact that Phillips seems prepared on occasions so
to use it. For Wittgenstein,'forms of life', 'language games'
represented the 'given',that from which philosophy must begin.
They can neither be justified, nor explained - explained away -
but are recognised to be there - 'like our life*.
Indeed P. Sherry,whose critical work in this area is
very important, states: "As regards the question of justifying
forms of life, Phillips' argument is vitiated by his regarding
religion as a form of life, and not as ... a collection of
forms of life, language-games etc." (16) However,it should be
noted that even if Phillips' argument is stated as Sherry
believes it should be, Sherry still is of the opinion that the
argument fails. As he states;
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"but it does seem a sensible question to ask why
people pray or worship, and why these language-
games are not a universal form of human behaviour
... surely it is a highly interesting question
for philosophy to ask why certain forms of
behaviour, linguistic or otherwise, are common
to all mankind ... while others are not so." (17)
And of course one would have to agree here because^as Sherry
claims, "there are some activities, responses, forms of life
and language-games which can be appraised as wholes". (18)
However, while agreeing with the general conclusions drawn by
Sherry in this area, I think Sherry is mistaken insofar as he
seems to imply on occasions that Wittgenstein's use of the
terms 'language-game' and 'form of life' was somehow more
'strict' than, for example, Phillips' use /Phillips being
thought of as deviating from some acknowledged 'normor
again when he denies that "Wittgenstein would have approved of
the use of the 'this language game is played' move as part of
a religious apologetic.f: (19) With regard simply to the first
point, as we have seen, Wittgenstein did seem to regard reli¬
gion as a 'form of life'. Certainly it is true that in the
Investigations the examples given there„ of forms of life' are
hoping and feeling certain, and examples of'language games'
given are asking, thanking, praying, etc., all of which would
lead one to suspect that for Wittgenstein the term 'religion'
should cover 'a family of language-games' and religion should
be a 'collection of forms of life'. Again,however,Wittgenstein
does refer to mathematics as being a 'language-game' and he
also speaks of special technical languages, e.g. descriptive
geometry and chemical symbolism, as 'language-games'. (20)
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What I do think impresses itself on one immediately is, as it
has been expressed, "the seeming heterogeneity of the collec¬
tion" (21) and one indeed wonders whether,given such terms as
'language-game' and 'form of life' with such 'loose' criteria
of application and identity, anything of philosophical impor¬
tance and substance can be said to depend on their use.
There is no religious language .we said, but there are
religious uses of language and for Phillips, we stated,this
assertion found its expression in the claim that the term
'religion' 'covers a family of language games'. But herein
lies a further difficulty and it is a difficulty which not
only faces Phillips but is also present in Wittgenstein's work
as well. Indeed it seems to me that there is an unresolved
dilemma underlying Wittgenstein's conception of language in
the later period of his philosophy. I have already stated the
'two poles' of the dilemma in my account of the use of the
terms 'language' and 'language-games' in Wittgenstein's later
philosophy but I have not, as yet, presented or stated the
dilemma. Allow me to do so now. On the one hand, with
reference to one model, 'a language game' can be considered a
complete language in itself and,on the other hand, and with
reference to another model, as being one of a 'family* of
language-games, which family of 'language-games' constitutes
language. That is, a language is, a family of 'language games'.
Now so stated this dilemma gives rise to the following
problem,which is well articulated by Rhees:
"When he (Wittgenstein) says that any language
is a family of language-games, and that any of
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these might be a complete language by itself, he
does not say whether people who might take part
in several such games would be speaking the same
language in each of them. In fact, I find it
hard to see on this view that they would ever be
speaking a language." (22)
Now this is true and Phillips, who considers Rhees' difficulties
here,also finds that they pose a problem for his position as
well. For Phillips:
"one reason why Wittgenstein said that each
language-game is complete is that he wanted to
rid us of the supposition that all propositions
have a general form. The different language
games do not make up one big game. For the most
part this is what I have been stressing in rela¬
tion to religious language games ... but it gives
rise to new problems. The different games do
not make up a game, and yet Wittgenstein wants
to say that a language, the same language, is a
family of language-games - that is, that this is
the kind of unit^ a language has. At this point th
there is a strain in the analogy between language
and a game." (23)
Now note two points here. First of all,Phillips admits
that his stress has been on the separateness of 'religious
language games' and,secondly, his conclusion that, given that
this is where his stress has been and the problems which this
can give rise to, a certain tension must exist in 'the analogy
between language and a game'. But how does this tension find
expression in relation to religious phenomena? Well it would
seem to be the case, as Phillips appears to be saying, that if
one insists on stressing the separateness of the 'religious
language-games', religious practices and behaviour cease to
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have any im-oortance and become themselves a kind of game. As
Phillips states:
"if we think of religious worship as cut off
from everything outside the formalities of wor¬
ship, it ceases to be worship and becomes an
esoteric game. What is the difference between a
rehearsal for an act of worship and the actual
act of worship? The answer cannot be in terms
of responses to signs, since the responses to
signs may be correct in th® rehearsal. The
difference has to do with the point the activity
has in the life of the worshippers." (2^)
It is only if religion relates to the world, takes the world
seriously, that religious beliefs can retain any force.
Indeed religion must have
"something to say about aspects of human exis¬
tence which are quite intelligible without
reference to religion: birth, death, joy ... The
connection between these and religion is not
contingent ... The force of religious beliefs
depends, in part, on what is outside religion."
(25)
What is interesting here is the claim that there is some
necessary connection between non-religious phenomena and reli¬
gious belief. How does this connection find expression? Is it
the case that the non-religious facts provide the justification
or the grounds for the religious belief? For Phillips, as we
might expect, this last point cannot be the case:
"To say that the meaning of religious beliefs is
partly dependent on non-religious facts is not
to say that these beliefs are justified by, or
could be inferred from, the facts in question."
(26)
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But,Phillips continues, and this is crucial and important here:
"having recognised, correctly,that the meaning
of religious beliefs is partly dependent on
features of human life outside religion, philo¬
sophers conclude, wrongly, that one would be
contradicting oneself if one claimed to recog¬
nise this dependence, and also claimed that
religious beliefs are distinctive language
games." (27)
However note now that we have a new adjective qualifying
'religious language games'. It is not merely the case that the
'games' are part of the 'given' but they have a 'distinctive
particular,unique role in the language - a role which is
separate from the function or role of all other sets of
language games' in the language. (28) Now here^what I say is
tentative,but it seems to me that we can partly trace the
origin, the genesis of Phillips' 'supernatural religion',
'supernatural God', back to the claim that the 'language-games'
of religion have a distinctive role, a distinctive and parti¬
cular job to play in the language. Let me very quickly explain
what I mean.
First of all,I am not denying a point made earlier,that
Phillips' account of the role of the philosopher plotting the
depth grammar of religious belief and language presupposes a
substantive religious point of view. What I am saying now,
however,is that once one distinguishes religious beliefs as a
set of 'language games' which play a distinctive role in the
language,separate from,in particular,the role played by
'scientific language games' or 'factual language games', this
limits what can and what cannot be said in the language; in
- 3^9 -
particular; what can and what cannot be said of God. Indeed,as
M. Charlesworth points out,we seem to be prevented from using
the concept of God "as though it were descriptive of some
entity, since this would be to confuse the functions of reli¬
gious language with that of scientific language." (29) And
one could continue the list. It may be, in fact is^ charac¬
teristic of certain 'religious believers' to claim that God
can intervene in a causal manner in events in the world,but
such a claim is not permissible for Phillips,for in making it
one is conflating the function of 'scientific language games'
with that of 'religious language games'; cause being a concept
which is only 'at home' in the 'scientific language game'.
Again,it is characteristic of certain religious believers to
affirm that by Immortality they mean survival of death or at
least that their belief in Immortality entails their survival
of death. But such a belief is not a 'proper' religious belief
for Phillips because it entails conflating,again,two very
different 'language games'; the games we play with facts,
'factual language games' /survival after death being considered
a fact7 which are a species of 'scientific language games'
and distinctive 'religious language games'.
It is not the case,as has recently been claimed, that
"Phillips rejects the efficacy of petitionary
prayer, the belief that life goes on beyond
death, the belief that God intervenes in the
world, the idea that the Last Judgement is an
event, and the belief that all evil will be made
right some day, in all these respects providing
clear evidence of the intrusion of science upon
his religion." (30)
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It is rather because of his unwillingness to allow science to
intrude - which would for Phillips permit a conflation of
•scientific language-games' with 'religious language-games' -
that Phillips rejects the above mentioned beliefs. Further,
if Phillips argues like this stressing the separateness
and the distinctiveness of the 'language-games of religion' -
the 'completeness' of the 'religious language-game'-aren't we
in a sense presented again with our old problem? The suggestion, that is,
that one can conceive of the 'language-games of religion', the
'religious language-games', as representing a distinctive
religious language? And,of course, in an important sense we
are.
But note, we only arrive at this position if we stress
one model of Wittgenstein's account of the nature of language —
the model,that is, which claims that a 'language-game' or set
of 'language games' could be considered a complete language by
itself. But there is another model, a model which stresses
that a language is a 'family' of 'language-games', that the
•family relationship' between 'language-games' constitutes the
kind of unity a language has. Now it is obvious that Phillips
and indeed Wittgenstein himself seem to have the first model
in mind when discussing religious belief and concepts,but
might it not be more fruitful to stress the second model? A
model which not only stresses the differences between language
games' but also equally stresses the sameness. As G. Downing
states when discussing the topic (31)'
"Obviously, along the lines of Wittgenstein's
original analogy, there may be members of a
family who are very different from each other,
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they are, respectively, similar only to a third
member; or there may be an even more extended
chain of resemblance. But there is no 'natural'
boundary between them ... - there is only the
third member whom they differently resemble.
Language-games, too, are not separated by boun¬
daries, only by other games that they differently
resemble. And, depending on the way you look at
it, you might as easily say 'joined' as
•separated'." (32)
One point which stands out as rather surprising,in both
Wittgenstein's and Phillips' account of the nature of religious
belief,is the basically essentialist approach they both adopt
and practice. For both,there seems to be only one grammar of
religious belief,only one genuine kind of religious belief.
Indeed the term 'superstition' is never very far from the lips
of either to characterise any kind of 'religious belief' which
they regard as suspect. Now of course there are reasons for
this approach, which we have already gone into, but what parti¬
cularly interests me at the moment is how /If I can be forgiven
for uttering such a strange assertioii7 characteristically
un-Wittgensteinian such an approach,as adopted by both
Wittgenstein and Phillips,is. We are not 'here taught
differences' but rather 'sameness'. Indeed wasn't it W. James,
whom Wittgenstein greatly admired, who said, when defining the
word 'religion';
"... the very fact that they (the definitions of
religion) are so many and so different from one
another is enough to prove that the word
•religion' cannot stand for any single principle
or essence, but is rather a collective name ...
We may very likely find no one essence, but many
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characters which may alternately be equally
important in religion." (33)
And what applies to the word 'religion1 applies equally to the
nature of religious belief and truth.
However,it may be argued ,while one may accept the point
you are making against Wittgenstein and Phillips,doesn't it or
couldn't it be applied equally well against a position you
have adopted during your argument? You have constantly com¬
plained that the account both Phillips and Wittgenstein present
us with fails to meet or cohere with 'traditional' Christian
belief and surely the assumption that either there is such a
'traditional belief', or a 'traditional account' of belief, is
equally an essentialist assumption - the assumption that there
is a kind of essence of, in particular, Christian belief. And,
it must be admitted that to this charge I would have to plead
guilty, although at the same time remaining convinced that
Christian belief does have an essence. But equally,it could
be argued,both Wittgenstein and Phillips would most likely
remain convinced that they too have discovered the essence of
religious belief.
And this, I think, is the crucial point. To affirm or
practice the 'second model' would be to eschew the search for
essences of religious belief, truth etc., but would rather
involve plotting the various kinds of sameness, difference and
relationships existing between religious beliefs and,not only
between religious beliefs,but also between religious and non-
religious belief. It would also mean,pace Wittgenstein and
Phillips,plotting the use of the terms 'fact', 'evidence',
'reason' etc., as they apply and are used in both religious
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and non-religious 'language-games' and not anchoring their use
to any particular or distinctive 'language-game' or set of
'games' - in particular,the 'scientific language-game'. That
at least would be a very small part of the programme and it
represents, I would argue, an alternative strategy which would
be in keeping with a more balanced development of certain
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